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This dissertation examined two policies to improve low-income women and children’s 
healthcare utilization: physician payments and cash transfer programs. Higher physician payments 
increase the supply of healthcare services while cash transfers increase individuals’ demand for 
healthcare services. Cash transfer programs can improve health outcomes, yet the extent to which 
they are a cost-effective strategy is largely understudied. Therefore, this dissertation examines 
three overarching research questions: 
1. Are Medicaid physician fees associated with access to substance abuse disorder (SUD) 
treatment among low-income women of reproductive age? 
2. Do economic preferences moderate cash transfer program effects on children’s health care 
utilization? Evidence from a randomized field experiment in Kenya.  
3. Are cash transfer programs cost-effective in reducing infectious diseases amongst orphans 
and vulnerable children in Kenya?  
 
Broadly, the evidence from these papers suggests that supply and demand driven public 
policies increase the use of healthcare services for low-income women and children. Specifically, 
higher state Medicaid physician payments improve access to SUD treatment for low-income non-
Hispanic Black women of reproductive age. Further, cash transfer programs improve the use of 
preventative healthcare services for children, and this impact is moderated by a caregiver’s time 
preference. Additionally, a cash transfer program is cost-effective in reducing illnesses amongst 
children compared to the status-quo. Policy makers should invest resources in policies supporting 




Chapter I: Introduction  
Approximately half of the people in the world are unable to access essential health 
services.1 Inadequate use of healthcare services has contributed to poor health outcomes, especially 
among women and children. Policy makers have been working to increase healthcare services to 
low-income populations using supply-side policies that improve payments to health service 
providers who treat low-income populations2 and/or demand-side policies that reduce the costs 
associated with accessing healthcare.3  
In the United States, programs such as Medicaid provide public health insurance coverage 
to over 75 million low-income individuals.4 With the passing of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
in 2014, a mandatory fee bump in Medicaid physician payments to align with higher Medicare 
payment rates was implemented to improve access to care for Medicaid enrollees.2 While there is 
evidence that the fee bump to the supply-side improved access to care for low-income 
beneficiaries,5 this fee bump was only mandatory for two-years and not all states have continued 
at the higher fee rates.2 As states determine their own Medicaid reimbursement rates, the variation 
in Medicaid fee rates may have implications for the supply of quality healthcare for enrollees 
across the US. On the other hand, demand-side policies such as those implemented in sub-Saharan 
African countries, have reduced or eliminated out-of-pocket costs for essential health services.6 
Given that demand for healthcare is more price elastic among lower income populations, such 
policies aim to increase healthcare use.6  
Nonetheless, significant supply- and demand-side barriers remain that limit the full 
potential of public sector delivery system reforms to improve the health of low-income 
populations.6  This dissertation will conduct three studies to examine the effectiveness of two 
policies to address supply-and demand-side barriers to healthcare utilization: physician payments 
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and cash transfers. An overview of how the key concept across these studies relates is presented 
in Figure 1. 
 






















 About 25 million adult women are covered by Medicaid,7 and their coverage includes a 
range of health services provided at low or no cost.7 Regardless, these women face barriers in 
accessing care, such as limited access to providers, in part due to providers hesitance to accept 
Medicaid patients due to low Medicaid physician payments.8,9 Given the importance of Medicaid 
for women’s health, changes in the coverage, program’s financing and structure have important 
implications for their access to care.7  
The first paper of this dissertation explored the association of Medicaid physician payments 

















disorder (SUD) among women of reproductive age,10 and the unmet need for treatment,11 this 
paper specifically examines the association between Medicaid provider payments and substance 
abuse treatment. Leveraging the state-level variation in physician payments, the paper utilized 
Medicaid claims data (2008 -2012) to examine the association of Medicaid provider payments on 
access to SUD treatment. 
In most developing countries, limited access to healthcare services is as a result of financial 
constraints preventing individuals from seeking necessary health care.12 Cash transfer programs 
are demand-side policies that have been used to improve the well-being of low-income individuals 
and families by removing them from extreme poverty.13 The increased household income works 
to remove or mitigate cost-related barriers to accessing healthcare use and result in increased 
demand.14 Addressing the cost-related barriers to healthcare utilization, particularly for children, 
is expected to increase the prevention and treatment of diseases that have caused high mortality 
rates in developing countries.14  
The second paper of this dissertation analyzed the extent to which cash transfers affect 
children’s healthcare utilization. The paper is based on the premise that income shocks affect 
healthcare use for children and these effects are moderated by the economic preferences of 
caregivers (i.e., risk aversion and discount rates). The study used impact evaluation data from the 
Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children program (CT-OVC) implemented in Kenya. 
The additional income from the cash transfer program is expected to increase healthcare demand, 
however, levels of economic preferences held by caregivers receiving these payments are expected 
to moderate this effect.  
In the third paper, the existing evidence that the CT-OVC program decreased infectious 
diseases (malaria and pneumonia) among children under seven years of age15 is extended to assess 
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whether the program is a cost-effective strategy. The study conducted an incremental cost-
effectiveness analysis to assess whether cash transfer programs, compared to the status-quo, are a 
cost-effective strategy in reducing infectious diseases amongst orphans and vulnerable children in 
Kenya. Assessing whether the program is cost-effective informs decisions by policy makers about 
which programs to fund, as there is an opportunity cost to other public programs associated with 
policies that expend limited resources on cash transfer programs.16 Policy makers role in 
promoting appropriate healthcare use is essential, especially for low-income individuals who face 
many barriers in accessing care. This dissertation contributes to the literature on whether physician 





























Chapter II: Are Medicaid physician fees associated with access to and quality of substance 
abuse treatment among low-income women of reproductive age? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the United States, approximately 90% of women with a substance use disorder (SUD), 
defined broadly as abuse or misuse of substances such as alcohol, opioids, heroin, cocaine and 
marijuana, are of reproductive age.10 Despite a slight reduction in SUD amongst adults aged 18 
years and older from 9.1% in 2008 to 8.8% in 2012,17  there has been a continued increase in SUD 
amongst women of reproductive age. For instance, opioid use disorder (OUD) amongst pregnant 
women has been on the rise since the 1990s.18,19 This increase in maternal opioid use has increased 
the incidence of neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS) and results in substantially higher healthcare 
costs for hospital births and in the first years of life.18,20–22 The risk of adverse birth outcomes such 
as fetal loss and preterm birth is also compounded in women with SUD.19 Women of reproductive 
age also face unmet SUD treatment. A recent study found low receipt (9.3%) of SUD treatment 
amongst women of reproductive age who needed treatment.23 There are a number of reasons for 
unmet treatment need, however treatment cost is a highly cited reason, such that low-income 
individuals may face significant barriers to treatment.24 Additionally, people with disabilities, who 
have a high prevalence of SUD, face lower treatment rates.25 Thus, low-income women of 
reproductive age and those with a disability are a key population at risk that require increased 
access to SUD treatment.21  
Medicaid plays an important role in SUD treatment as 12% of its beneficiaries have a 
SUD26 and it covers 40% of all US adults with OUD.27 In 2017, only a third of individuals with an 
OUD covered by Medicaid received drug or alcohol treatment.27  In a study of Medicaid enrollees, 
fewer than 47% of those with SUD who needed treatment received it.28 In addition to the unmet 
 15 
need for treatment for behavioral health outcomes,11 there is also limited participation of 
behavioral healthcare providers in Medicaid.29 Several studies suggest the low physician 
reimbursement rates, or fees, from Medicaid compared to other payers may hamper access to SUD 
treatment for beneficiaries.8,9 Based on the economics literature, providers may be driven by the 
profit motive such that they will provide more services to other markets with higher payments and 
less administrative processes (Appendix A1 describes the theoretical framework for how low 
payments in Medicaid may affect the supply of services to its enrollees). Consequently, assessing 
the role of physician reimbursements in SUD treatment is crucial. 
The role of Medicaid in SUD treatment for women of reproductive age intersects with other 
important populations who face significant barriers in health care access, such as racial and ethnic 
minorities. There are documented racial and ethnic disparities for SUD. Minorities face lower 
retention in SUD treatment,30 and those with an opioid use disorder (OUD) specifically, are less 
likely to be treated compared to non-Hispanic (NH) Whites.31 For instance, between 2008-2010, 
SUD treatment among people with past-year SUD, was estimated as 8% amongst NH-Whites, 3% 
amongst Hispanics, 7% amongst NH Blacks and 6% amongst NH-Asians.32 In another study 
amongst adult outpatient visits in the US, NH-Blacks were treated less frequently than NH 
Whites.33 Therefore, understanding the relationship between physician payments and access to 
SUD treatment for minorities is of importance in addressing racial and ethnic disparities. 
Nonetheless, most studies have found a positive association of physician fees on various 
health outcomes and access to health services.34–41 Higher Medicaid physician fees have been 
shown to increase the number of prenatal care visits and adequate prenatal care amongst pregnant 
women,40 and reduce adverse birth outcomes such as  preterm birth and low-birthweight.39 These 
improvements in health outcomes are thought to result from increased provider payment rates 
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increasing access to care for Medicaid enrollees.40 Similar findings have been documented among 
children, as there was an increase in take-up of insurance, preventive care visits, and having a usual 
source of care when provider payments increased.37,42 Other studies have found increases in 
provider payments are associated with increases in the number of private physicians who see 
Medicaid patients and outpatient physician visits.29,34 
However, only one study has examined the impact of Medicaid physician payment rates 
on SUD treatment.29 This study found that higher Medicaid provider reimbursement rates 
improved behavioral health outcomes (any mental illness, SUD, and tobacco use) but had no effect 
on receipt of any SUD treatment.29 This study was limited to survey data which may not accurately 
capture diagnosis or treatment of SUD due to self-reporting bias. In addition, this study primarily 
leveraged the Medicaid-fee bump, whose variation occurred over a short period of time which and 
may not reflect the differences in state policies.29  
Therefore, utilizing Medicaid claims data and based on the variation in state-level 
physician reimbursement rates across 16 states, this study analyzed whether Medicaid physician 
fees are associated with access to SUD treatment among low-income women of reproductive age. 
We hypothesized that higher state Medicaid physician fees will be associated with increased access 
to SUD treatment (the conceptual framework for this paper is provided in Appendix AI). 
Considering the racial and ethnic disparities in SUD treatment,23 we further examined whether this 
association varies by race and ethnicity to determine whether increased Medicaid payments can 
improve access to SUD treatment for minorities. We hypothesized that higher Medicaid physician 




2.2.1. Data  
The primary data source for this study is the 2008 - 2012 Medicaid Analytical eXtract 
(MAX) data.43 This is a collection of enrolment and claims data from Medicaid agencies in each 
state. The federal government partners with states to manage and monitor the Medicaid program 
and converts the data collected into an aggregated standardized dataset. Our data contained 
information for Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in a state through income and disability pathways. 
The Medicaid eligibility disability pathways include those with physical conditions (such 
as quadriplegia, traumatic brain injuries); intellectual or developmental disabilities (for example, 
cerebral palsy, autism, Down syndrome); and serious behavioral disorders or mental illness (such 
as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder).44 We used two files of the MAX data, the MAX Other 
Service (OT) file and the MAX Personal Summary (PS). The MAX OT includes claims records 
for the different Medicaid services received,45 while the MAX PS file contains a record for an 
individual eligible and enrolled in Medicaid for a minimum of one month or had a service paid for 
by Medicaid in a year.46 This dataset was additionally ideal for our analysis as it provided 
geographical identifiers to merge with state and county level characteristics obtained from other 
data sources.  
Additional data was obtained from the Kaiser Family Foundation,47 the American 
Community Survey48,49 and the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)50. The Urban 
Institute collects data on physician fee ratios using a survey conducted every two years collecting 
data from providers. The Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio is obtained from the Urban Institute to 
proxy Medicaid physician payments. The American Community Survey (ACS) provide state and 
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county-level characteristics. We include county-level income, education, employment, and 
urbanicity from the ACS. The NSDUH provides annual estimates of SUD prevalence in each state. 
 
2.2.2. Sample 
Data completeness and quality of the claims data was assessed with state-years not meeting 
data user checks in the MAX OT file. The sample included women of reproductive age (18 – 50 
years)51 enrolled in Medicaid through the disability and income pathways and had been diagnosed 
with SUD based on ICD9 codes to identify SUD [n=27,559 enrollee-years; Appendix AII provides 
ICD-9 codes)]. The sample included Medicaid patients in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. These states in 
the selected regions have varying SUD prevalence. For instance, West Virginia has the highest 
age-adjusted rate of drug overdose (52%) in the country, while the District of Columbia (DC) has 
the highest SUD prevalence (12% for adults aged 18 and older).52 There is also variation in SUD 
treatment need. DC has the highest unmet SUD treatment need while North Carolina has the 
lowest. 52  This analysis considered states near these states for comparability but also offered 
variation in SUD prevalence and treatment needs.  
The sample included women with continuous enrollment for one calendar year (n=17,487 
enrollee-years). The sample excluded those dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare  (n=2,740 
enrollee-years).53 As this study examined treatment utilization under Medicaid, health service 
utilization under Medicare claims could not be examined in the MAX data and therefore would 
not be a complete record of service utilization. We excluded data with missing county level 
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2.2.3. Access to SUD treatment 
Access to SUD treatment is the dependent variable defined as the receipt of any SUD 
treatment following a diagnosis of any SUD within a calendar year.54,55  We include SUD treatment 
in the analysis as a binary measure for receipt of any SUD treatment within a calendar year. 
Appendix AIII provides the CPT-codes used to define SUD treatment. 
 
 
Excluding missing data 
Final analytical sample (n=7,128 enrollees-years; 5,976 enrolees)
Excluding dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare (n=14,747 enrollees-years; 
12,582 enrollees)
Excluding less than one year enrollment (n=17,487 enrollee-years; 14.861 enrolees)
Women of reproductive age diagnosed with a SUD (n=27,559 enrollees-years; 24015 
enrolees)
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2.2.4. Medicaid Physician Fees  
The primary independent variable is the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio which represents 
the level of Medicaid fees in a state relative to the Medicare level. The Medicaid-to-Medicare fee 
ratio serves as a proxy for the level of Medicaid physician fees in each state. The Medicaid-to-
Medicare fee ratio is appropriate as the ratio varies by state (Table 1).  As treatment of SUD is 
increasingly being delivered in primary care settings, for instance Medication for Opioid Use 
Disorder (MOUD),29 the primary care fee ratios work as the best proxy from the other two types 
of fee ratios currently available (pediatrics and gynecology). The Medicaid physician surveys 
collected by the Urban Institute were only conducted in 2008 and 2012 during the observation 
period of this study. Following prior previous literature,29,35 we use a linear model to interpolate 
the fees for each state for the years these ratios are unavailable. The Medicaid-to-Medicare fee 
ratio is assessed as a continuous variable in the analysis.  
 
2.2.5. Covariates 
We control for variables identified in the literature as associated with SUD 
treatment29,34,35,56 and based on Andersen’s behavioral model (Appendix AI provides the 
conceptual model).57 Predisposing characteristics included the age, and race and ethnicity. Age of 
a patient at time of diagnosis was measured as a categorical variable (<25 years, 25-34 years, 21-
44 years, and 45+ years) while race and ethnicity were measured as a categorical variable (non-
Hispanic (NH) White, NH Black, Hispanic and other). Enabling factors included income, 
education, employment, and urbanicity. In the absence of individual-level characteristics, we 
included these as country-level factors.29,41 Income is included as a continuous variable measuring 
the average household income in the county. We log-transformed the income variable to 
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approximate a normal distribution. Education is measured as a continuous variable measuring the 
share of the population in a county with more than a high school education and employment is the 
share of the population in the county employed. Urbanicity was defined as the share of the 
population living in an urban area (or in a metropolitan area). County-level education, employment 
and urbanicity, as well as the state-level SUD variable, were divided by 10 to represent the effect 
of a 10-percentage point change of these variables on access to SUD treatment in our regression 
models. Need factors included the state SUD prevalence measured as a continuous measure and a 
binary measure for whether an individual had a comorbidity. A comorbidity was defined as having 
any other diagnosis besides an SUD diagnosis. Additionally, we included a binary measure for 
whether an individual was enrolled in managed care plan. We also controlled for state and year 
fixed effects to account for unobservable state- and year-specific time invariant characteristics that 
may affect access to SUD treatment. 
 
2.2.6. Statistical analysis 
The study analysis was based on the variation in Medicaid physician fees across states and 
over time. To estimate the association of Medicaid physician fees on the access to SUD treatment, 
we estimate the following linear probability model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡           (i) 
 
The dependent variable Y for individual i in state s and year t was analyzed as a function 
of Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio in state s and year t, controlling for individual X, county  and 
State 𝜆 characteristics are as described above. We divided the fee ratio by 10 for our regression 
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models for ease of interpretation of the 𝛽1 coefficient. For instance, if the ratio is 0.85 and increases 
by 1 unit, that would be an increase to 1.85, which is an increase of 100-percentage points. 
Therefore, dividing by 10 would make a unit increase as a 10-percentage point change.  The 
estimate 𝛽1 therefore represents the probability of an enrollee receiving SUD treatment given a 10-
percentage point increase in the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio. The State and Year is included to 
control for unobserved factors that are time-invariant factors across state and year, respectively.  
To assess whether Medicaid reimbursement policies can improve access to SUD treatment 
for minorities (NH-Blacks), we run stratified models by race and ethnicity. We additionally run a 
parameter stability to estimate the unrestricted and restricted model to test whether the parameters 
are different by race and ethnicity. The unrestricted model included two separate models for NH-
white and NH-Blacks as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, i=1,2…, N       (ii)     
𝑌𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝛼 +  𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑗𝑠𝑡,j=1,2…,M     (iii) 
The parameter stability null hypothesis that was tested across race and ethnicity was Ho: 𝛽0=𝛼0 
𝛽1=𝛼1, 𝛽=𝛼. The restricted model was as in model i, where i=1,2,..(N+M). The f-statistic was 
computed to test the null hypothesis using the followingmequation: 
𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑟 − (𝑆𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑅2)
2
(𝑆𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑅2)
(𝑁 + 𝑀 − 4)
 
 
Where SSR represents the residue sum of squares, SSRr  is the SSR from our restricted model and 
𝑆𝑆𝑅1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑅2 is the total SSR from equation (ii) and (iii) above. A significance level of p<0.05 
was used for all analysis. All analyses were conducted in SAS.  
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2.2.7. Sensitivity analysis 
Firstly, as we created linear estimates for the fee ratio in the years where they are 
unavailable, we conducted a sensitivity analysis using only the 2008 and 2012 data where the fee 
estimates are available. We conducted this sensitivity analysis to assess whether there are any 
differences in the estimates when we compare the results to those from the models using the linear 
estimates of the fee ratio for 2009-2011. Secondly, we examined an additional model to assess 
differences in SUD treatment by race and ethnicity when the fee ratio increases. As we observed 
the racial and ethnic disparities in SUD treatment, we run this sensitivity analysis to assess whether 
the effect of the fee ratio on SUD treatment is larger, smaller or the same depending on minority 
status. We run the following model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑀𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝐵 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡            
(iv) 
 
The variable 𝑀𝑠𝑡 is a binary measure equal to 1 if the Medicaid enrollee is a NH-Black 
woman. 𝛽3 represents the change in probability of an enrollee receiving SUD treatment by minority 
status given a 10-percentage point increase in the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio. A significant 
positive 𝛽3 would suggest that an increase in the fee ratio has a larger effect for minorities, while 
significant negative 𝛽3 would suggest that the effect is larger amongst NH-Whites. 
Thirdly, we examined the association of the fee ratio and receipt of any SUD treatment 




Table 1 provides the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio across 16 states included in this study. 
The ratio represents the level of Medicaid fees in a state relative to the Medicare level. For instance, 
in 2008, the Medicaid fee level in Arkansas was 23% less than the Medicare level while North 
Carolina’s Medicaid fee level was 5% less than the Medicare level. Oklahoma, on the other hand, 
had Medicaid fees that were the same as the Medicare level in 2008. The Medicaid-to-Medicare 
fee ratios vary across these states with Delaware having the highest fee ratio in both 2008 and 
2012. In 2008, the District of Columbia had the lowest fee ratio and in 2012 Florida had the lowest. 
 
Table 1: Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio 
State 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
United States 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 
Alabama 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.68 
Arkansas 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.68 
Delaware 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 
District of Columbia 0.45 0.54 0.63 0.71 0.80 
Florida 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.49 
Georgia 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.72 0.67 
Kentucky 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70 
Louisiana 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.75 
Maryland 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.69 
Mississippi 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.90 
North Carolina 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.85 
Oklahoma 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 
South Carolina 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.74 
Texas 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.60 
Virginia 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.74 
West Virginia 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 
Source: 2008 and 2012 values from the Kaiser Family Foundation47 while 2009-2011 were interpolated 






Table 2 provides the summary characteristics of the sample. Enrollees mainly had alcohol 
use disorder in 54% of their enrollee years followed by an opioid use disorder with 24% of their 
enrollee years. Hallucinogens was the least abused substance in their enrollee-years. 
Approximately 27% of women diagnosed with a SUD received any treatment for SUD in their 
enrollee-years. The sample comprised 49% white women mainly aged 35-44 years (37%). 
Additionally, there are racial and ethnic disparities in SUD treatment: 24.12% of NH Whites 
received SUD treatment, compared to 15.86% (p<0.05) of NH-Blacks and 34.01% (p<0.05) 

















Table 2: Sample characteristics, 2008-2012 
 Full sample (N=7,128 enrollee-years) 
Variable n % 
SUD diagnosis:   
Alcohol 3822 53.6 
Cannabis  121 1.7 
Cocaine 291 4.1 
Drug-induced mental disorder 847 11.9 
Hallucinogens 109 1.5 
Other 236 3.3 
Opioids 1702 23.9 
Received any SUD treatment 1934 27.1 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio* 0.76 0.14 
Age#:   
<25 years 
882 14.8 
25-34 years 1403 23.5 
35-44 years 2237 37.4 
45+ 1454 24.3 
Race and ethnicity#:   
NH-White 2937 49.1 
NH-Black 2216 37.1 
Hispanic 500 8.4 
Other 323 5.4 
County characteristics*:   
share of population with more than high school 
education   
0.68 0.06 
share of population living in an urban area    0.73 0.38 
share of the population employed  0.58 0.06 
average household income (ln($)) 12.86 0.46 
Comorbidity 3312 14.5 
Managed care  6661 93.5 
State SUD prevalence (%)* 22.14 1.79 
State of enrollment:   
Alabama 68 0.9 
Arkansas 126 1.8 
District of Columbia 553 7.8 
Delaware 890 12.5 
Florida 418 5.9 
Georgia 205 2.9 
Kentucky 220 3.1 
Louisiana 1892 26.5 
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Maryland 87 1.2 
Mississippi 934 13.1 
North Carolina 34 0.5 
Oklahoma 43 0.6 
South Carolina 1383 19.4 
Texas 275 3.9 
Virginia 68 0.9 
Year of enrollment:   
2008 3361 47.2 
2009 677 9.5 
2010 818 11.5 
2011 1017 14.3 
2012 1255 17.6 

















2.3.1. The association of Medicaid fees and SUD treatment 
Table 3 provides the association of the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio and access to SUD 
treatment. We do not find a significant association of the fee ratio and receipt of any SUD 
treatment. However, we find that the probability of receiving SUD increased with age. 
Specifically, compared to women aged less than 25 years, those aged, 25-34 years, 35-44 years 
and more than 45 years were more likely to receive SUD treatment [=0.11(p<0.01),  =0.15 
(p<0.01), and =0.18 (p<0.01), respectively]. Compared to white women, NH-black women were 
less likely (=-0.06, p<0.01) to receive SUD treatment while Hispanic women were more likely 
(=0.04, p<0.01) to receive SUD treatment. In addition, higher education was associated with 
higher receipt of SUD treatment (=0.004, p<0.01), while those that lived in an area with a high 
population of employed individuals was associated with lower probability of receipt of SUD 
treatment (=-3.28, p<0.01). A woman in a state with a higher SUD prevalence had a higher 












Table 3: Regression results for receipt of any SUD treatment 
 Full sample (N=7128 enrollee-years) 
    Standard error 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio 0.027 0.02476 
Age (ref: <25 years):   
25-34 0.105*** 0.01699 
35-44 years 0.154*** 0.01571 
45+ years 0.184*** 0.01691 
Race and ethnicity (ref: NH-White):   
NH-Black -0.059*** 0.01160 
Hispanic 0.040** 0.02051 
Other -0.031 0.02127 
Share of the population employed, county  -3.28*** 1.18324 
Share of the population with more than high school, county   0.004*** 0.00150 
Share of the population living in an urban area, county    -0.171 0.15519 
Average household income (ln($)), county -0.013 0.01546 
Comorbidity -0.002 0.01016 
Managed care 0.027 0.02545 
SUD prevalence (%) -0.20*** 0.02314 
State (ref West Virginia):   
Arkansas -0.609*** 0.10837 
District of Columbia 1.111*** 0.10846 
Delaware 0.441*** 0.07275 
Florida 0.097 0.07722 
Georgia -0.009 0.04193 
Kentucky -1.045*** 0.14707 
Louisiana -0.249*** 0.06019 
Maryland -0.821*** 0.13755 
Mississippi -0.164*** 0.05311 
North Carolina -0.469*** 0.10505 
Oklahoma -0.302*** 0.09088 
South Carolina -0.176*** 0.07860 
Texas -0.609*** 0.10837 
Virginia 1.111*** 0.10846 
Year (ref: 2012):   
2008 0.029** 0.00754 
2009 0.111 0.11289 
2010 0.312 0.28863 
2011 0.242 0.23362 
Intercept -55.55*** 15.48 
 30 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1; reporting liner probability estimates; Alabama and West Virginia missing since they 
are. a linear combination of other variables in the model 
 
2.3.2. The association of Medicaid fees and SUD treatment by race and ethnicity 
Table 4 provides the results of the association of Medicaid fees and SUD treatment 
stratified by race and ethnicity. We find that amongst NH-Black women with a SUD diagnosis 
enrolled in Medicaid, a 10-percentage point increase in the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio was 
associated with an 8% (p<0.01) higher probability of receiving any SUD treatment. Amongst both 
NH-Whites and NH-Blacks, we find that there is a lower probability of receiving SUD amongst 
younger women. For instance, compared to women aged more less than 25 years, those aged more 
than 45 years were more likely to receive SUD treatment [=0.17 (p<0.01) amongst NH-Whites 
and =0.13 (p<0.01) amongst NH-Blacks. We find a lower probability. (=-0.41, p<0.01) of a 
NH-White women in an urban area receiving SUD treatment. Finally, both NH-White and NH-
Black women in states with a higher SUD prevalence were less likely to receive any SUD 
treatment.  
The results of the parameter stability found an F-statistic of 766 as shown below: 
𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =
1183 − (638 + 307)
2
(638 + 307)
(3585 + 2479 − 4)
= 766 
 
This represents a p-value of 0.000, and we can reject the null that the estimates from the stratified 





Table 4: Regression results for receipt of any SUD treatment, by race and ethnicity 
 NH-Whites (n=4055) NH-Black (n=2819) 





Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio -0.025 0.04123 0.08*** 0.03067 
Age (ref: <25 years)     
25-34 0.11*** 0.02296 0.081*** 0.02809 
34-44 0.13*** 0.02200 0.128*** 0.02535 
45+ years 0.17*** 0.02435 0.134*** 0.02691 
Share of the population employed, county  -2.62* 1.57254 -0.854 2.34015 
Share of the population with more than high school, 
county   
0.003 0.00230 0.002 0.00337 
Share of the population living in an urban area, 
county    
-0.41** 0.20931 0.118 0.28149 
Comorbidity -0.022 0.01486 -0.019 0.01494 
Average household income (ln ($)), county 0.013 0.02038 -0.025 0.02943 
Managed care 0.049 0.03579 -0.012 0.03601 
SUD prevalence (%) -0.26** 0.03376 -0.14*** 0.03158 
State (ref West Virginia):     
Arkansas -0.87*** 0.15680 -0.33** 0.14908 
District of Columbia 1.044*** 0.23093 0.856*** 0.14990 
Delaware 0.645*** 0.11594 0.267** 0.09636 
Florida -0.0412 0.12470 0.235** 0.10119 
Georgia -0.091 0.06273 0.067 0.05577 
Kentucky -1.42*** 0.21434 -0.73*** 0.20135 
Louisiana -0.35*** 0.08618 -0.683** 0.19792 
Maryland - - -0.093 0.07202 
Mississippi -1.11*** 0.19489 -0.62*** 0.17118 
North Carolina -0.21*** 0.07713 -0.085 0.13435 
Oklahoma -0.47*** 0.14929 -0.04*** 0.11038 
South Carolina -0.44*** 0.12853 -0.683 0.19792 
Texas -0.35*** 0.11990 - - 
Year (ref: 2012):     
2008 -0.52*** 0.1215 0.057*** 0.0102 
2009 0.22 0.1263 0.002 0.1763 
2010 0.26** 0.1157 0.24 0.1823 
2011 0.24** 0.1222 0.09 0.1814 
Intercept -39.9 944.0 -113*** 21.922 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1; reporting liner probability estimates; some states are missing since they are a linear 
combination of other variables in the model 
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2.3.3. Sensitivity analyses 
In the analysis of the association of the Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio and SUD treatment 
using only the 2008 and 2012 data (Appendix A4.1), we find a 15% (p<0.01) higher probability 
of receiving SUD treatment associated with a 10-percentage point increase in fee ratio amongst 
NH-Black women. These findings are in line with the estimates from the main regression model. 
However, when we run a model including an interaction term (Appendix A4.2), we find a 
significant difference (=0.22, p<0.01) in the effect of an increase in Medicaid physician fees and 
SUD treatment by minority status. This means that increases in the state Medicaid-to-Medicare 
fee ratio affect SUD treatment amongst women, and this differs by race and ethnicity when we 
compare NH-Black women to NH-White women. The finding from the interaction model supports 
our main findings from the stratified model as we found a significant effect amongst the NH-Black 
sample and no effect in NH-White sample. Finally, our findings are robust to restricting the sample 
to only those enrolled in managed care as we find an 8% increase in the probability of receiving 




This study analyzed the association of Medicaid physician fees with access to SUD 
treatment among women of reproductive age in 16 states in the United States. Noting the racial 
and ethnic disparities in SUD treatment, where NH-Whites are more likely to receive SUD 
treatment compared to NH-Blacks we additionally examine whether increasing Medicaid 
physician fees can address the racial and ethnic disparities in treatment. We find that among NH-
Black women, higher Medicaid fees increase the likelihood of receiving SUD treatment. These 
findings contribute to the literature on physician payments and access to SUD treatment by being 
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the first to analyze this association amongst a key population (low-income women of reproductive 
age living with a disability) that face huge obstacles in access to SUD treatment in the US.  
Similar to a prior study,29 we did not find an association of Medicaid fees and SUD 
treatment when we examined this association amongst the full sample that included all race and 
ethnicities. However, when we stratify the sample by race and ethnicity, we find that higher state 
physician payments increase the likelihood of NH-Black women of reproductive age receiving 
SUD treatment, and this differs from the findings of the study.29 In addition to the stratification by 
race and ethnicity, this difference could be explained by the difference in sample as our study 
focused on low-income women of reproductive age with a disability compared to the prior study 
that examined the general population. Our findings show that the lower fees for Medicaid providers 
compared to other providers may be a barrier to accessing SUD treatment for minorities. As NH-
Black women face more barriers to accessing SUD treatment, we show that even a modest 
improvement in public service delivery will increase access for the more vulnerable populations. 
We find that younger women are less likely to receive SUD treatment. Specifically, women 
aged more than 45 years were more likely to access SUD treatment compared to those aged less 
than 25 years, 25-34 years, or 35-44 years. The finding that use of health services differs by age is 
contrary to other literature showing that access to care increases with age.34 Similarly, our findings 
on SUD treatment and women in areas of higher education status and urbanicity are not aligned to 
prior literature. These differences could be explained by the differences in the sample composition 
of this study. Further, there is no study to our knowledge that has examined access to SUD 





This study has several important limitations. Firstly, the data on the Medicaid-to-Medicare 
ratios are only available for the years 2008 and 2012. To address this limitation, we use linear 
models to estimate the fee ratios for the missing years (2009-2011). However, our main findings 
are robust to replicating our analysis using only the 2008 and 2012 data. Secondly, the study 
findings may not be applicable to the general population as our study sample includes women of 
reproductive age who were eligible for Medicaid under disability and income. However, this study 
is the first to our knowledge providing evidence on the association of Medicaid physician fees and 
SUD treatment among a key population of interest. The study sample includes women who were 
eligible for Medicaid under disability and income. Low-income individual’s generally have less 
access to healthcare services, and people living with disability (PWD) are a vulnerable population 
that experience additional barriers to SUD treatment. Therefore, this sample selection likely 
underestimates the number of individuals who receive treatment, and this makes our estimates 
conservative.  Our findings suggest that this key population may receive higher SUD treatment if 
physician payments in their states increased.  
Additionally, as with many diagnosis using claims data, there might be misdiagnosis 
related to having an SUD. Although we do not address this limitation, we anticipate that this 
limitation underestimates the treatment effect as those with more SUD diagnosis have more 
interaction with the healthcare system and would be more likely to receive SUD treatment. 
Therefore, our estimates are conservative, and we do not anticipate that this would affect our policy 
conclusion that higher state Medicaid fees can improve access to SUD treatment. We also note 
that our findings could be sensitive to the ICD-9 or CPT codes used in our analysis. However, we 
reviewed the literature on diagnosing and treating SUDs and used those codes mainly reported in 
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the peer review literature. We additionally cross-referenced the codes with those provided by the 
CMS. Similarly, our findings may be sensitive to the fee ratio used in our analysis as there are 
various fee estimates published. However, we do not anticipate that this will affect our policy 
conclusions as the differences in the ratios are only slight.  
Finally, this study does not provide evidence on the causality of Medicaid physician fees 
and SUD treatment for women of reproductive age and should be interpreted with caution. 
Assessing causality requires examining the effect of an exogenous policy change, such as the ACA 
Medicaid fee bump in 2014. Although we are unable to assess the impact of this change due to the 
period of data availability, this study provides initial evidence on the relationship between state 
Medicaid physician fees and access to SUD treatment amongst a key population of interest. Future 
studies could extend this analysis to a larger population (e.g., the entire Medicaid population), 
additional outcomes (e.g., regular receipt or the quality of SUD treatment), and other vulnerable 
populations (e.g., people living with HIV). 
 
2.4.2. Conclusion 
Limited provider participation in the Medicaid market, in part due lower fees compared to 
other payers, has been an ongoing concern for policy makers as this affects access to care for 
Medicaid enrollees.29 While there have been efforts to improve provider payments, such as the 
2014 Medicaid fee bump, to improve access to care for beneficiaries, significant state variation in 
Medicaid payment rates still exist.2,5 This study analyzed whether there is an association of 
Medicaid state fee rates and access to SUD treatment among women of reproductive age. Given 
the importance of Medicaid for women’s health,7 changes in Medicaid reimbursement policy can 
have important implications for their access to care. Our findings are important for Medicaid policy 
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as we show that increases in reimbursement rates for providers improves SUD treatment outcomes 
for low-income women. Specifically, we provide evidence that higher physician payments can be 
used as tool to address the unmet treatment need of minorities, especially among NH-Black 
women. Our study supports intervention in Medicaid reimbursement policy, as Medicaid 
disproportionately pay for services for SUD treatment and for women of reproductive age. Without 
changes to the Medicaid fee rates, the incidence of SUD among women may continue to rise 
















Chapter III: Do economic preferences moderate cash transfer program effects on children’s 
health care utilization? Evidence from a randomized field experiment in Kenya 
 
3.1. Introduction  
In Kenya, under-five mortality is high with approximately 41 deaths per 1000 live births.58 
The leading causes of these deaths include malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea which are preventable 
and treatable.59,60 The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends regular use of healthcare 
services to address treatable and preventable illnesses that cause the high mortality rates.61 
However, parents or caregivers face numerous barriers, such as financial constraints, that limit 
access to healthcare services for their children.12 Low income is a well-established risk factor 
associated with inadequate access to healthcare for children, leading to poor health, and increased 
under-five mortality.62–64 In developing countries where the majority of the people are poor, 
caregivers may not be able to afford transportation to access care or pay out-of-pocket costs once 
they get there, and the time cost of substituting work hours for healthcare visits is high.64 Cash 
transfer programs are a common strategy in developing countries to lift low-income individuals 
out of poverty such that the aforementioned barriers can be addressed, and child healthcare 
utilization can improve.14  
In 2007, Kenya’s largest social protection program, the Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) program was rolled out as a pilot by the Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Social Development.65 This cash transfer program was implemented in Kenya to 
promote human capital development through improving children’s health.66 Specifically, it aims 
to reduce under-five morbidity and mortality, particularly through increasing immunization rates, 
growth monitoring and uptake of vitamin A supplements.66 Immunization is crucial to prevent life-
threatening illnesses in children, such as polio, measles and tuberculosis.67,68 Growth monitoring 
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is a preventative measure involving routine measurement of the weight or height of a child to judge 
the physical conditions of child and provide the appropriate care when abnormalities are 
detected.69 Vitamin A supplements are crucial for children’s growth, and a deficiency leads to 
night blindness and increases the risk of illnesses and death.70 However, while the aim of the CT-
OVC was to improve children’s health and wellbeing, there were no conditions attached to 
receiving the cash transfer. The CT-OVC pilot disbursed approximately $10 million dollars to 
households in seven districts.66 The program has since been scaled up, and has been incorporated 
in the governments annual national budget.71 
Prior evaluations of the CT-OVC program find mixed evidence on the effect of healthcare 
utilization. For instance, one study found no effect on seeking diarrhea treatment for children under 
the age of seven years,15 while another found the program increased consulting an appropriate 
source of care when there was an illness.66 One limitation of prior evaluations of the CT-OVC 
program was the limited length of follow-up observations (two years) on children’s health and 
health care use.15  
Several other cash transfer programs have been implemented in developing countries, and 
similarly, there is mixed evidence on their effect on healthcare utilization.13,72–76  An evaluation of 
an unconditional cash transfer program implemented in Zambia found very limited evidence of a 
positive impact on children’s curative or preventive health service utilization.74,75 Although, a 24 
month evaluation of Zambia’s cash transfer program found a reduction in curative care for  
respiratory illnesses in children.77 Furthermore, no measurable impacts of this cash transfer 
program were found on maternal healthcare utilization in general.77 Yet, another study reported 
that among women that already had access to health care, cash transfers were positively associated 
with an increased likelihood of giving birth where a skilled healthcare professional was present.13 
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In a systematic review conducted in Latin America, conditional cash transfers were found effective 
in increasing the use of preventive services, improving immunization coverage, certain health 
outcomes and in encouraging healthy behaviour.76  
An important limitation with prior studies examining the impact of cash transfer programs 
on healthcare utilization is that they have not accounted for cash transfer recipients’ economic 
preferences and how these preferences might amplify or dampen the intended impacts of the cash 
transfer program. We address this gap in the literature and examined whether two measures of 
economic preference, time and risk preference, moderate cash transfer program effects on 
children’s healthcare utilization.  
 
3.1.1. Time Preference  
Time preference is the extent to which an individual discounts future benefits and costs 
such that their preferences for current consumption of a good or service is determined by their 
valuation of future consumption.78,79 When a caregiver receives a cash transfer, they may evaluate 
tradeoffs between the associated cost of healthcare utilization in the near term and their expectation 
of future costs and benefits for their children and families.79 Consequently, their decision to spend 
money and time for healthcare in the present period will depend on whether they value the future 
benefit of using the healthcare services. The extant literature supports the theory that time 
preferences affect health seeking behaviour.79 An empirical assessment of time preference is 
usually defined using a discount rate,78 where a lower discount rate suggests a preference for higher 
future benefits compared to immediate smaller ones. In a study among adults in the United States, 
those with higher discount rates used fewer preventive services such as mammograms, flu shots, 
pap smears, dental visits and cholesterol testing.80 Yet, the evidence on time preference and 
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healthcare use in sub-Saharan Africa is limited. The only related study was conducted in South 
Africa, and it found that individuals with higher discount rates were in worse health.81 However, 
as suggested by data from the US, time preference may relate to health via its influence on 
decisions about preventive care utilization. The economic framework for time preference and 
healthcare use is presented in Appendix B1.2. 
 
3.1.2. Risk Preference   
Risk preference reflects an individual’s preference for a certain payoff (or loss) to an 
uncertain one.82 Upon receipt of a cash transfer, a caregiver’s decision to invest in the child’s health 
depends on the value they place on the benefit they can derive from the cash compared to that of 
investing in preventive healthcare services to reduce the probability of loss in income associated 
with a child becoming ill. In addition, there are competing demands and an associated opportunity 
cost of investing the cash transfer in healthcare for a child. Therefore, as caregivers vary on the 
degree to which they are willing to pay for preventive healthcare services to reduce future potential 
income losses due to child illness, a caregiver’s risk preference may affect their health seeking 
behavior.83 Evidence suggests that being risk averse  (i.e., less willing to take risks) is associated 
with using more healthcare services.84–86 A study conducted in Nigeria found that individuals who 
were more risk averse were more likely to have higher malaria care-seeking behavior and have 
higher willingness-to-pay for the recommended care.87 Among elderly adults in Germany, less risk 
averse individuals were less likely to have physician visits, physical therapy and take prescribed 
medications.85 Similarly, other research examining nonelderly adults in the US found that adults 
who were more risk averse used more preventative services.86 The economic framework for risk 
preference and healthcare use is presented in Appendix B1.3. 
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3.1.3. The Present Study 
Despite the theoretical and empirical evidence that economic preferences may be 
associated with healthcare use, there is no evidence assessing how these preferences affect cash 
transfer program impacts on child healthcare utilization. To address this gap, we leveraged five 
years of evaluation data for the CT-OVC to assess whether caregiver’s time and risk preferences 
moderate the impact of cash transfers on children’s healthcare utilization. We hypothesized that a 
caregiver with a low discount rate who receives a cash transfer may increase their child’s 
healthcare utilization as they value the future benefit of healthcare utilization enough to spend 
current income on healthcare services, as opposed to using the income on goods and services 
providing smaller potential benefits sooner. Similarly, receipt of a cash transfer by a more risk 
averse caregiver may impact child healthcare utilization as they are more willing to invest in 
preventive care services to reduce the probability of future losses due to illness or the magnitude 
of loss in the event of an illness. Appendix B1.4 provides the conceptual model for our hypothesis. 
This study adds to the literature in two important ways. First, it contributes to the limited literature 
documenting the impact of cash transfers on children’s healthcare use for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Second, this study is the first to analyze the role of caregiver’s preferences in the relationship 
between cash transfer receipt and use of healthcare services for their children. 
 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Data  
Our study utilized impact evaluation data for the cash transfer for orphans and vulnerable 
children (CT-OVC) implemented in Kenya.88 The CT-OVC began as a pilot study in 2004. Prior 
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to its expansion in 2007, a baseline household survey was conducted using a longitudinal cluster 
randomized design study by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Oxford Policy 
Management.66 A follow-up survey was conducted after 24-months and 48-months, that is, in 2009 
and 2011 respectively.89 The evaluation took place in seven districts in Kenya: Garissa, Homabay, 
Kisumu, Kwale, Migori, Nairobi and Suba districts. These districts were identified by the 
Government of Kenya’s Department of Children’s Services (DCS) and scheduled for inclusion in 
the expansion of the CT-OVC.66 Four eligible locations in each district were selected as eligible 
to be part of the CT-OVC. However, financial constraints limited the roll-out of the CT-OVC to 
all locations simultaneously, such that only two of the four locations were randomized to the initial 
expansion and others would serve as the control locations.66  
Targeting of the households in the intervention locations was based on the standard 
program operation guidelines of the CT-OVC.66 Specifically, a committee of individuals in each 
community was formed to identify households based on selected poverty indicators and having an 
orphan or vulnerable child in the household.15 To reduce selection bias the list of households 
identified by the committee was reviewed by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Development Community to confirm eligibility using a questionnaire to rank households.15 In the 
control locations, however, targeting of households was based on a simulation that identified a 
sample of households that were comparable to those identified as eligible in the treatment groups.66 
The CT-OVC impact evaluation data collected individual, household, socioeconomic status and 
healthcare utilization characteristics in each wave. Additionally, in the 2011 survey, a module to 
collect individual economic preferences, time preference and risk preference, was included. 
Further, a community-level questionnaire was administered using focus group discussions in each 
wave. The community-level data is merged with the individual level data to include healthcare 
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fees, and facility and worker availability in the analysis. The baseline survey included a random 
sample of 2,759 households and approximately 15,500 individuals.88 A total of 2,255 households 
were surveyed again at follow-up in 2009 (wave 2), a retention rate of 82%.66 
 
3.2.2. Sample  
Our initial sample comprised 3,594 children aged five years and less and living in a 
household where a caregiver, identified as the household head, responded to the economic 
preference module in wave 3. We excluded observations where all outcome data were missing 
(n=201). The final analytical sample was 3,393.  
 
3.2.3. Child Healthcare Utilization  
Child healthcare utilization measures were created based on a combination of data 
collected from actual health records in the form of a health card and from self-reported measures 
collected during the time of the interview. A health card for a child is usually provided at a child’s 
birth when delivery happens at a health facility. Records of immunization and weight are usually 
recorded on this card at every healthcare visit.90 We created four measures that proxy general child 
healthcare utilization as binary variables for whether a child (i) has a health card (ii) was weighed 
by a healthcare worker (iii) sought treatment for diarrhea and (iv) received vitamin A from a 
healthcare worker. We also created measures for receipt of disease-specific vaccinations as four 
binary variables for whether a child received (i) any BCG (or tuberculosis) vaccination (ii) any 
polio vaccination (iii) any DPT/Hep/Flu vaccination and (iv) any measle vaccination. We 
additionally created two count variables for disease-specific vaccinations: (i) number of polio 
vaccination and (ii) number DPT/Hep/Flu vaccinations. As not all children’s healthcare utilization 
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outcomes variables were measured in each wave of data, sample sizes of regressions will vary 
slightly across outcomes. Specifically, seven of the ten outcomes were measured in all three waves 
and three were measured in two waves. Appendix B2 provides the list of survey questions used to 
create these outcomes. 
 
3.2.4. Cash Transfer Receipt: CT-OVC 
The primary regressor or independent variable was a binary measure to indicate whether a 
child lived in a household that was in the treatment group (i.e., in a community that was allocated 
to receive cash transfers via CT-OVC) versus whether they were in a control household. 
 
3.2.5. Economic preferences: Time Preference and Risk Preference 
Two measures of economic preference were analyzed in the study: Time preference and 
risk preference. As the economic preference module was only included in the 2011 survey, we 
assumed that time and risk preferences do not change over time for the following reasons. Firstly, 
prior literature has found that the CT-OVC has no association with either time or risk preferences.91 
Secondly, despite other literature finding that preferences change with age,81 caregivers in our 
sample are primarily older individuals and a short time period exists between baseline and follow-
up (five years). Lastly, the cash transfer represents about 22% of the households’ budget in the 
sample66 and may therefore not be large enough to shift preferences. Nonetheless, we also created 
a conservative measure of time and risk preference such that a caregiver is unlikely to move from 
being more risk averse to less (or having a low discount rate to high).  
A measure of time preference was created based on caregiver responses to a hypothetical 
scenario. Respondents were asked: “Suppose that you suddenly win money in the Lotto. If you 
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could choose between these payments, which would you choose?” Respondents were then given 
six options in which they were asked to choose between receiving an amount of money now or a 
higher amount one month later as follows: “1. Ksh 1500 today or 2. Ksh XX in one month”. The 
amount of money available today was kept constant at Ksh 1500, but the amount they could take 
instead one month from now varied to the following amounts:  Ksh 1250, Ksh 1500,  Ksh 3000, 
Ksh 4500, Ksh 7000, Ksh 9000. We exclude the ksh1500 future payment from the calculation of 
time preference as this option represents indifference, and we have no information to assess 
whether a participants choice represents patience or not. Inconsistent responses were set to missing 
(n=4), such as a respondent choosing to wait for Ksh 1250 but not to wait for Ksh 9000.92 
Following a prior study,92 we created a binary measure equal to 1 for a caregiver that always choses 
to wait for the future payment, such that our time preference variable is a measure for having a 
low discount rate. A low discount rate (time preference =1) indicates preferences for larger, later 
benefits over sooner, smaller ones.  
Risk aversion is a measure of risk preference that reflects an individual who prefers a 
certain payoff (or loss) to an uncertain one.82 A measure of risk aversion was created based on the 
following hypothetical scenario: Now I want to ask how you would respond in a hypothetical 
game. In this game you can choose to get Ksh 1500 or you can choose to a lottery that will give 
you a 50% chance of winning an even greater amount or a 50% chance of getting less than Ksh 
1500. Which of the lotteries would you prefer over getting Ksh 1500 for certain?” A. 3000 or 0; 
B. 12000 or 0; C. 7000 or 1000; D. 8000 or 0; E. 2000 or 1000. We created a binary measure of 
risk aversion as a binary variable equal to 1 for a caregiver who always chose not to take the 




Following prior research, we include individual, household and community characteristics 
that have been found to be associated with healthcare utilization. Individual characteristics include 
age, gender, education and marital status.13,93–98 The age of the child and age of the caregiver are 
both included as a continuous variable. The highest education of the caregiver is included as a 
categorical variable (no schooling, standard 1-8, Form 1-4, Secondary and above). The marital 
status of household head is measured as a binary measure (married/living with partner versus 
not).94 Gender of the caregiver and of the child are both included as a binary variable equal to 1 
for female.  
Household characteristics included the number of children living in the household and the 
number of rooms in the house.94–97 Considering the targeting of the CT-OVC for extremely poor 
households, we used the number of rooms in the household as a proxy for household wealth.99 
Community characteristics included distance to the nearest health facility, mobile clinic 
availability, the cost of vaccination and medicine availability at nearest health facility. 13,94,96,98  
The distance to the nearest health facility is created as a categorical variable (0-2km, 2-5km, 5-
10km, >10km). A binary measure for whether the nearest health facilities usually offer vaccination 
was included in the analysis. Mobile clinic availability was a binary measure for whether a health 
worker is temporarily available in that community to provide healthcare services. Community 
facility fees for vaccinations for children under the age of 5 was included as a (log-transformed) 





3.2.7. Statistical analysis 
We used the difference-in-difference approach, a quasi-experimental approach, to estimate 
the change in child healthcare utilization from baseline to follow-up for children in the treatment 
group, compared to the change in utilization from baseline to follow-up for children in the control 
group. The validity of the difference-in-difference approach relies on the parallel trend assumption. 
The parallel trend assumption means that the trends prior to the intervention are the same across 
treatment and control groups.100 While the assumption is not full testable, we compared the 
differences in children healthcare utilization between the treatment and control groups in the 
baseline period. We estimated linear probability models for our binary measures and OLS-
regression for continuous outcomes. The following equation was estimated: 
 
Yiht = β0 + β1CTiht + β2Postit + β3(CTiht ∗ Postit) + βX + λ + εiht           (i) 
 
In equation (i) the dependent variable Y is child healthcare utilization for individual i in 
household h and year t. CT is the treatment variable or indicator that child lived in a household 
that received the CT-OVC and Post is a binary measure to indicate the period after baseline. 𝛽3 is 
the difference-in-difference estimate and coefficient of interest that measures the impact of the 
cash transfer on child healthcare use. X is the set of covariates (at baseline value) as described 
above and 𝜆 represents district fixed effects. To estimate whether time or risk preference moderates 
the impact of the cash transfer program on child healthcare utilization, we estimated the following 
triple-difference model using both linear probability model and OLS-regressions:  
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Yiht = β0 + β1CTiht + β2Postit + β3Eh + β4(CTiht ∗ Postit) + β5(CTiht ∗ Eh) + β6(Postit ∗
Eh) + β7(CTiht ∗ Postit ∗ Eh) + βX + λ + εiht             (ii) 
 
In equation (ii) 𝐸ℎ reflects caregivers’ economic preferences (i.e., either discount rate or risk 
aversion). The triple-difference coefficient 𝛽7 therefore captures the effect of a caregiver’s 
preferences on the impact of the CT-OVC and child healthcare use. All other variables were as 
described for equation (i). All our regression models cluster standard errors at the household level 
to correct for multiple children in a household and multiple observations within a household 
overtime. A significance level of p<0.05 was used. All analyses were conducted using StataIC 
15.1. 
 
3.2.8. Sensitivity analysis 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses. Firstly, the outcomes used in our main analysis 
are a combination of data obtained from the health card and self-reported measures. Therefore, we 
run our analysis separately for measures created from the health card and from self-reported 
measures. Secondly, we test the sensitivity of our results to specification of the risk and time 
preference. Specifically, we use a continuous measure of time preference as the number of times 
a caregiver chose to wait for future payment and risk preference as the number of times the gamble 
was not chosen. Finally, there were baseline differences in demographic characteristics of the 
caregiver between the treatment and control, we created weights to estimate treatment effects that 
are more robust. Specifically, we estimated inverse probability weights as the probability of being 




On average, children in the sample were aged 3 years old while their caregivers were 53 
years old (Table 5). The sample mainly comprised caregivers who were female (56%), unmarried 
(54%) and had low levels of education (about 98% had less than secondary education). Households 
had about 2 children living in them, and majority (60%) were located about 0-2km from a health 
facility. About 70% of the sample lived in communities where medicines were always available at 
the nearest health facility and 52% in areas where healthcare workers were present for part of the 
week to provide health services. The average rates of child healthcare utilization ranged from 49% 
to 92%. Majority of children had received DPT, Polio and BCG vaccinations (>89%) but had low 
levels of receipt of Vitamin A supplements from a healthcare worker. Approximately 65% of 
children lived in households that received the CT-OVC. Overall, 12% of caregivers had low 














Table 5: Summary statistics, full sample (n=3393) 
Variable n mean SD 
Outcomes    
Health card (vaccination card, growth monitoring card) 2,793 0.67 0.47 
Received BCG vaccination  2,595 0.90 0.31 
Number of times DPT vaccination was received 2,289 2.37 1.24 
Received DPT vaccination  2,533 0.89 0.31 
Received Polio vaccination  2,600 0.92 0.28 
Number of times Polio vaccination was received 2,304 3.07 1.41 
Received measles vaccination  2,383 0.80 0.40 
Given Vitamin A supplements 2,079 0.49 0.50 
Sought treatment for diarrhea 684 0.79 0.41 
Any vaccination  2,695 0.90 0.30 
Independent variables 
   
Received CT-OVC 3,390 0.65 0.48 
Low discount rate 3,051 0.12 0.32 
Risk averse 3,393 0.64 0.48 
Covariates    
Child age  3,393 2.65 1.66 
Age of household head 3,385 53.68 17.00 
Female household head 3,393 0.56 0.50 
Highest education of household head*  
   
No schooling 1,365 40.87 
 
Standard 1 - 8 1,628 48.74 
 
Form 1 - 6 312 9.34 
 
Above secondary 35 1.05 
 
Married/living together 3,393 0.46 0.50 
Number of children 3,393 2.16 1.21 
Number of rooms in household  3,393 2.50 1.39 
Distance to nearest health facility* 
   
0-2km 1,978 59.74  
2-5km 880 26.58  
5-10km 274 8.28  
>10km 179 5.41  
Medicine availability at nearest health facility 3,295 0.70 0.46 
Cost of vaccinations (kSh) 3,305 0.70 0.46 
Mobile clinics available  3,273 0.52 0.50 
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Generally, healthcare utilization for children was higher in households that received the 
CT-OVC compared to those in households that did not, although there was no unadjusted 
significant difference in any of our outcomes at baseline, as expected with random assignment 
(Table 6). Although we did not test for the parallel trend assumption, this assumption is plausible 
since we found no significant differences in our measures of children healthcare utilization 
between treatment and control groups in the baseline period. There were also no significant 
differences in our measure of discount rate and risk aversion amongst care givers in the treatment 



































Table 6: Baseline characteristics between treatment and control, wave 1 
*** p-value less than 0.05 
 
  CT-OVC No CT-OVC  
  n mean SD n mean SD 
p-
values 
Outcomes:        
Health card 365 0.53 0.50 218 0.56 0.50 0.346 
Received BCG vaccination  347 0.87 0.34 210 0.82 0.38 0.169 
Number of times DPT vaccination was received 305 2.28 1.17 186 2.32 2.51 0.434 
Received DPT vaccination 333 0.85 0.35 214 0.83 0.38 0.761 
Received Polio vaccination  352 0.89 0.31 216 0.86 0.35 0.216 
Number of times Polio vaccination was received 297 3.11 1.52 192 2.84 1.64 0.070 
Received measles vaccination 315 0.84 0.37 184 0.83 0.38 0.679 
Sought treatment for diarrhea 135 0.76 0.43 76 0.70 0.46 0.391 
Given Vitamin A supplements 614 0.45 0.50 342 0.45 0.50 0.990 
Independent variables:        
Low discount rate 900 0.12 0.32 325 0.10 0.29 0.135 
Risk averse 1,008 0.62 0.48 361 0.64 0.48 0.437 
Covariates:       
 
Child age  647 2.56 1.65 361 2.50 1.65 0.545 
Age of household head*** 647 58.20 18.71 361 51.87 23.07 0.000 
Female household head*** 647 0.60 0.49 361 0.45 0.50 0.000 
Highest education of household head***  
   
   
 
No schooling 300 47.47  99 28.45  
0.000 
Standard 1 - 8 282 44.62  207 59.48  
 
Form 1 - 6 44 6.96  39 11.21  
 
Above secondary 6 0.95 
 
3 0.86  
 
Married/living together*** 647 0.39 0.49 361 0.56 0.50 0.000 
Number of children*** 647 2.28 1.63 361 2.06 0.96 0.020 
Number of rooms in household  647 2.53 1.52 361 2.37 1.19 0.075 
Distance to nearest health facility***       
 
0-2km 418 64.61  257 71.19  
0.000 
2-5km 139 21.48  82 22.71  
 
5-10km 45 6.96  15 4.16  
 
>10km 45 6.96  7 1.94  
 
Medicine availability at nearest health facility*** 647 0.91 0.29 361 0.82 0.39  
Cost of vaccinations (kSh)*** 647 1.83 5.24 361 3.02 3.81 0.000 
Mobile clinics available  647 0.50 0.50 329 0.50 0.50 0.770 
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3.3.1. CT-OVC impact on child healthcare utilization  
In our models analyzing the impact of the CT-OVC on our measures of child healthcare 
utilization, we do not find significant effects in any of our adjusted models (Table 7-8). Although, 
in the unadjusted models, we found that children that received the cash transfer were more likely 
to receive vitamin A supplements. Specifically, in the unadjusted model, children that received the 
cash transfer were estimated to have 0.114 (p<0.05) higher probability of receiving a vitamin A 
supplement from a healthcare worker, other things constant. However, this effect became 
imprecise when we include covariates in the model. Nonetheless, older children were less likely 
to have a health card, be weighed by a healthcare worker and receive any vaccination. However, 
they were also more likely to receive measles vaccination (=0.079, p<0.01). Children who had 
female caregivers had received more polio vaccinations (=0.419, p<0.01) and DPT vaccinations 
(=0.288, p<0.05). Similarly, if the caregiver was married/cohabiting the children had higher polio 
and DPT vaccinations. A caregiver with education above secondary was less likely to seek 
treatment for diarrhea when compared to those with no schooling.  
We found that children living in households where medicine fees are charged for 
vaccination were less likely to receive vitamin A supplement but more likely to receive any 
vaccination. Further, those that lived in communities where medicine was always available at the 
nearest health facility were less likely to receive polio, BCG, DPT and any vaccinations. The 
further a household from a health facility, the less likely the child was to have a health card, to 
receive vitamin A supplements and measles vaccination, and had lower polio and DPT 
vaccinations.
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Table 7: CT-OVC impact on proxy measures of healthcare use under-5, Difference-in-difference estimate 
 Has Health card Weighed by Health 
Worker 
Sought treatment for 
Diarrhea 
Received vitamins from 
a healthcare worker 
 Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
         
CT -0.0382 -0.0106 0.0189 0.00902 0.0582 0.0926 0.00118 -0.0199 
 (0.0400) (0.0495) (0.0305) (0.0385) (0.0584) (0.0804) (0.0336) (0.0491) 
POST 0.152*** 0.334*** 0.0308 0.0372 0.0679 -0.0415 0.00175 -0.0422 
 (0.0358) (0.0461) (0.0327) (0.0398) (0.0550) (0.0835) (0.0360) (0.0511) 
CT*POST 0.0145 -0.0149 -0.00574 -0.0197 0.0201 0.00364 0.114** 0.114* 
 (0.0450) (0.0502) (0.0412) (0.0492) (0.0697) (0.0848) (0.0454) (0.0599) 
Child Age  -0.0487***  -0.0735***  -0.00889  -0.00808 
  (0.00566)  (0.00592)  (0.0112)  (0.00650) 
Female Caregiver  -0.0315  0.0179  0.0590  0.109* 
  (0.0421)  (0.0508)  (0.0718)  (0.0579) 
Caregiver Age  -0.000714  0.000227  0.00203  0.000652 
  (0.000758)  (0.000750)  (0.00124)  (0.000936) 
Caregiver 
married/cohabiting   0.00545  -0.0289  0.0397  0.109* 
  (0.0414)  (0.0503)  (0.0739)  (0.0565) 
Education: ref: No 
schooling         
Standard 1-8  0.0511*  0.00930  0.0435  0.00439 
  (0.0283)  (0.0325)  (0.0427)  (0.0391) 
Form 1 -6  -0.0237  0.0424  0.0683  0.0852 
  (0.0431)  (0.0485)  (0.0783)  (0.0622) 
Above secondary  0.0501  0.0886  -0.796***  -0.0690 
  (0.0916)  (0.121)  (0.0839)  (0.120) 
HH size  -0.00609  -0.00110  0.00765  0.0111 
  (0.00973)  (0.0143)  (0.0139)  (0.0186) 
Number of rooms  0.00358  0.00375  -0.0370**  -0.00519 
  (0.00770)  (0.0110)  (0.0162)  (0.0127) 
ln(Clinic fees)  0.00174  0.000798  0.00192  -0.0072*** 
  (0.00178)  (0.00242)  (0.00289)  (0.00267) 
Mobile clinic availability   0.00557  0.00177  -0.0212  -0.0136 
  (0.0228)  (0.0300)  (0.0430)  (0.0352) 
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Medicine Availability   -0.0519**  -0.0278  0.0484  -0.0109 
  (0.0240)  (0.0364)  (0.0471)  (0.0387) 
Distance to nearest health 
facility: ref: 0-2km          
2-5km  -0.0108  0.00596  -0.0500  -0.0370 
  (0.0268)  (0.0344)  (0.0471)  (0.0400) 
5-10km  -0.0854**  2.24e-05  0.00112  -0.0647 
  (0.0408)  (0.0488)  (0.0603)  (0.0618) 
>10km  -0.0972**  -0.0584  0.0180  -0.126** 
  (0.0438)  (0.0655)  (0.0859)  (0.0628) 
District: Ref: Garissa         
Homabay  0.196***  -0.0729  0.0482  -0.0269 
  (0.0577)  (0.0665)  (0.0938)  (0.0793) 
Kisumu  0.250***  -0.0412  -0.0872  0.0117 
  (0.0551)  (0.0679)  (0.0906)  (0.0772) 
Kwale  0.423***  0.0915  -0.00303  -0.0457 
  (0.0483)  (0.0664)  (0.0942)  (0.0717) 
Migori  0.160***  -0.0472  -0.0441  -0.0788 
  (0.0570)  (0.0680)  (0.0899)  (0.0766) 
Nairobi  0.374***  0.0775  -0.107  0.135* 
  (0.0545)  (0.0653)  (0.0919)  (0.0759) 
Suba  0.255***  -0.113*  -0.0298  0.0256 
  (0.0561)  (0.0638)  (0.0987)  (0.0759) 
Constant 0.564*** 0.364*** 0.279*** 0.249 0.697*** -0.241 0.453*** 0.240 
 (0.0316) (0.126) (0.0244) (0.162) (0.0467) (0.262) (0.0269) (0.170) 
Observations 2,790 2,607 2,160 2,073 682 633 2,076 1,992 
R-squared 0.020 0.196 0.001 0.103 0.015 0.098 0.012 0.052 























             
                          
CT 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.048 0.267* 0.275 0.025 0.025 -0.075 -0.082 -0.001 -0.019 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.025) (0.036) (0.137) (0.177) (0.028) (0.041) (0.121) (0.238) (0.038) (0.040) 
POST 0.1*** 0.059 0.1*** 0.044 0.152 0.057 0.07** 0.046 -0.002 -0.093 -0.1** -0.1** 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.023) (0.034) (0.124) (0.176) (0.026) (0.040) (0.110) (0.238) (0.034) (0.036) 
CT*POST -0.030 -0.038 -0.026 -0.027 -0.142 -0.156 -0.010 -0.013 0.114 0.080 0.068 0.049 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.029) (0.038) (0.155) (0.190) (0.032) (0.041) (0.137) (0.225) (0.043) (0.041) 
Child Age  -0.006  -0.001  0.010  -0.000  0.008  0.1*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.006) 
Female Caregiver  0.027  0.035  0.4***  0.039  0.29**  0.038 
  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.152)  (0.036)  (0.122)  (0.036) 
Caregiver Age  -0.000  -0.00*  -0.003  -0.001  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Caregiver 
married/cohabiting   0.026  0.046  0.4***  0.045  0.2**  0.016 
  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.149)  (0.035)  (0.119)  (0.035) 
Education: ref: No schooling            
Standard 1-
8  0.013  0.011  0.080  0.029  0.081  -0.015 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.095)  (0.022)  (0.083)  (0.023) 
Form 1 -6  0.001  0.014  0.070  0.017  0.041  0.021 
  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.145)  (0.031)  (0.111)  (0.035) 
Above 
secondary  -0.002  0.022  0.389  0.063  0.228  0.069 
  (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.248)  (0.057)  (0.200)  (0.061) 
HH size  -0.007  0.001  -0.026  0.004  -0.013  -0.008 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.039)  (0.008)  (0.032)  (0.009) 
Number of rooms  0.006  0.006  0.024  0.005  0.011  0.011 
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  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.028)  (0.006)  (0.028)  (0.008) 
Ln(Clinic fees)  0.002  0.002*  0.001  0.00**  0.006  -0.00* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
Mobile clinic 
availability   0.019  0.009  0.047  0.018  0.096  0.025 
  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.082)  (0.017)  (0.065)  (0.021) 
Medicine Availability   -0.1**  -0.1**  -0.15*  -0.1**  -0.14*  0.005 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.089)  (0.020)  (0.070)  (0.023) 
Distance to nearest health facility: ref: 0-
2km            
2-5km  -0.015  -0.005  -0.130  0.002  -0.112  -0.1** 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.091)  (0.020)  (0.075)  (0.023) 
5-10km  -0.003  -0.018  -0.28*  -0.007  -0.2**  -0.1** 
  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.149)  (0.026)  (0.107)  (0.041) 
>10km  -0.061  -0.067  -0.4**  -0.08*  -0.3**  -0.1** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.159)  (0.043)  (0.153)  (0.048) 
District: Ref: Garissa             
Homabay  0.007  0.030  0.49**  0.013  0.328*  -0.053 
  (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.220)  (0.052)  (0.168)  (0.057) 
Kisumu  0.1**  0.1***  0.9***  0.1***  0.7***  -0.069 
  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.197)  (0.047)  (0.152)  (0.048) 
Kwale  0.2***  0.2***  1.3***  0.2***  1.1***  0.078* 
  (0.046)  (0.041)  (0.180)  (0.043)  (0.172)  (0.046) 
Migori  0.046  0.062  0.47**  0.016  0.278*  -0.020 
  (0.051)  (0.044)  (0.209)  (0.053)  (0.168)  (0.049) 
Nairobi  0.1***  0.1***  1.2***  0.2***  0.9***  -0.016 
  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.195)  (0.044)  (0.141)  (0.048) 




**  0.1**  
0.590*
**  -0.009 
























 (0.022) (0.110) (0.020) (0.096) (0.109) (0.547) (0.023) (0.129) (0.097) (0.500) (0.031) (0.101) 
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Observations 2,428 2,427 2,434 2,433 2,157 2,156 2,369 2,368 2,140 2,139 2,226 2,225 
R-squared 0.005 0.043 0.005 0.045 0.003 0.088 0.007 0.057 0.001 0.077 0.007 0.136 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.3.2. Time Preference effect on the impact of CT-OVC on child healthcare utilization  
On average, there was a significant positive program impact of the cash transfer on 
healthcare utilization for children that had caregivers with a low discount rate compared to those 
with a higher discount rate (Table 9-10). Time preference moderated the impact of the CT-OVC 
on child healthcare utilization in five of the ten measures of child healthcare utilization in both the 
adjusted and unadjusted models in the expected direction. In the adjusted model for general 
healthcare use measure, children that received the cash transfer and had a caregiver with a low 
discount rate were estimated to have a 0.398 (p<0.01) higher probability of having a health card, 
other things constant. Despite these findings supporting our hypothesis that time discount rates of 
caregivers moderate the cash transfer impacts on child healthcare utilization, the estimate is 
suggesting a huge difference in the probability that may not be plausible. In addition, the other 
estimates from the triple-difference model are counterintuitive. For instance, children in the post 
period who had a caregiver and those with a low discount rate had a high probability of having a 
healthcare card [=0.312 (p<0.01) and =0.362 (p<0.01), respectively]. However, those children 
in the post period and with a caregiver with a low discount rate had a lower probability (=-0.297, 
p<0.01) of having a healthcare card.  
Of the six measures on disease specific vaccinations, we find a significant effect amongst 
four of our measures (Table 10). In the unadjusted models, children who lived in a household that 
received the CT-OVC and had a caregiver with a low discount rate were more likely to receive a 
vaccination for BCG, polio and DPT. This effect was significant even after we controlled for other 
variables. Specifically, children that received the cash transfer and had a caregiver with a low 
discount rate were more likely to receive a BCG vaccination (=0.262, p<0.05), polio vaccination 
(=0.269, p<0.01) and DPT vaccination (=0.331, p<0.01). In addition, children who lived in a 
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household that received the CT-OVC and had a caregiver with a low discount rate also had a higher 
number of polio vaccinations (=1.117, p<0.05) on average. The estimates from the models on 
disease specific measures are also counterintuitive. The counterintuitive findings could be 
explained by the small sample size (n<18) of children in the baseline period that did not receive 
the CT-OVC and had a caregiver who had a low discount rate but had the highest probability of 
experiencing the outcome. This results in a negative difference when compared to those that 










Table 9: Time Preference Effect on CT-OVC impact on general measures of healthcare use under-5; Triple-Difference estimates 
 Has Health card Sought treatment for 
Diarrhea 
Weighed by Health 
Worker 
Received vitamins from 
a healthcare worker 
 Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
         
CT -0.00713 0.000228 -0.00871 0.0198 0.00829 -0.0180 0.00264 -0.00210 
 (0.0449) (0.0548) (0.0674) (0.0896) (0.0374) (0.0538) (0.0342) (0.0431) 
Time Preference 0.283** 0.312*** -0.491*** -0.312 -0.0202 -0.0869 0.0442 0.0222 
 (0.119) (0.108) (0.154) (0.221) (0.0953) (0.120) (0.0870) (0.0954) 
Post  0.173*** 0.362*** 0.0313 -0.117 -0.00287 -0.0613 0.0532 0.0527 
 (0.0399) (0.0512) (0.0630) (0.0859) (0.0397) (0.0553) (0.0361) (0.0456) 
CT*Post -0.0214 -0.0439 0.0770 0.0923 0.142*** 0.150** 0.00210 -0.00970 
 (0.0505) (0.0562) (0.0806) (0.0917) (0.0505) (0.0655) (0.0460) (0.0553) 
CT* Time -0.351** -0.344** 0.605*** 0.560** -0.0768 -0.0342 0.0126 0.0448 
 (0.141) (0.139) (0.196) (0.247) (0.114) (0.141) (0.104) (0.124) 
Time*Post  -0.349** -0.297*** 0.119 -0.00829 0.131 0.189 -0.222* -0.128 
 (0.136) (0.0964) (0.204) (0.275) (0.126) (0.161) (0.117) (0.122) 
CT* Time * Post  0.473*** 0.398*** -0.259 -0.317 -0.134 -0.159 0.0976 0.0192 
 (0.161) (0.137) (0.247) (0.306) (0.152) (0.192) (0.140) (0.163) 
Child Age  -0.050***  -0.00506  -0.0110  -0.073*** 
  (0.00592)  (0.0124)  (0.00687)  (0.00624) 
Female Caregiver  -0.0167  0.132*  0.0963  0.00853 
  (0.0436)  (0.0689)  (0.0595)  (0.0533) 
Caregiver Age  -0.000464  0.00306**  0.000193  0.000557 
  (0.000780)  (0.00134)  (0.000966)  (0.000787) 
Caregiver 
married/cohabiting   0.0188  0.0857  0.114**  -0.0365 
  (0.0424)  (0.0700)  (0.0581)  (0.0525) 
Education: ref: No 
schooling         
Standard 1-8  0.0605**  0.0868*  0.00557  0.00645 
  (0.0299)  (0.0501)  (0.0393)  (0.0340) 
Form 1 -6  -0.00900  0.149*  0.0722  0.0333 
  (0.0463)  (0.0874)  (0.0654)  (0.0528) 
Above 
secondary  0.0574  -0.714***  -0.113  0.0505 
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  (0.102)  (0.164)  (0.125)  (0.121) 
HH size  -0.00441  -0.00700  0.0219  -0.00372 
  (0.0104)  (0.0158)  (0.0188)  (0.0160) 
Number of rooms  2.80e-05  -0.053***  -0.00220  0.000981 
  (0.00856)  (0.0173)  (0.0130)  (0.0108) 
Clinic fees  0.00256  0.00119  -0.0073***  -0.000129 
  (0.00189)  (0.00328)  (0.00278)  (0.00258) 
Mobile clinic 
availability   0.00701  -0.0167  -0.0330  0.00594 
  (0.0239)  (0.0447)  (0.0373)  (0.0321) 
Medicine Availability   -0.0418*  0.0326  -0.0148  -0.0202 
  (0.0249)  (0.0544)  (0.0414)  (0.0391) 
Distance to nearest 
health facility: ref: 0-
2km          
2-5km  0.00796  -0.00554  -0.0356  0.0127 
  (0.0278)  (0.0521)  (0.0410)  (0.0367) 
5-10km  -0.0635  -0.0337  -0.0522  -0.0309 
  (0.0441)  (0.0671)  (0.0632)  (0.0510) 
>10km  -0.112**  0.0591  -0.112  -0.0311 
  (0.0474)  (0.0936)  (0.0705)  (0.0735) 
District: Ref: Garissa         
Homabay  0.176***  -0.00142  0.0127  -0.0570 
  (0.0605)  (0.106)  (0.0851)  (0.0733) 
Kisumu  0.231***  -0.126  0.0415  -0.0225 
  (0.0578)  (0.0958)  (0.0830)  (0.0747) 
Kwale  0.414***  -0.0392  0.000825  0.0695 
  (0.0523)  (0.107)  (0.0810)  (0.0734) 
Migori  0.121**  -0.0805  -0.0382  -0.0353 
  (0.0602)  (0.103)  (0.0818)  (0.0754) 
Nairobi  0.364***  -0.171  0.176**  0.0721 
  (0.0571)  (0.106)  (0.0819)  (0.0722) 
Suba  0.230***  -0.0898  0.0731  -0.0988 
  (0.0588)  (0.111)  (0.0818)  (0.0708) 
Constant 0.540*** 0.311** 0.741*** -0.468* 0.454*** 0.218 0.278*** 0.214 
 (0.0354) (0.131) (0.0537) (0.283) (0.0296) (0.184) (0.0270) (0.176) 
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Observations 2,508 2,355 582 548 1,872 1,800 1,948 1,877 
R-squared 0.023 0.205 0.048 0.141 0.020 0.060 0.006 0.100 
Total impact – Low 
discount rate 0.451*** 0.391*** -0.182 -0.166 0.099 0.09 0.007 -0.009 
 (0.153) (0.123) (0.233) (0.295) (0.132) (0.951) (0.14) (0.961) 
Total impact – High 
discount rate -0.0214 -0.0439 0.0770 0.0923 0.142*** 0.150** 0.00210 -0.00970 
 (0.0505) (0.0562) (0.0806) (0.0917) (0.0505) (0.0655) (0.0460) (0.0553) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; #program impact is the sum of the difference-in-


























































                       
CT 0.08*** 0.09** 0.08*** 0.09** 0.48*** 0.48** 0.07** 0.069 0.015 -0.006 0.000 -0.013 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.028) (0.040) (0.154) (0.198) (0.031) (0.046) (0.138) (0.292) (0.043) (0.046) 
Time Preference  0.185** 0.2*** 0.166** 0.2*** 0.715* 0.8*** 0.19** 0.2*** 0.352 0.474 0.103 0.117* 
 (0.077) (0.038) (0.070) (0.035) (0.365) (0.311) (0.078) (0.040) (0.325) (0.294) (0.103) (0.070) 
Post  0.09*** 0.077* 0.08*** 0.073* 0.242* 0.180 0.1*** 0.081* 0.002 -0.066 -0.09** -0.1*** 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.025) (0.039) (0.137) (0.194) (0.028) (0.044) (0.124) (0.287) (0.039) (0.040) 
CT*Post -0.064* -0.075 -0.07** -0.075* -0.312* -0.328 -0.063* -0.068 0.033 0.006 0.087* 0.060 
 (0.034) (0.046) (0.031) (0.043) (0.173) (0.214) (0.035) (0.046) (0.155) (0.279) (0.048) (0.046) 
CT * Time -0.3*** -0.3*** -0.21** -0.2*** -1.3*** -1.1** -0.24** -0.2*** -0.688* -0.624 -0.123 -0.103 
 (0.093) (0.083) (0.085) (0.076) (0.457) (0.414) (0.096) (0.081) (0.405) (0.379) (0.126) (0.103) 
Time*Post  -0.21** -0.2*** -0.18** -0.19** -0.8** -0.9** -0.2*** -0.3*** -0.470 -0.548 -0.091 -0.126 
 (0.089) (0.076) (0.081) (0.074) (0.432) (0.320) (0.091) (0.076) (0.383) (0.356) (0.120) (0.105) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  0.273** 0.26** 0.3*** 0.3*** 1.205** 1.12** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.720 0.628 -0.020 0.003 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.097) (0.101) (0.530) (0.447) (0.110) (0.106) (0.469) (0.442) (0.145) (0.131) 
Child Age  -0.007  -0.003  0.004  -0.001  0.005  0.08** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.024)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.006) 
Female Caregiver  0.036  0.036  0.5***  0.052  0.3***  0.034 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.160)  (0.036)  (0.123)  (0.039) 
Caregiver Age  -0.000  -0.001*  -0.003  -0.001  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Married/cohabiting   0.040  0.048  0.46**  0.054  0.27**  0.012 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.156)  (0.035)  (0.120)  (0.037) 
Education: ref: No schooling            
Standard 1-8  0.019  0.013  0.082  0.036  0.091  -0.022 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.100)  (0.023)  (0.087)  (0.025) 
Form 1 -6  0.016  0.024  0.148  0.032  0.083  0.025 
  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.151)  (0.032)  (0.117)  (0.037) 
Secondary+  -0.005  0.021  0.389  0.070  0.227  0.062 
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  (0.064)  (0.059)  (0.274)  (0.063)  (0.225)  (0.068) 
HH size  -0.005  0.002  -0.025  0.005  -0.021  -0.010 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.042)  (0.009)  (0.036)  (0.010) 
Number of rooms  0.006  0.006  0.015  0.007  0.010  0.013 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.033)  (0.007)  (0.034)  (0.009) 
Clinic fees  0.001  0.002*  0.001  0.00**  0.006  -0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Mobile clinic availability   0.021  -0.003  0.039  0.013  0.096  0.033 
  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.089)  (0.018)  (0.071)  (0.022) 
Medicine Availability   -0.05**  -0.05**  -0.149  -0.05**  -0.141*  -0.020 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.092)  (0.021)  (0.074)  (0.024) 
Distance to nearest health facility: ref: 0-2km            
2-5km  -0.019  -0.010  -0.127  0.000  -0.101  -0.06** 
  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.097)  (0.022)  (0.081)  (0.024) 
5-10km  0.011  -0.019  -0.27*  -0.002  -0.23**  -0.2*** 
  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.159)  (0.027)  (0.117)  (0.044) 
>10km  -0.059  -0.075*  -0.4**  -0.090*  -0.314*  -0.11** 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.171)  (0.046)  (0.171)  (0.052) 
District: Ref: Garissa             
Homabay  0.030  0.034  0.59**  0.010  0.331*  -0.046 
  (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.233)  (0.055)  (0.181)  (0.061) 
Kisumu  0.13**  0.1***  0.9***  0.13**  0.7***  -0.051 
  (0.053)  (0.048)  (0.208)  (0.050)  (0.164)  (0.054) 
Kwale  0.2***  0.2***  1.3***  0.2***  1.0***  0.077 
  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.196)  (0.047)  (0.196)  (0.052) 
Migori  0.065  0.057  0.53**  0.006  0.241  -0.016 
  (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.226)  (0.057)  (0.184)  (0.056) 
Nairobi  0.2***  0.2***  1.3***  0.2***  0.8***  -0.000 
  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.205)  (0.047)  (0.153)  (0.053) 
Suba  0.081  0.12**  0.8***  0.11**  0.6***  0.007 
  (0.055)  (0.048)  (0.216)  (0.050)  (0.170)  (0.056) 
Constant 0.82*** 0.7*** 0.8*** 0.8*** 2.76*** 1.26** 0.8*** 0.6*** 2.35*** 0.809 0.84*** 0.6*** 
 (0.024) (0.107) (0.022) (0.098) (0.122) (0.557) (0.025) (0.128) (0.111) (0.506) (0.035) (0.108) 
             
Observations 2,318 2,182 2,324 2,189 2,052 1,935 2,267 2,134 2,042 1,924 2,132 2,006 
R-squared 0.011 0.087 0.011 0.091 0.010 0.108 0.012 0.097 0.003 0.097 0.012 0.144 
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Total impact – Low 
discount rate 0.173* 0.172* 0.183** 0.19** 0.891* 0.79** 0.216 0.24** 0.652 0.559 0.069 0.064 
 (0.082) (0.098) (0.900) (0.092) (0.490) (-.396) (0.104) (0.099) (0.437) (0.328) (0.135) (0.121) 
Total impact – High 
discount rate -0.064* -0.075 -0.07** -0.075* -0.312* -0.328 -0.063* -0.068 0.033 0.006 0.087* 0.060 
 (0.034) (0.046) (0.031) (0.043) (0.173) (0.214) (0.035) (0.046) (0.155) (0.279) (0.048) (0.046) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1#program impact is the sum of the difference-in-difference 
estimate and the triple-difference estimate. Program impacts estimated using the lincolm command.
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3.3.3. Risk Preference effect on the impact of CT-OVC on child healthcare utilization  
In the adjusted models on the impact of CT-OVC on child healthcare utilization by risk 
preference, we do not find any significant associations (Table 11-12). Although, in one of the 
unadjusted models, we find that children whose caregiver was risk averse and received the CT-
OVC had a lower number of DPT vaccinations received (=-0.553, p<0.05) on average, contrary 
















Table 11: Risk Preference Effect on CT-OVC impact on general measures of healthcare use under-5; Triple-Difference estimates 
 Has Health card Sought treatment for 
Diarrhea 
Weighed by Health 
Worker 
Received vitamins from 
a healthcare worker 
 Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
         
CT 0.00621 0.0286 0.0171 0.123 -0.0849 -0.0894 0.0141 -0.0233 
 (0.0652) (0.0795) (0.0960) (0.143) (0.0559) (0.0788) (0.0503) (0.0679) 
Risk Preference -0.0960 -0.00851 0.0863 0.164 -0.0524 -0.0178 -0.0238 -0.0343 
 (0.0655) (0.0805) (0.0968) (0.143) (0.0565) (0.0783) (0.0508) (0.0656) 
Post  0.0740 0.286*** 0.121 0.0583 -0.0491 -0.0668 0.0228 0.0155 
 (0.0586) (0.0680) (0.0877) (0.131) (0.0600) (0.0754) (0.0541) (0.0668) 
CT*Post -0.0182 -0.0524 0.0656 -0.0458 0.222*** 0.198** 0.000642 0.00664 
 (0.0735) (0.0806) (0.112) (0.156) (0.0752) (0.0962) (0.0679) (0.0834) 
CT * Risk -0.0754 -0.0662 0.0655 -0.0411 0.137* 0.111 0.00686 0.0513 
 (0.0824) (0.0979) (0.121) (0.168) (0.0699) (0.0981) (0.0633) (0.0810) 
Risk*Post  0.124* 0.0812 -0.0828 -0.163 0.0791 0.0371 0.0122 0.0344 
 (0.0739) (0.0813) (0.113) (0.148) (0.0750) (0.0969) (0.0680) (0.0802) 
CT* Risk* Post  0.0559 0.0578 -0.0731 0.0742 -0.171* -0.134 -0.00904 -0.0424 
 (0.0929) (0.101) (0.143) (0.183) (0.0943) (0.122) (0.0855) (0.104) 
Child Age  -0.049***  -0.00886  -0.00795  -0.073*** 
  (0.00563)  (0.0113)  (0.00655)  (0.00595) 
Female Caregiver  -0.0358  0.0458  0.111*  0.0187 
  (0.0417)  (0.0718)  (0.0575)  (0.0509) 
Caregiver Age  -0.000745  0.00187  0.000605  0.000245 
  (0.000769)  (0.00126)  (0.000938)  (0.000756) 
Caregiver 
married/cohabiting   0.00158  0.0355  0.111**  -0.0288 
  (0.0409)  (0.0736)  (0.0559)  (0.0503) 
Education: ref: No 
schooling         
Standard 1-8  0.0554**  0.0364  0.00129  0.00952 
  (0.0282)  (0.0431)  (0.0387)  (0.0327) 
Form 1 -6  -0.0230  0.0712  0.0841  0.0417 
  (0.0434)  (0.0793)  (0.0621)  (0.0482) 
Secondary +  0.0493  -0.786***  -0.0669  0.0898 
  (0.0907)  (0.102)  (0.123)  (0.122) 
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HH size  -0.00666  0.00717  0.0132  -0.000666 
  (0.00957)  (0.0142)  (0.0180)  (0.0144) 
Number of rooms  0.00517  -0.0364**  -0.00449  0.00382 
  (0.00785)  (0.0169)  (0.0126)  (0.0111) 
Clinic fees  0.00178  0.00218  -0.0073***  0.000769 
  (0.00177)  (0.00290)  (0.00267)  (0.00243) 
Mobile clinic 
availability   0.00377  -0.0189  -0.0125  0.00177 
  (0.0226)  (0.0439)  (0.0354)  (0.0299) 
Medicine Availability   -0.0459*  0.0495  -0.00923  -0.0268 
  (0.0240)  (0.0478)  (0.0387)  (0.0365) 
Distance to nearest 
health facility: ref: 0-
2km          
2-5km  -0.00932  -0.0338  -0.0295  0.00730 
  (0.0268)  (0.0471)  (0.0402)  (0.0343) 
5-10km  -0.0774*  0.0120  -0.0659  0.00128 
  (0.0409)  (0.0630)  (0.0619)  (0.0490) 
>10km  -0.0939**  0.0154  -0.121*  -0.0575 
  (0.0436)  (0.0860)  (0.0637)  (0.0656) 
District: Ref: Garissa         
Homabay  0.195***  0.0716  -0.0115  -0.0683 
  (0.0587)  (0.0956)  (0.0804)  (0.0678) 
Kisumu  0.252***  -0.0595  0.0259  -0.0383 
  (0.0562)  (0.0901)  (0.0779)  (0.0684) 
Kwale  0.431***  0.0294  -0.0268  0.0956 
  (0.0498)  (0.0962)  (0.0726)  (0.0670) 
Migori  0.162***  -0.0192  -0.0649  -0.0438 
  (0.0583)  (0.0903)  (0.0773)  (0.0689) 
Nairobi  0.384***  -0.0735  0.155**  0.0823 
  (0.0556)  (0.0934)  (0.0760)  (0.0666) 
Suba  0.257***  -0.0120  0.0410  -0.109* 
  (0.0564)  (0.0997)  (0.0769)  (0.0646) 
Constant 0.625*** 0.371*** 0.643*** -0.355 0.487*** 0.227 0.295*** 0.263 
 (0.0521) (0.130) (0.0769) (0.276) (0.0456) (0.176) (0.0406) (0.167) 
Observations 2,790 2,607 682 633 2,076 1,992 2,160 2,073 
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R-squared 0.025 0.200 0.023 0.106 0.015 0.054 0.001 0.103 
Total impact – High risk 
preference 0.038 0.03 -0.007 0.016 -0.008 -0.036 0.051 0.064 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.089) (0.095) (0.052) (0.061) (0.056) (0.076) 
Total impact – Low risk 
preference -0.0182 -0.0524 0.0656 -0.0458 0.222*** 0.198** 0.000642 0.00664 
 (0.0735) (0.0806) (0.112) (0.156) (0.0752) (0.0962) (0.0679) (0.0834) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; #program impact is the sum of the difference-in-
















































                       
CT 0.043 0.037 0.026 0.032 0.251 0.174 0.021 0.012 -0.43** -0.503 -0.024 -0.053 
 (0.046) (0.063) (0.041) (0.053) (0.224) (0.266) (0.046) (0.057) (0.197) (0.55) (0.061) (0.052) 
Risk Preference -0.036 0.001 -0.050 -0.011 -0.332 -0.153 -0.072 -0.028 -0.8*** -0.645 -0.075 -0.079 
 (0.047) (0.065) (0.042) (0.056) (0.227) (0.280) (0.047) (0.060) (0.202) (0.53) (0.063) (0.061) 
Post  0.053 0.058 0.047 0.050 0.059 0.035 0.036 0.034 -0.5*** -0.499 -0.12** -0.2*** 
 (0.042) (0.060) (0.038) (0.049) (0.205) (0.252) (0.042) (0.053) (0.181) (0.53) (0.055) (0.044) 
CT*Post -0.062 -0.079 -0.054 -0.062 -0.181 -0.191 -0.025 -0.031 0.49** 0.458 0.121* 0.106* 
 (0.052) (0.069) (0.047) (0.058) (0.253) (0.293) (0.052) (0.060) (0.223) (0.54) (0.068) (0.057) 
CT * Risk  -0.011 -0.000 0.016 0.027 -0.002 0.161 0.002 0.019 0.53** 0.657 0.035 0.055 
 (0.058) (0.079) (0.052) (0.068) (0.283) (0.337) (0.059) (0.076) (0.249) (0.56) (0.078) (0.076) 
Risk*Post  0.027 0.003 0.018 -0.010 0.138 0.034 0.046 0.020 0.8*** 0.649 0.059 0.070 
 (0.052) (0.070) (0.047) (0.062) (0.256) (0.305) (0.053) (0.064) (0.22) (0.53) (0.070) (0.066) 
CT* Risk * Post  0.053 0.061 0.046 0.052 0.096 0.056 0.027 0.028 -0.55** -0.589 -0.081 -0.089 
 (0.065) (0.087) (0.059) (0.077) (0.320) (0.377) (0.066) (0.081) (0.282) (0.57) (0.087) (0.081) 
Child Age  -0.006  -0.001  0.011  0.000  0.009  0.1*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.005)  (0.02)  (0.006) 
Female Caregiver  0.024  0.033  0.4***  0.038  0.29**  0.040 
  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.151)  (0.035)  (0.12)  (0.036) 
Caregiver Age  -0.000  -0.00**  -0.003  -0.001  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.00)  (0.001) 
Caregiver married/cohabiting   0.023  0.044  0.4***  0.044  0.24**  0.018 
  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.147)  (0.034)  (0.12)  (0.034) 
Education: ref: No schooling             
Standard 1-8  0.015  0.012  0.086  0.030  0.084  -0.015 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.095)  (0.022)  (0.08)  (0.023) 
Form 1 -6  0.003  0.016  0.077  0.018  0.032  0.019 
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  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.145)  (0.031)  (0.11)  (0.035) 
Above secondary  -0.003  0.021  0.388  0.062  0.231  0.067 
  (0.058)  (0.053)  (0.243)  (0.056)  (0.19)  (0.063) 
HH size  -0.007  0.001  -0.027  0.004  -0.010  -0.008 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.039)  (0.008)  (0.03)  (0.009) 
Number of rooms  0.007  0.006  0.024  0.005  0.012  0.011 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.029)  (0.006)  (0.03)  (0.008) 
Clinic fees  0.002  0.00**  0.001  0.00**  0.005  -0.003* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.01)  (0.001) 
Mobile clinic availability   0.017  0.008  0.041  0.016  0.084  0.025 
  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.082)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.021) 
Medicine Availability   -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.140  -0.04**  -0.12*  0.004 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.089)  (0.020)  (0.07)  (0.024) 
Distance to nearest health facility: ref: 0-2km            
2-5km  -0.011  -0.001  -0.126  0.004  -0.116  -0.05** 
  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.090)  (0.020)  (0.08)  (0.023) 
5-10km 
 0.006  -0.009  -0.265*  -0.001  
-
0.22**  -0.1*** 
  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.149)  (0.026)  (0.11)  (0.041) 
>10km  -0.062  -0.069  -0.39**  -0.081*  -0.3**  -0.12** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.159)  (0.043)  (0.15)  (0.048) 
District: Ref: Garissa             
Homabay  0.014  0.039  0.51**  0.018  0.36**  -0.057 
  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.220)  (0.053)  (0.17)  (0.057) 
Kisumu  0.11**  0.1***  0.9***  0.1***  0.7***  -0.078 
  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.198)  (0.047)  (0.15)  (0.048) 
Kwale  0.1***  0.2***  1.3***  0.1***  1.1***  0.065 
  (0.046)  (0.041)  (0.181)  (0.043)  (0.17)  (0.046) 
Migori  0.054  0.070  0.48**  0.020  0.293*  -0.026 
  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.210)  (0.054)  (0.17)  (0.050) 
Nairobi  0.2***  0.2***  1.2***  0.2***  0.9***  -0.031 
  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.201)  (0.045)  (0.15)  (0.049) 








*  -0.015 
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  (0.051)  (0.044)  (0.205)  (0.047)  
(0.160






















 (0.037) (0.114) (0.033) (0.095) (0.182) (0.538) (0.037) (0.127) (0.162) 
(0.592
) (0.049) (0.102) 
                         
Observations 2,428 2,427 2,434 2,433 2,157 2,156 2,369 2,368 2,140 2,139 2,226 2,225 
R-squared 0.008 0.048 0.008 0.050 0.008 0.089 0.010 0.059 0.011 0.082 0.011 0.138 
Total impact – High risk 
preference -0.035 -0.021 -0.017 -0.009 -0.096 -0.135 0.003 0.007 -0.052 -0.098 0.039 0.017 
 (0.038) (0.53) (0.035) (0.050) (0.187) (0.234) (0.041) (0.057) (0.167) (0.18) (0.053) (0.057) 
Total impact – Low risk 
preference -0.062 -0.079 -0.054 -0.062 -0.181 -0.191 -0.025 -0.031 0.48** 0.458 0.121* 0.106* 
 (0.052) (0.069) (0.047) (0.058) (0.253) (0.293) (0.052) (0.060) (0.223) (0.54) (0.068) (0.057) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0; #program impact is the sum of the difference-in-difference 






3.3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
We find that our results are sensitive to classification of our outcomes (Appendix B3.1). 
Specifically, when we rerun sperate analysis for measures created from the health card and from 
the self-reported measures we do not find any significant moderating effects on any of the 
outcomes. However, this could be due to the reduction in sample size when stratify the analysis by 
source of outcome data. We also do not observe any moderating effect when we classify risk and 
time preference as a continuous measure (Appendix B3.2). However, this is unsurprising as we 
used a stricter economic preference measure for our main analysis. Nonetheless, our main findings 
remain consistent when we run weighted regression models using inverse probability weights 
(Appendix B3.3).  
 
3.4. Discussion 
Our study analyzed the moderating effect of time and risk preference on cash transfer 
program impacts on child healthcare utilization. We found evidence that a caregiver’s time 
preference but not risk preference moderates the impact of the CT-OVC on child healthcare 
utilization. Specifically, we found that children who lived in a household that received the CT-
OVC and had a caregiver with a low discount rate were more likely to have a health card, and 
receive a BCG, polio and DPT vaccination. These children also received a higher number of polio 
vaccinations on average. These findings contribute to the literature on cash transfer impact 
evaluations by providing evidence that the time preference of a recipient may affect healthcare 
service use for their children. 
Consistent with previous studies,15,74,75 when we assessed the CT-OVC impact without 
accounting for economic preferences, we did not find any significant effect for any of our measures 
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of child healthcare utilization. The CT-OVC is an unconditional cash transfer program, and as 
such, receipt of the cash transfer was not conditional on taking a child to receive healthcare services 
for instance. It has been purported that unconditional cash transfer programs may not improve 
child healthcare service use.73 However, our study finds that the CT-OVC, despite being 
unconditional, may in fact improve child healthcare utilization when we account for caregiver time 
preference. This finding is consistent with evidence from Latin America on the effectiveness of 
cash transfer programs on healthcare utilization.101,102 
Our main finding that time discounting moderates cash transfer impacts on child healthcare 
utilization is consistent with evidence from existing literature showing increased healthcare use 
amongst individuals with low discount rates.80,81 Individuals face a choice of spending their money 
and time on current healthcare utilization that has some future benefit or using their money and 
time in the present for other goods and services that have smaller more immediate benefits. We 
show that caregivers who place a higher value on future benefits have a higher likelihood of taking 
their children to receive vaccinations when they receive a cash transfer. This implies that the cash 
transfer enabled caregivers with low discount rate to increase child healthcare utilization.  
While our study found some evidence of a moderating effect of time preference on child 
healthcare utilization, we note that this effect was significant for most of our measures related to 
child vaccinations (BCG, Polio and DPT vaccinations). Similar to another study in Kenya, the 
vaccinations rates in our sample were relatively high at baseline in 2007 (>82%),103 this implies 
that overall, surveyed participants in these areas already placed a high value on getting 
vaccinations. Although, full vaccination coverage and timely receipt of the vaccinations is an 
ongoing problem in Kenya.103 However, we also found a significant moderating effect on having 
a health card. Having a health card is as an important indicator of child healthcare utilization as a 
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health card is usually provided at a child’s birth or during a visit to a healthcare facility.90 This 
finding on our measure for having a health card therefore reinforces our finding that time 
preference moderates healthcare use as having a health card suggests an encounter with a 
healthcare facility. Further, it could be the case that these visits to a healthcare facility increase the 
likelihood of being informed about the importance of child vaccinations and could explain our 
observed effects on vaccination receipt. 
Nonetheless, we do not find any evidence that risk aversion moderates cash transfer 
program effects despite evidence that risk aversion is associated with healthcare use.85–87 Amongst 
these studies, only one was conducted in a sub-Saharan African country, Nigeria. In this study, 
participants who were risk averse had a higher likelihood of accepting a malaria rapid diagnostic 
test.87 It is possible that the deviation of our finding is due to differences in the study samples. 
Specifically, with this study conducted in Nigeria, the choice of testing for Malaria was amongst 
individuals who had just purchased mosquito net for themselves. This sample already included 
individuals who had high health seeking behaviors. Further, despite the evidence that risk 
preference is associated with healthcare use, these studies are not directly comparable to ours as 
they explored a direct relationship of preferences and healthcare use. Our study is the first to 
explore the relationship between economic preferences, cash transfers and healthcare use.  
  
3.4.1. Limitations  
Our study has three important limitations. Firstly, the outcomes used in the analysis are a 
combination of data obtained from the health card and self-reported measures, and the latter are 
more likely to be reported with bias.103 We addressed this limitation by conducting a sensitivity 
analysis using measures that were collected from the health card only and those that were self-
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reported. Secondly, economic preferences were only collected during the last wave of the CT-
OVC evaluation in 2011. There is evidence suggesting that the CT-OVC had no effect on these 
economic preferences measures which may be explained by the low cash-transfer amount in 
relation to household consumption.91 In addition, caregivers in our sample were mainly older and 
may not experience a huge shift in preferences over a short time period.81 We therefore assumed 
preferences did not vary significantly during our analytical time period. Nonetheless, we still used 
a conservative measure of time discounting and risk aversion such that it is unlikely that a 
caregiver’s preferences will change significantly if they have the lowest discount rate or highest 
risk aversion. Regardless, the estimates from the triple-difference model may suggest that this 
assumption is violated. This is due to the estimated differences in probabilities between different 
groups. For instance, the difference in the average outcomes for children with a low discount rate 
in the post period compared to those children with a high discount rate in the baseline period. 
Although it is likely that the economic preference variables are endogenous, the same preference 
variables are used in the baseline and post period and are not changing in the analysis. We are 
unable to test our assumption that preferences do not change with the available data.   
Thirdly, due to the small sample size, running the triple-difference model creates 
interactions with very small samples that are leading to counterintuitive estimates from the triple-
difference model. An example of the counterintuitive finding is in Table 9 (unadjusted model) 
where it is implausible that children with patient caregivers have a 0.283 higher probability of 
having health card among control group but have a lower probability among CT-OVC group. As 
shown in the Appendix B4, the number of children in the baseline period that did not receive the 
cash transfer and had a low discount rate is a small sample size (n=17) yet the probability of having 
them healthcare card is the highest 0.82. This is the pattern with all the outcomes (receiving a 
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BCG, polio or flu vaccination). The conservative measure we use for time preference plays a huge 
role in reducing this sample size. Although we use an alternative specification for the time 
preference models, our choice of measurement of time preference follows prior literature.91 
Further, there is the possibility of spillover effects of the cash transfer to non-cash transfer 
households that may be influencing the counterintuitive findings of the triple-difference model as 
prior studies assessing a similar cash transfer in Lesotho has shown positive spillovers to non-cash 
transfer benefeciaries.104 Future studies could replicate this study on a lager dataset, and offer a 
comparison of estimates, as this study provides initial evidence to support the moderating effect 
of time preferences on the impact of cash transfers on child healthcare use. Despite these 
limitations, our study is the first to our knowledge to provide evidence on the moderating effect of 
economic preferences on cash transfer program impacts on child healthcare utilization. 
As this study underscores the role of economic preferences in healthcare decisions, 
implementing “cash plus” programming, that is, providing the cash transfer with complementary 
support, may address the role preferences have in dampening the intended program effects. Cash 
plus programs are recommended as the income effect from standard cash transfer programs may 
not be large enough to achieve the desired outcomes.105 Cash-plus programs have been successful 
as evidenced by the success of the LEAP (2000) implemented in Ghana where universal health 
insurance coverage was the complementary program. As we find that cash transfer effects differ 
by time preference, the complementary program can include information and behavior change 
communication to target caregivers that may have high discount rates. This complementary 
program could be designed using a behavioral economic policy tool, framing. Framing would 
involve presenting information about the choice on whether or not to utilize child healthcare 
services, by additionally presenting the information around the other choices that surround it, such 
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that utilizing child health services is a better option in comparison.83 In addition to targeted 
communication to improve the use of preventative healthcare services, the cash plus program can 
be designed to improve nutrition outcomes for children such as in Ethiopia where an integrated 
nutrition social cash transfer program was implemented.105 
 
3.4.2. Conclusion  
Children in developing countries suffer high rates of preventable and treatable illnesses 
which can be addressed with regular healthcare use. There is debate on whether cash transfer 
programs should be implemented, in part, due to the mixed evidence that exists. Prior studies that 
have examined cash transfer program impacts do not account for the role economic preferences in 
moderating program impacts.13,15,66,74,75,77 We showed that understanding whether economic 
preferences are a modifier in the relationship between cash transfers and healthcare allows for a 
more comprehensive evaluation of cash transfer program effects. This study is the first to provide 
evidence that the CT-OVC program improves child healthcare utilization measures (having a 
health card and receipt of vaccinations) and this effect is moderated by time discounting. 
Investment into cash transfer programs should be supported as they improve children’s health. In 
addition, prior evidence such as from the evaluation of the Ghana Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty (LEAP) 2000 program found improved social support for beneficiaries.106 This 
means that expanding cash transfer programs can improve the target beneficiaries beyond the cash 
benefit from the program. An important implication of this finding is that cash transfers to 
individuals with high discount rates are likely to be ineffective in improving the use of healthcare 
services for children.  
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Chapter IV: Are cash transfer programs cost-effective in reducing infectious diseases 
amongst orphans and vulnerable children in Kenya? 
 
4.1. Introduction  
In Kenya, approximately 74,000 children die before reaching their fifth birthday every 
year.107 Most deaths amongst children are from preventable and treatable diseases such as malaria 
and pneumonia which account for two-thirds of child deaths in developing countries.15,108,109 It is 
estimated that over 75% of the population is at risk of malarial infection causing about 20% of all 
under-five deaths.15 Further, acute respiratory infections cause about 16% of child deaths in 
Kenya.15 As both malaria and respiratory infections are preventable and treatable with access to 
and utilization of recommended healthcare services,110,111 recent policies have attempted to address 
the problem of child mortality through providing a cash transfer to low-income populations.15,112–
114 Providing unconditional cash transfers to low-income households can address barriers to health 
care access and health production, such as transport and hunger,14,112 to reduce diseases and 
mortality amongst children.115 
In 2007, Kenya’s largest social protection program, the Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) program was rolled out by the Ministry of Gender, Children and 
Social Development.65 The CT-OVC was rolled out as a pilot program costing approximately US$ 
10 million. The CT-OVC has been scaled-up and included in the governments national budget 
allocating approximately US$85 million to over 310,000 households in 2013-2014.116 The 
objective of the CT-OVC was to promote human capital development through improving 
children’s health.66 The program gave approximately Ksh 344 (US$4.34; 2010) per adult 
equivalent a month to households with a child whose main caregiver was chronically ill or 
deceased.65,66  
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A longitudinal cluster-randomized study was designed to evaluate the impact of the CT-
OVC program on children’s health.15,66 Using the evaluation data, a recent study found that the 
CT-OVC program was effective in decreasing infectious diseases (malaria and pneumonia) among 
children under seven years.15 Specifically, the study found that children that lived in households 
that did not receive the cash transfer had 1.8 higher odds of being ill compared to children who 
lived in a household that received the transfer.15 Other studies have additionally found that cash 
transfer programs are effective in improving children’s health. For instance, in a systematic review 
and meta-analysis, cash transfers were effective in improving children’s nutrition outcomes.117 In 
Latin America, conditional cash transfers have been found to be effective in improving health 
outcomes such as reducing morbidity risk, and improving nutritional outcomes, health service use 
and immunization coverage.101,102 While the CT-OVC, and other cash transfer programs, are 
effective in improving child health, it is unknown whether cash-transfer programs are cost-
effective in reducing infectious diseases amongst children. 
We conducted an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis of the CT-OVC in reducing 
malaria and pneumonia amongst children under the age of seven. The objectives of this research 
are twofold. Firstly, we examined the economic costs (that is, medical, non-medical and 
productivity loss) associated with the CT-OVC program compared to the status quo. We 
hypothesized that the cost of the CT-OVC is higher than the status quo (i.e., children in households 
that were eligible to receive the cash transfer but did not) because of high administrative cost to 
implement the cash transfer program and cash transfer payments of the CT-OVC. Secondly, we 
assessed the incremental cost-effectiveness of the CT-OVC in reducing illness amongst children 
that received the cash transfer compared to the status-quo. We hypothesize that providing the cash 
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transfer to households with children under the age of seven years is cost-effective in reducing 
infectious diseases compared to the status quo based on prior evidence of effectiveness. 15,16 
 
4.1.1. Overview of the CT-OVC program  
The CT-OVC program was a collaboration between the Government of Kenya’s 
Department of Children’s Services (DCS), with financial assistance from the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Department for International Development (DFID).15 It was 
introduced as a pre-pilot during 2004 and expanded to include over 240,000 households as of 
2014.15 The objective of the program was to provide a social protection system through regular 
and predictable cash transfers to families so as to promote the human capital development of 
orphans and vulnerable (OVC) children.66 Specifically related to child health, the program was 
intended to reduce child mortality and morbidity through increased uptake of immunizations, 
growth control and vitamin A supplements.66 A household was eligible for the cash transfer if it 
had a child under the age of 18 and a deceased or chronically ill child parent (or caregiver), was 
poor and was not receiving any other assistance.15 While entry into the program is unconditional, 
recipients are informed that the purpose of the cash transfer is to support the care of children 
through investing in human capital.15 
 
4.1.2. Prior studies conducting economic evaluations of cash transfer programs  
Cash transfer programs play an important role in alleviating vulnerable populations from 
extreme poverty, and are effective in improving child health,15,113,114,118 yet, there is limited 
evidence on their cost-effectiveness,119 particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. A review of the existing 
literature on economic evaluations of cash transfer programs in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as 
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studies in the region assessing programs to reduce malaria and pneumonia among children, show 
that while there are some economic evaluation studies, there are limited formal cost-effectiveness 
studies. 
Regarding economic evaluations of cash transfer programs, in a study comparing the cost-
effectiveness of a cash transfer and food transfer program in Malawi,120 found the cash transfer 
program cost beneficial (based on the cost per program beneficiary) in improving food security 
compared to the food transfer program. Another study assessing a mobile cash transfer program to 
prevent child undernutrition in Burkina Faso found the program had a higher cost per beneficiary 
compared to other programs.121 Further, in a meta-analyses of cash transfer programs and 
educational impacts, the authors found considerable heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness amongst 
nine cash transfer programs analyzed.122 In this study, the authors assessed cost-transfer ratios (i.e., 
the ratio of non-transfer costs to the value of money actually transferred to the beneficiary). As 
this differs from a cost-effectiveness analysis,123,124 this study addresses the gap in knowledge by 
conducting an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis of a cash transfer program with regard to 
child health. 
There have been studies evaluating the cost-effectiveness of various approaches to prevent 
malaria in children in Kenya.125–127 One study found that delivering intermittent preventive 
treatment through teachers was a cost-effective strategy in preventing malaria in children.125 
Although, the alternative strategy was not clearly defined in the study. Another study that modelled 
the cost-effectiveness of malaria control interventions found that employing long lasting 
insecticide treated nets (ITN) was highly-cost effective in reducing disability-adjusted life years 
(DALYs) over a five year period.126 A related study found ITN highly cost effective in averting 
deaths among children in Kenya.127 Other studies have been conducted in sub-Saharan 
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Africa.128,129 For instance, one study found that pre-referral treatments using community health 
workers was cost-effective in averting DALYs in children compared to provision using a health 
facility.128 However, there are no studies that have examined the cost-effectiveness of a cash-
transfer program in reducing malaria amongst children. 
Regarding economic evaluations of programs to prevent pneumonia among children, a 
cost-effectiveness analysis on vaccines against pneumonia was conducted in Kenya.130 The study 
found that vaccinations were cost-effective in preventing pneumonia compared to no vaccinations 
from the societal perspective.130 Another study that examined data from 72 countries including 
Kenya found vaccinations as a cost-effective strategy to prevent child mortality.131 Other studies 
analyzing cost-effectiveness of strategies to prevent pneumonia in children have been conducted 
in Malawi132 and South America.133–135 As most of these studies examined the cost-effectiveness 
of vaccination strategies133–135 and only one cross-country analysis examined environment and 
nutritional strategies,136 a critical gap exists in the literature on cost-effectiveness of a cash transfer 
program as a strategy for the prevention of illness in children. This study fills the gap in the 
literature and provides evidence on the cost-effectiveness of a cash transfer program in reducing 
malaria and pneumonia in children in Kenya. 
 
4.2. Methods 
We conducted an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis of the CT-OVC program in 
reducing infectious diseases amongst children that received the cash transfer compared to the status 
quo. This study used data from a longitudinal cluster-randomized study evaluating the CT-OVC 
(2007 and 2009),137 the grey literature66 and peer-reviewed literature.16,138,139   Outcome data were 
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obtained from the CT-OVC program evaluation data and costs were from the grey literature and 
peer-reviewed literature.  
We conducted the cost-effectiveness analysis from the payer or healthcare and societal 
perspective. As this was a national-level program that has potential to be scaled up by government 
and cooperating partners, it becomes important to provide evidence to the payers (governments 
and non-government funders) on whether the program is cost-effective. The societal perspective 
is analyzed as this encompasses the costs associated with the payer and the patient which vary by 
the two treatment groups. We conducted the analysis from the societal perspective as there are 
patient costs associated with the alternative strategies. Further, it is recommended that the societal 
perspective be included in cost-effectiveness analysis.123,124 We compared the incremental costs 
and incremental effectiveness of receiving the CT-OVC (i.e., children in households that were 
eligible and received the cash transfer) compared to the status quo (i.e., children in households that 
were eligible to receive the cash transfer but did not).15 We conducted the analysis over a two-year 
time horizon, which is the time between baseline and follow-up of the longitudinal cluster-
randomized study evaluating the CT-OVC.  
 
4.2.1. Overview of the longitudinal cluster-randomized study design  
The CT-OVC begun as a pilot study in 2004. Prior to its expansion in 2007, UNICIEF and 
Oxford Policy Management designed a longitudinal cluster-randomized study to track the impact 
of the program.66 The study involved conducting a baseline household survey before the cash 
transfer program could be expanded and conducting a follow-up survey after 24-months (2009) 
and 48-months (2011).89 The DCS identified seven districts across the country that were scheduled 
for inclusion in the expansion of the CT-OVC program.66 In the selected districts, four locations 
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were selected as eligible. Of these four locations, two were randomized to the initial expansion 
and the others would serve as the control locations.66 Due to financial constraints, the CT-OVC 
expansion program could not be rolled out to all eligible locations at the same time.66 The 
evaluation of the CT-OVC program was therefore designed as the location of those whose entry 
would occur later to be the control group.66 
In the intervention locations, targeting of the households was conducted based on the 
standard program operation guidelines.66 This includes formation of a committee of individuals in 
each community that identify households based on poverty indicators and having an OVC.15 The 
list of households identified by the committee are then sent to the Ministry of Gender, Children 
and Social Development Community. The Ministry then confirms eligibility using a questionnaire 
to rank households. This reduces the selection bias of households into the program as the CT-OVC 
recipients are selected at the district-level.15 In the control locations, program targeting was 
simulated in order to identify a sample of households that were comparable to those identified as 
eligible in the treatment groups.66 Both the treatment and control households were interviewed 
before the roll-out of the expansion program in 2007 and prior to knowledge that they were selected 
into the program.66 They were then interviewed again after the expansion of the CT-OVC program 
to the treatment group in 2010. The data collected from these surveys informed the evaluation of 
the CT-OVC program. 
 
4.2.2. Sample  
We retain all children in the sample from the baseline survey (n=2593). There were 1588 
children in the treatment group (received the cash transfer) and 1005 children in the control group 
(status quo).  739 of these were in wave 1 and not wave 2 and were lost to follow-up. As malaria 
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and pneumonia in children may cause mortality, we accounted for the possibility that the children 
in the baseline survey and not in the follow-up could have died. We assumed that some of these 
children could have died from a case of malaria based on the illness-specific age-sex mortality.140 
We randomly assigned children based on a draw from a uniform distribution, such that we had 127 
children who experienced either malaria or pneumonia and were assigned as dead. We used t-tests 
and found no statistically significant differences in the demographic characteristics of children in 
the treatment compared to those in the control groups for the study sample.  
 
4.2.3. Effectiveness 
The study measures whether a child aged less than seven years had a case of either malaria 
or pneumonia (i.e., 1 = malaria or pneumonia). Measures for malaria and pneumonia are self-
reported symptoms observed by the caregivers of the household who were asked whether the child 
had been ill with fever, hot body, or cough at any time in the last month. Following a prior study,15 
we report the effectiveness using the odds ratio..  
 We replicated the analysis of a prior study15 to verify that the CT-OVC is effective in 
reducing illnesses amongst children. The replication results are reported in Appendix C1. We 
obtained an odds ratio of 0.535 (95% CI 0.336-0.851) compared to the odds ratio of 0.556 reported 
in the prior study. The difference in odds ratio may be attributed to differences in estimation 
packages and stata commands that the authors may have used. However, for reasons discussed in 





4.2.4. Incremental effectiveness 
We empirically defined the incremental effectiveness of the CT-OVC using disability-
adjusted life years (DALY) averted similar to several studies on child health141–144 and as 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) guide for cost-effectiveness.123 The 
advantage of using DALYs as the measure of incremental effectiveness is the comparability of 
this measure to other studies assessing the impact of different strategies on malaria and 
pneumonia.141,142,144 Further, as malaria and pneumonia are responsible for the high rates of child 
mortality in Kenya,15 the DALYs take into account the years of life lost as well as the morbidity 
of a child due to the illness.123 DALYS are calculated using the following equation:  
𝐷𝐴𝐿𝑌 = 𝑌𝐿𝐿 + 𝑌𝐿𝐷      (i) 
 
Where YLL is the years of life lost due to premature mortality and YLD are the years lived with 
disability123. Following the global burden of disease, the YLL that includes both age-weighting 









𝑒−𝑟𝐿)      (ii) 
Where a is the age of death (years), r is the discount rate, B is the age weighting constant, K is the 
age-weighting modulation constant, C is the adjustment for age-weights and L is the standard life-





[𝑒−(𝑟+𝐵)(𝐿+𝑎)[−(𝑟 + 𝐵)(𝐿 + 𝑎) − 1] − 𝑒−(𝑟+𝐵)𝑎[−(𝑟 + 𝐵)𝑎 − 1]] +
1−𝐾
𝑟
(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝐿)}    (iii) 
 89 
Where a is the age of death (years), r is the discount rate, B is the age weighting constant, 
K is the age-weighting modulation constant, C is the adjustment for age-weights, L is the duration 
of the disability and DW is the disability weight. However, we did not conduct age-weighting as 
we found no differences in demographic characteristics between treatment and control and did not 
anticipate that this will impact the incremental effectiveness. Although several approaches exist in 
implementing the DALY’s145 we use the approach as presented by the global burden of disease by 
the WHO,146 and as commonly used in prior literature.141,144  





(1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝐿)      (iv) 
Where N is the number of deaths, L is the standard life expectancy at death and r is the discount 
rate. We apply the age-sex-specific life expectancy for 2010 (the closest year available for our 
analytical period) from the WHO147 as follows: male aged 0-4 years as 60.87, male aged 5-7 as 
58.07, female aged 0-4 years as 64.36 and female aged 5-7 as  61.55. We apply a discount rate of 
3% as recommended.123 
The YLD was implemented in the study as follows: 
𝑌𝐿𝐷 =
𝐼 𝑥 𝐷𝑊𝑥 𝐿(1−𝑒−𝑟𝐿)
𝑟
      (v) 
Where I is the number of incident cases, DW is the disability weight, L is the duration of the illness 
and r is the discount rate. The disability weight associated with malaria is 0.20 and that of an 
episode of pneumonia 0.28.146 An onset of malaria lasts for an average of 7 days (or 0.019 years),141 
while that of pneumonia lasts for 5 weeks (or 0.096 years) on average.148  We use the recommended 
discounting rate of 3%.123 
 90 
We separately calculated the total DALYs associated with malaria (3441 DALYs) and that 
of pneumonia (3163 DALYs) for our sample. The calculation of DALYs is provided in Table 13 
and Table 14. We then calculated the average DALY associated with a case of malaria (2.46 
DALYs per case of malaria) and a case of pneumonia (2.19 DALYs per case of pneumonia). We 
assign the associated DALYs for a child that had either malaria or pneumonia. However, for a 
child that experienced both malaria and pneumonia we added the associated DALYs to obtain the 
total DALYS for an illness. The difference in DALYs between treatment and control is the DALYs 
averted or the incremental effectiveness. We estimated a generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
to calculate the incremental effectiveness.  
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Table 13: Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) calculation for Malaria 
 Population Incidence 
Incidence/ 
Population Age at onset Duration DW YLDs 
YLD - Year 1       
Males:        
0-4 613 316 0.515 1.980 0.019 0.2 0.0007 
5-7 590 137 0.232 5.820 0.019 0.2 0.0003 
Females:        
0-4 725 362 0.499 2.017 0.019 0.2 0.0008 
5-7 665 84 0.126 5.607 0.019 0.2 0.0002 
YLD - Year 2 
Males: 
0-4 314 156 0.497 2.720 0.019 0.2 0.0003 
5-7 190 84 0.442 5.840 0.019 0.2 0.0002 
Females 
0-4 394 172 0.437 1.660 0.019 0.2 0.0004 
5-7 209 89 0.426 5.840 0.019 0.2 0.0002 
 Population Deaths 
Death/ 
Population 
Average age at 
death Standard LE YLL  
YLL        
Males 
0-4 613 34 0.055 2.120 60.87 950.8209  
5-7 590 28 0.047 5.570 58.07 769.8580  
Females 
0-4 725 30 0.041 1.930 64.36 854.9679  
5-7 665 22 0.033 5.450 61.55 617.6218  
DALYs  Male Female Total  
  Cases in 2 years DALYS Cases in 2 years DALYs Cases in 2 years DALYs  
0-4 472 950.822 534 950.822 1006 1901.644  
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5-7 221 769.858 173 769.858 394 1539.717  
Total 693 1720.680 707 1720.680 1400 3441.361  
































Table 14: Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) calculation for pneumonia 
 Population  Incidence 
Incidence/ 
Population Age at onset Duration DW YLDs 
YLD Year 1 
Males: 
0-4 613 318 0.519 2.142 0.096 0.280 0.025 
5-7 590 134 0.227 5.843 0.096 0.280 0.010 
Females: 
0-4 725 372 0.513 2.032 0.096 0.280 0.029 
5-7 665 92 0.138 5.554 0.096 0.280 0.007 
YLD Year 2        
Males: 
0-4 314 153 0.487 2.667 0.096 0.280 0.012 
5-7 190 90 0.474 5.800 0.096 0.280 0.007 
Females: 
0-4 394 188 0.477 2.660 0.096 0.280 0.015 
5-7 209 100 0.478 5.900 0.096 0.280 0.008 
 Population Deaths Death/Population 
Average Age at 
death Standard LE YLL  
YLL 
Males: 
0-4 613 31 0.051 2.120 60.870 866.925  
5-7 590 26 0.044 5.620 58.070 714.868  
Females: 
0-4 725 27 0.037 1.810 64.360 769.471  
5-7 665 28 0.042 5.360 61.550 786.064  
DALYs   
 Male Female Total  
  Cases in 2 years DALYS Cases in 2 years DALYs #Cases in 2 years DALYs  
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0-4 471 866.961 560 866.968 1031 1733.929  
5-7 224 714.885 192 714.883 416 1429.769  
Total 695 1582 752 1582 1447 3163.698  
DALY/case   2.276   2.104   2.186  
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4.2.5. Economic costs 
The baseline economic costs were obtained from the grey and peer reviewed literature. The 
costs were classified as either fixed costs (do not vary with output in the short term, such as facility 
costs) or variable costs (vary with output, such medications). We assigned the costs based on both 
a micro-costing and gross costing approach. Table 15 shows that the baseline costs vary by 
treatment group. We estimated the economic costs for the treatment and control group by 
multiplying the resource used by each child by the unit cost of the resource. The sections that 
follow describe the cost source including the search strategy, cost reporting and cost assignment 
in more detail (section a, b and c, respectively). 
 
Table 15: Baseline cost components vary by treatment group 
COST COMPONENTS CT-OVC Status-quo 
Payer perspective:   
Cash transfer value x 
 
Drugs for case of Malaria  x x 
Nurses for treatment of Malaria x x 
Drugs for case of Pneumonia  x x 
Nurses for treatment of Pneumonia x x 
Overhead  x x 
Health facility  x x 
Cash transfer administration  x  
*Societal perspective:   
Transport for receipt of cash transfer x  
Transport to clinic  x x 
Average wage (opportunity cost of time – receipt of cash) x 
 
Average wage (opportunity cost of time – care for ill child) x x 





a. Cost sources: 
As the longitudinal cluster-randomized study evaluating the CT-OVC was not designed to 
conduct an economic evaluation, costs were collected from grey literature and peer-reviewed 
literature. Cost data on the cash transfer amount and administrative costs were obtained from the 
grey literature were obtained from UNICEF66 and the WHO Choosing Interventions that are Cost-
Effective project (or WHO-CHOICE).149 A costing study on the CT-OVC is available from 
UNICEF that informed the costs associated with the implementation of the CT-OVC program. All 
other costs were obtained from peer-reviewed literature.126,150–153 For the peer-reviewed literature, 
we prioritize studies conducted in Kenya searching databases PubMed and Google Scholar using 
specific search terms. The search terms in Pubmed and google scholar included the following 
combinations: “malaria” OR “pneumonia” AND “cost” OR “economic burden” OR “cost-
effectiveness” OR “economic evaluation” OR “cost-benefit” AND “Kenya” OR “sub-Saharan”. 
Where studies from Kenya are not available, we prioritized studies from countries with similar 
context to Kenya based on region, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and year the study was 
conducted. Region will be prioritized based on East African countries then sub-Saharan countries. 
GDP per capita will be obtained from the World Bank and studies conducted closest to the time 








Table 16: Baseline costs, in US$ 2018 









CT-OVC       
Cash transfer payment Per month 5.96 2.98 8.94 66 
Administration Per household 
per year 
271.01 135.50 406.51 
66 
Medications        
Malaria Medication  Per tablet 0.52 0.36 0.68 126 
Drugs for case of 
Pneumonia 
Per case 
0.29 0.14 0.43 
150 
 Nurse Salary Per month  0.14 0.04   151 
Health facility Per day 21.83 6.58 0.24 149 
Patient costs      37.08  
Collection of cash transfer 
(Garissa district only) 
Per month 
1.20 0.60   
66 
Collection of cash transfer 
(all districts except Garissa) 
Per month 
1.16 0.58 1.81 
66 
Transport to visit a clinic Per visit 0.17 0.09 1.74 152 
Care giver time Per day 3.36 1.68 0.26 153 
Where confidence intervals were not provided, we use 50% higher and lower than the base case 
as the upper and lower bound, respectively. 
 
 
b. Cost reporting: 
We report the costs in United States dollars (US$) as this is the most commonly reported 
and easily understood currency in the world that has the advantage of being easily converted to 
other currencies because of its wide use.154 For instance, we assume it is highly likely for a Kenyan 
policy maker to understand and easily convert US$ to Kenyan shillings. This is also relevant for 
donors or cooperating partners who may fund the cash transfer program and fund programs in 
US$; noting that donor funds are also usually reported in US$.154 We use the exchange rate from 
the World Bank to convert to US$ after adjusting for inflation. We discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of using other currency for reporting in detail in Appendix C2. 
We adjusted for inflation and report the costs in constant 2018US$. Since the cluster-
randomized study was conducted for more than a year and cost sources came from multiple time 
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periods, we inflation adjust the costs to account for the differences in purchasing power at different 
times and convert them to a common time period.155 To adjust for inflation, we used the GDP 
deflator accessible from the World Bank.156 Although it is recommended to inflation adjust to the 
year in which the results will be reported,155 we inflation adjust costs to 2018 as this is the most 
recent year where the GDP deflator from the World Bank is available.156 We adjusted for inflation 
before applying the exchange rate. Inflation adjusting approaches are compared and discussed in 
Appendix C2. As the cluster-randomized trial was conducted for more than a year, we discount 
costs so that all costs reflect the present value. Discounting is the process of converting future cost 
to their present value.123 This is important for economic policy to allow policy makers to compare 
costs overtime. We use a rate of 3% per year. 
 
c. Cost assignment:  
Costs were assigned based on both micro-costing and gross costing. Micro-costing entails 
conducting a detailed measurement of all activity inputs to determine costs.157 The costs were 
assigned to each child based on whether they were in the treatment group, their treatment needs 
and the number of children in the household. This entails multiplying the unit cost by each child. 
Gross costing is also used as there are costs that cannot be assigned at the child level. Therefore, 
aggregated data will be used to determine the average cost per child. The cost assignment details 
are described below: 
i. Cash transfer costs: We obtained the total cost of the cash transfer program and averaged 
this cost per households that were targeted in the CT-OVC program. We only assigned this 
average at the household level as there is no evidence that the cost of the cash transfer is 
based on the number of children in the treatment household.  
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ii. Medications: We included the average costs of treatment drugs for pneumonia and malaria. 
To assign the cost of medication we multiplied the unit cost of the drug by the number of 
days it takes to treat the illness in a child. We assumed that an illness requires a seven-day 
treatment.153 
iii. Labor costs: We used the average salary of a nurse and assigned the cost based on the 
number of times a child is taken to the clinic when they have an illness. We assumed that 
an ill child required two clinic visits; one at the beginning of the treatment and one to 
review the condition of the child. We also assumed it takes 20 minutes to care for an ill 
child.125 
iv. Health facility costs: We used gross costing to determine the health facility cost as actual 
utilization of the resources for each child cannot be determined. We assumed a visit lasts 
for approximately 20 minutes125 and use this to determine the proportion of the monthly 
health facility cost that is assigned to each visit to the clinic. 
v. Patient costs: We included patient costs in the form of transport costs and the opportunity 
cost of time spent caring for an ill child and for collecting the cash transfer. Since the cash 
transfer is administered monthly, the transport costs for receipt of cash transfer will be 
assigned as one trip a month for every child that is in the treatment group. We assumed that 
it costs a caregiver 4.5 income days to care for an ill child. Although it is common to use 
the minimum wage as a measure of productivity cost, for rural households that focus on a 
subsistence economy this may not be meaningful.  We use an estimate of US$1 (2005 
reporting year) a day based on a study that assessed the cost of uncomplicated fevers to 
households.  
Table 15 shows the variation in cost-assignment by treatment groups. 
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4.2.6. Incremental cost 
The incremental cost was calculated as the difference in costs between the treatment and 
control groups. We estimated a generalized estimating equation (GEE) to calculate the incremental 
cost.  
 
4.2.7. Statistical Analysis 
We estimated a generalized estimating equation (GEE) to estimate the incremental 
effectiveness (DALYs averted) and the incremental costs (US$2018). The GEE model with a 
binomial distribution and logit link was used to estimate the incremental effectiveness (DALYs 
averted) of the CT-OVC program. We used the GEE model because it estimates the change in the 
population mean given changes in the covariates while accounting for within neighborhood 
dependence.158 We estimate the model of the form: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝑎𝑋𝑖𝑗  (vi) 
 
Where Y is a binary measure for illness of the ith child from the jth community; CTOVC 
is 1 if the child was in a household that was a recipient of CT-OVC, and X is a matrix of participant 
characteristics (i.e. age, gender, education, orphan status, relationship to household head, wealth 
index, food insecurity, use of mosquito net, food variety, crowding index, unprotected water source 
and rural area: variable defined in Appendix C3) following the study that assessed the effectiveness 
of the CT-OVC.15 The coefficient 𝛽3 represents the effectiveness of the CT-OVC. We provide an 
evaluation of alternative statistical models in Appendix C4.  
To estimate the incremental costs, we use the GEE model with a gamma distribution. We 
estimate the following equation:  
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𝐸(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝑎𝑋𝑖𝑗 (vii) 
 
Where the Cost of the ith child from the jth community is a function of the CTOVC (equal 
to 1 if the child was in a household with CT-OVC) and X (the matrix of covariates as specified in 
model (vi) and Appendix C3). The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1. We discuss the statistical models 
to estimate the costs and the rationale for selecting the GEE model in Appendix C5. 
 
4.2.8. Cost effectiveness - Incremental Cost-effectiveness Ratio (ICER) 
Cost-effectiveness was measured using the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). 
The ICER is calculated as the incremental cost divided by the incremental effectiveness so that the 
ratio represents the cost (US$2018) per DALYS averted: 
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
        (viii) 
 
The threshold for cost-effectiveness was based on the Kenya’s per-capita GDP 
(US$1,710.51; 2018) based on WHO guidelines,123 such that the CT-OVC will be considered cost 
effective if it is less than 3 times Kenya’s GDP per capita (i.e., <US$5,131.53.159  As there is debate 
about the threshold for cost-effectiveness of 3 times the GDP per capita being too high and not in 
alignment with funded programs and policies, we additionally considered the CT-OVC as highly 
cost-effective if it is less than the per GDP/capita of Kenya (i.e., <US$1,710.51).159  The threshold 
represents the willingness to pay for an additional child health benefit (or DALY averted) from 
the CT-OVC. To estimate the 95% confidence intervals of the ICER, we used non-parametric 
bootstrap using 1500 replications.160 Although there is no consensus on the number of replications, 
it is recommended to have more than 1000 replications.161,162 
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4.2.9.  Uncertainty analysis 
a. One--way sensitivity analysis:  
We assessed the uncertainty associated with costs obtained from different data sources. We 
conducted one-way sensitivity analyses, which are a deterministic sensitivity analysis where single 
cost components are varied and the effect on the ICER results is reported.163 The deterministic 
analysis, although not commonly conducted in cost-effectiveness analysis, was used to provide 
more information on key factors driving the cost-effectiveness of the intervention. The one-way-
sensitivity analysis was conducted by varying the cost components one at a time (i.e. using the 
best and worst case scenario based on the lower and upper bound of the base costs, respectively) 
to determine the main cost drivers. Baseline costs were provided in Table 16 above. 
 
b. Multi-way sensitivity analysis  
As multiple costs are uncertain, we also conducted a multi-way sensitivity analysis to account for 
the best and worst case scenarios.163 Therefore, we set all the costs to the extreme values using the 
lower bound (or upper bounds) to obtain the ICER of the best case scenario (or worst case 
scenario). Lower and upper bound costs were based on the 95% confidence intervals. Where 
confidence intervals were not available, we used 50% higher and lower than the base case as the 
upper and lower bound, respectively. 
 
c. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves 
We estimated cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEAC) to assess the uncertainty 
associated with the ICER estimates. We estimated the CEAC from the joint distribution of 
incremental costs and incremental effectiveness estimated using non-parametric bootstraps 
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methods. Specifically, we randomly drew a sample of children from the treatment and control 
groups and estimated the mean incremental effectiveness and costs. We then calculated the ICER 
from the estimated effectiveness and costs of costs of 1500 replications. To reduce bias with the 
bootstrap estimates, our bootstrap replications were more than the recommended 1000 
replications.161,162 The CEAC was constructed by calculating the proportion of bootstrap replicas 
falling within the acceptable willingness-to-pay threshold.160 
 
d. Sensitivity analysis- complete case analysis  
As we assumed some children that were not in the follow-up survey died, we conducted a 
complete case analysis using the sample of children that were in both wave 1 and wave 2 of the 
data. We included 921 children aged 0 to 7 years interviewed in both 2007 and 2009, lived in 
households that were in treatment and control groups and had complete data (outcome and 
covariates). We used the complete case sample of the previous study  that analyzed the 
effectiveness of the CT-OVC.15 This study sample represented 79.3% of the original sample of 
children aged 0-7 years old that were in the same intervention group in 2007 and 2009. However, 
we did not assign a reduction in the life expectancy following an illness of malaria and pneumonia 
considering the 2-year time horizon of the study. Although all children in the study sample are 
alive in 2007 and 2009, getting malaria or pneumonia has long term impacts on health and 







Replicating the effectiveness of the CT-OVC, we report the odds ratios associated with a 
child getting pneumonia or malaria (Table 17). We found that children in households that received 
the CT-OVC were less likely to get ill. Specifically, children in the treatment group had 0.605 
[95% CI: 0.414-0.885] lower odds of getting pneumonia/malaria compared to children in the 
control. Compared to children aged 5-7 years old, children aged 1-2 years were more likely to get 
ill. The higher the age of the caregiver, the lower the odds of the child getting pneumonia/malaria. 
Children living in rural areas and with higher food insecurity had high odds of getting ill, while 
















Table 17: Effectiveness of the CT-OVC 
 Pneumonia/ Malaria 
 Odds ratios CI 
CT-OVC 0.605*** [0.414 - 0.885] 
Post 1.168 [0.840 - 1.624] 
Treatment status 1.744 [0.786 - 1.415] 
Age     Ref: 5 – 7 years   
Under 1 year 1.415 [0.897 - 2.230] 
1 – 2 years 1.531*** [1.134 - 2.067] 
3 – 4 years 1.102 [0.867 - 1.401] 
Male child 0.888 [0.727 - 1.084] 
Orphan status 0.918 [0.734 - 1.147] 
Child/Grandchild 0.898 [0.614 - 1.315] 
Female household head 0.949 [0.760 - 1.185] 
Age of household head 0.993** [0.987 - 0.999] 
Household head education  1.011 [0.984 - 1.039] 
Rural 1.451*** [1.105 - 1.903] 
Mosquito net 1.018 [0.804 - 1.289] 
Unprotected/open water source 1.105 [0.890 - 1.372] 
Poor cook fuel quality  1.236 [0.204 - 7.501] 
Crowding index 0.940** [0.897 - 0.986] 
Asset/wealth index 0.942 [0.865 - 1.026] 
Food insecurity 1.307** [1.042 - 1.641] 
Food expenditures 1.000 [1.000 - 1.000] 
Food variety 1.038** [1.008 - 1.069] 
Constant 0.744 [0.123 - 6.120] 
Observations 1,842  
Number of children 921  




4.3.2. Incremental effectiveness  
The CT-OVC program reduced child illnesses amongst children less than seven years. The 
average DALYs for the treatment group was estimated as 1.80 (95% CI 1.78 – 1.82) and in the 
control was estimated as 2.01 (95% CI 1.98 – 2.05; Table 18). The incremental effectiveness was 




Table 18: Effectiveness and Incremental Effectiveness 
 Child Illness  95% CI 
DALYs in treatment group 1.80 [1.78 – 1.82] 
DALYs in the control group 2.01 [1.98 - 2.05] 
Incremental Effectiveness (DALYS)* 0.212 [0.174 - 0.251] 
Abbreviations: CI, confidence intervals; DALYs, Disability adjusted life years 
*Based on results of the GEE model  
 
 
4.3.3. Economic costs  
The economic costs stratified by treatment and control group are presented in Table 19. 
From the healthcare perspective, the mean total cost per child in the treatment group was 
US$152.80 [95% CI 149.77-155.84]] compared with US$0.94 [95% CI 8.88-0.99] in the control. 
Similarly, the mean costs were higher in the treatment (US$212.42 [95% CI 208.58-216.25]) 
compared to the control (US$7.09 [95% CI 6.67-7.51]) from the societal perspective. The cash 
transfer administration was the highest cost in the treatment group (US$151.99 [95% CI 148.96-
155.03]]) while caregiver time was the highest cost in the control group (US$7.17 [95% CI .77-
7.56]).  
 
4.3.4. Incremental costs  
The CT-OVC had an incremental cost of US$146.83 [95% CI 142.83 – 50.83] from the 
healthcare perspective and US$193.3 [95% CI 186.2 - 200.5)] from the societal perspective (Table 






Table 19: Mean cost per participant in treatment versus control, 2018US$ 
  Treatment Control   
  Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI p-value* 
CT-OVC            
Cash transfer payment 40.11 [39.31-40.91] 0 - <0.001 
Administration 151.99 [148.96-155.03] 0 - <0.001 
Medications 0.167 [0.159-0.175] 0.189 [0.178-0.199] 0.0007 
Nurse Salary 0.058 [0.056-0.061] 0.066 [0.063 - 0.069] <0.001 
Health facility 0.76 [0.722-0.827] 0.862 [0.814-0.91] <0.001 
Patient costs            
Transport (cash transfer) 14.17 [14.17-14.17] 0 - <0.001 
Transport (clinic visit) 0.145 [0.1470.159] 0.166 [0.567-0.175] <0.001 
Care giver time 6.31 [6.00-6.61] 7.17 [6.77-7.56] <0.001 
Total cost (healthcare perspective) 152.80 [149.77-155.84] 0.94 [0.88-0.99] <0.001 
Total cost (societal perspective) 212.42 [208.58-216.25] 7.09 [6.67-7.51] <0.001 


















Table 20: Incremental costs of the CT-OVC, (US$2018) 
  Healthcare perspective Societal perspective 
  Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI 
CT-OVC 146.83*** (142.83 – 50.83) 193.3*** (186.2 - 200.5) 
Post 1.858* (-0.177 - 3.893) 2.768* (-0.0652 - 5.601) 
Ref: 5 – 7 years     
Age: under 1 year -2.925 (-8.660 - 2.810) 1.161 (-6.792 - 9.114) 
Age: 1 – under 3 years -1.713 (-5.796 - 2.370) 1.713 (-3.784 - 7.210) 
Age: 3 – under 5 years -0.132 (-2.500 - 2.236) 0.941 (-2.328 - 4.210) 
Male child 0.00660 (-4.597 - 4.611) -1.140 (-7.161 - 4.882) 
Orphan status 1.245 (-1.789 - 4.279) 0.955 (-3.212 - 5.123) 
Child/Grandchild -2.720 (-7.474 - 2.035) -5.474 (-12.10 - 1.148) 
Female household head -4.581 (-10.12 - 0.959) -5.271 (-12.38 - 1.837) 
Age of household head 0.0263 (-0.0274 - 0.0800) -0.00563 (-0.0830 - 0.0718) 
Household head education  0.0651 (-0.349 - 0.479) 0.164 (-0.416 - 0.744) 
Rural 4.119 (-2.559 - 10.80) 6.895 (-1.794 - 15.58) 
Mosquito net 1.125 (-1.435 - 3.686) 1.963 (-1.561 - 5.486) 
Unprotected/open water source 0.328 (-1.867 - 2.522) 1.701 (-1.364 - 4.765) 
Poor cook fuel quality  -23.05** (-45.79 - -0.313) -32.12** (-62.00 - -2.233) 
Crowding index -1.671*** (-2.160 - -1.181) -2.342*** (-3.015 - -1.668) 
Asset/wealth index -0.101 (-0.709 - 0.507) -0.0557 (-0.914 - 0.802) 
Food insecurity 0.0934 (-2.735 - 2.921) 1.531 (-2.303 - 5.366) 
Food expenditures -0.000326 (-0.00194 - 0.00129) -0.000119 (-0.00230 - 0.00206) 
Food variety 0.0623 (-0.190 - 0.315) 0.200 (-0.153 - 0.552) 
Seasonality 1.268** (0.185 - 2.351) 1.464* (-0.0363 - 2.965) 
Constant 21.17* (-3.770 - 46.11) 36.60** (3.422 - 69.77) 
Observations 2,224  2,224 2,224 





4.3.5. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) 
We present the calculated ICER in the base case scenario from the healthcare and societal 
perspectives (Table 21). The ICER of the CT-OVC with respect to reducing child illness from the 
healthcare perspective was US$691.27 [95% CI 575.68-806.86] per DALY averted and 
US$939.82 [95% CI 752.14-1127.51] per DALY averted from the societal perspective. Given the 
GDP per capita of Kenya (2018) of US$1710.51, the CT-OVC is cost-effective in reducing child 
illness since the ICER is less than 3 times the per-capita GDP (<US$5,131.53). Additionally, the 
CT-OVC is highly cost-effective as the ICER from both the healthcare and societal perspective is 
less than the per-capita GDP. 
 
 
4.3.6. Uncertainty analysis  
a. One-way sensitivity analysis  
The main cost drivers are presented in the one-way sensitivity analysis (Figure 2). The cash 
transfer administrative cost and cash transfer payment are the main cost drivers. For instance, 
taking the best-case scenario of the cash transfer payment (US$35.76) reduces the ICER from 
US$939.82 to US$593.94 per DALY averted from the societal perspective. Taking the worst-case 
scenario of the administrative cost of the cash transfer would increase the ICER to US$1285.56 
per DALY averted. The CT-OVC is still cost-effective and highly cost-effective in all scenarios 








b. Multi-way sensitivity analysis  
In the best-case scenario, the CT-OVC is highly cost-effective (ICER<1X Kenya’s per 
capita GDP) from both the societal and healthcare perspective (Table 22). In the worst-case 
scenario, the CT-OVC is still highly cost-effective in reducing child illnesses among orphans and 
vulnerable children from the healthcare perspective and societal perspective. 
 
 
c. Sensitivity analysis – complete case analysis 
The finding of the sensitivity analysis that the CT-OVC is not cost-effective (Appendix 
C6) should be interpretated with caution. The high ICER is being driven by limitations of sample 
restriction, complete case analysis, to only children that were alive in the two waves of data used. 
This may have underestimated the DALYs as we do not account for years of life lost. As the 
denominator in the ICER ratio gets smaller or is underestimated, the cost-effectiveness ratio gets 








Table 21: Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios of CT-OVC 
 Healthcare perspective Societal perspective 
 Estimate 95% CI* Estimate 95% CI* 
Incremental effectiveness (DALYs averted) 0.21 [0.174 - 0.251] 0.21 [0.174 - 0.251] 
Incremental cost (US$) 146.8 (142.83 – 50.83) 199.63*** (194.52-204.73[ 
ICER  691.27 [575.68-806.86] 939.82  [752.14-1127.51] 
Abbreviations: CI, confidence intervals; DALYs, disability adjusted life years; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio;  
US$, United States Dollars 





Table 22: Multi-way sensitivity analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the CT-OVC: best and worst cases 
 Healthcare perspective Societal perspective 
 Estimate 95% CI* Estimate 95% CI* 
Best case scenario:     
Incremental effectiveness (DALYs averted) 0.21 [0.174 - 0.251] 0.21 [0.174 - 0.251] 
Incremental cost (US$) 73.42 [71.42-75.41] 99.82 [97.27-102.37] 
ICER 345,64  [274.31-416.97] 469.96 {342.59-597.31] 
Worst case scenario:     
Incremental effectiveness (DALYs averted) 0.21 [0.174 - 0.251] 0.21 [0.174 - 0.251] 
Incremental cost (US$) 220.25 [214.26-226.25] 299.45 [291.80-307.10] 
ICER 1036.92  [744.84-1328.99] 1409.79 [1053.54-1766.03] 
Abbreviations: CI, confidence intervals; DALYs, disability adjusted life years; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio;  
US$, United States Dollars 
*95% CI generated using the bootstrap method 
The best-case scenario was estimated by using the lower bound values for all cost components. The worst-case scenario was estimated 











4.3.7. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves and willingness-to-pay for CT-OVC  
We examined the uncertainty associated with the cost-effectiveness of the CT-OVC. Figure 
3 presents the joint distribution of the differences in costs and effects of CT-OVC in reducing 
pneumonia/malaria from 1500 bootstrap samples. All the bootstrapped data is on the northeast 
quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane showing that the cash transfer program increases both the 
costs and effects (DALYs averted). The cost-effectiveness acceptability curve shows the 
probability that the cash-transfer is cost-effective given varying willingness-to-pay thresholds 
(Figure 4). The probability that the CT-OVC is cost-effective reaches 1 at a willingness-to-pay 
threshold of $1287 dollars which is still less than Kenya’s GDP per capita, therefore at this 
















willingness to pay threshold the CT-OVC will always be cost-effective. Given the base case 
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We conducted an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis of the CT-OVC in reducing 
pneumonia and malaria amongst children under seven years of age in Kenya. From the healthcare 
perspective, the mean total cost per child in the treatment group was US$152.80 [95% CI 149.77-
155.84]] compared with US$0.94 [95% CI 8.88-0.99] in the control. Additionally, the CT-OVC 
had an incremental cost of US$146.83 [95% CI 142.83 – 50.83] from the healthcare perspective 
and US$193.3 [95% CI 186.2 - 200.5)] from the societal perspective. We found that the CT-OVC 
is cost-effective and highly cost-effective from both the healthcare and societal perspective. 
Specifically, the ICER of the CT-OVC with respect to reducing child illness from the healthcare 
perspective was US$691.27 [95% CI 575.68-806.86] per DALY averted and US$939.82 [95% CI 
752.14-1127.51] per DALY averted from the societal perspective.  
Our finding that the CT-OVC is a cost-effective strategy is similar to a prior study that 
found a cash transfer program cost-effectiveness in improving education outcomes122 but differs 
from a study conducted in Burkina Faso that did not find a cash program effective in improving 
child nutrition.121 While these studies provide evidence on cost-effectiveness of cash transfer 
programs, our study is the first to our knowledge to examine the cost-effectiveness of a cash 
transfer program with respect to infectious diseases amongst children. Despite available studies 
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of various approaches to prevent malaria125–127 and 
pneumonia133–135 in children, none have examined a cash-transfer program as a strategy to reduce 
these diseases. Further, prior studies have not conducted formal cost-effectiveness analyses,123,124 
and thus we provide evidence by conducting an incremental cost-effectiveness analysis. 
This study contributes to the limited literature on cost-effectiveness of cash transfer 






country, this cost-effectiveness study contributes to the evidence base to aid decision makers in 
the country and other developing countries on whether implementing cash transfer programs offers 
the best value for money amongst the alternate policies aimed to improve child health. There are 
a number of cash transfer programs being implemented in the sub-Saharan region such as the Child 
Grant program164 in South Africa that should be continued as they may reduce illnesses amongst 
children. Further, policy makers could consider restarting previous cash transfer programs that 
were discontinued in the region such as Zambia’s Child Grant program. Our study provides 
evidence to support expansion of social protection programs and the major cost drivers such that 
planners can project the costs required to achieve targeted child health outcomes after expansions.    
Additionally, recent prior evidence suggests positive spillover effects of cash transfer 
programs, as evidenced from a study examining a cash transfer program for pregnant women and 
mothers of children under one year living in poverty, the Ghana Livelihood Empowerment Against 
Poverty (LEAP) 2000 program. The LEAP 2000 improved social support for beneficiaries,106 
showing that cash transfer improve beneficiary households beyond the monetary benefits. 
 
4.4.1. Limitations 
This study has several limitations. Firstly, the longitudinal cluster-randomized study was 
not designed for an economic evaluation study and did not collect cost data. We therefore extracted 
cost estimates from multiple sources which could lead to bias in the cost estimates. However, to 
reduce the bias of these estimates, we extracted the costs from countries with similar contexts as 
Kenya. We additionally assessed the uncertainty of the costs using one-way sensitivity analysis 
and multi-way sensitivity analysis. We found the CT-OVC still cost-effective in the best- and 






Secondly, we did not have data on whether a child died from a case of malaria or 
pneumonia. We address this limitation by making assumptions about children dying based on 
reported age-sex mortality rates. However, since we do make assumptions about death, we 
conducted a sensitivity analysis based on the replication of the sample and effectiveness analysis 
of the prior study that assessed the impact of the CT-OVC on child illnesses. In this sample, the 
study restricted the analysis to children who were in both wave 1 and wave 2 datasets. Although 
we found the CT-OVC not cost-effective in this sensitivity analysis, the estimated DALYs may 
not be appropriate. As there is a probability of death associated with a case of malaria or 
pneumonia, the complete cases analysis is potentially underestimating the number of children that 
were ill. Similar limitations exist with the outcome as this was a self-reported measure based on 
whether a child was ill in prior months. We anticipate that the ICER estimates from the sensitivity 
analysis are over-estimated due to the limitations in the measurement of the outcomes. Therefore, 
to capture the long-term consequence of illnesses in children, including years of life lost is 
appropriate when estimating DALYs.  
An additional limitation of the study is the short time horizon that this study considers. 
This is particularly a challenge for policy makers that may be interested in assessing how long a 
program might have value for money to support public allocation planning and decisions. The 
short time horizon does not enable the analysis to account for practical implementation issues, 
such as staff turnover, that may make the program more costly and less effective in the long run. 
Further, the study does not account for unintended consequences, such as community members 
responsible for selecting the vulnerable children, doing so based on those they have established 
relationships with. We attempted to address this limitation by using a GEE model to account for 






additional possibility of spillover effects, such that the cash transfer is shared to non-cash transfer 
households as evidenced with similar cash transfer progamss,104 the cash transfer amount is small 
such that we do not anticipate this would significantly impact our ICER estimates. Despite these 
limitations, our study provides initial evidence upon which future studies can use to project the 
outcomes and costs of the CT-OVC over a longer time-horizon.  
 
4.4.2. Conclusion  
The CT-OVC is cost-effective in reducing infectious diseases amongst children in Kenya. 
As Kenya is a resource limited country, this cost-effectiveness study contributes to the evidence 
base to aid decision making in similar sub-Saharan countries, on evaluating alternate strategies 
that offer the best value for money in reducing illnesses amongst children. Noting that cash transfer 
programs are more efficient and easier to scale up than other resource intensive programs such as 
those that involve nutrition supplements or behavior change communication, policy makers should 
consider expanding current cash transfer programs and restarting discontinued cash transfer 
















Chapter V: Conclusion 
Policy makers play an important role in promoting appropriate healthcare use, especially 
for low-income individuals who face many barriers to accessing care. Although several policy 
options are available, this dissertation examined two important policies that can increase the supply 
of, and demand of health services: provider payments and cash transfer programs. Medicaid plays 
a crucial role in delivering health services to low-income individuals - providing public health 
insurance coverage to over 75 million low-income individuals,4 and about 25 million adult women 
in the US.7 Regardless, provider payments are generally lower than other payers, for instance 
compared to Medicare, and this may have implications beneficiaries access to care.   
Given the importance of Medicaid for women’s health, changes in the coverage, program’s 
financing and structure have important implications for their access to care.7 We leverage the state-
level variation in physician payments, and use Medicaid claims (2008 -2012) data to examine the 
association of provider payments and access to SUD treatment amongst women of reproductive 
age. We found evidence that NH-Black women living in states with higher Medicaid physician 
fees were more likely to have higher access to SUD treatment. The findings are important for 
Medicaid policy as increasing physician payments can be used as tool to address the unmet 
treatment need of minorities, specifically amongst NH-Black women. Addressing the low provider 
payments in Medicaid markets that disproportionately pay for services for low-income women, 
can reduce the incidence of SUD among women of reproductive age, and consequently improve 
other health outcomes. 
Further, policy makers may allocate resources to social protection programs, such as cash 
transfer programs, to address the financial barriers associated with obtaining health services. In 






Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) disbursed approximately $10 million dollars to households.66 As 
with most cash transfer programs in developing countries, there is limited evidence finding the 
CT-OVC effective in increasing health service utilization.15 However, we examined the impact of 
the CT-OVC on child healthcare use and account for the role of economic preferences in 
moderating the cash transfer program impacts – addressing a major limitation with prior studies.  
Understanding whether economic preferences are a modifier in the relationship between 
cash transfers and healthcare allows a more comprehensive evaluation of cash transfer program 
effects. We found evidence that a caregiver’s time preference moderates the impact of the CT-
OVC on child healthcare utilization. Therefore, receiving the CT-OVC enables caregivers to enact 
on their preferences once budget constraints are relieved. This finding has important policy 
implications as the evidence from our study can be used to advocate for increased resource 
allocation to social protection programs to improve children’s health.  
Finally, we found that the CT-OVC is cost-effective strategy in reducing illnesses amongst 
children from both the healthcare and societal perspective. As Kenya is a resource limited country, 
our findings contribute to the evidence base to aid decision makers in the country, and other 
developing countries, on whether implementing cash transfer programs offers the best value for 
money amongst the alternate policies aimed to improve child health. Policy makers should 
consider continuation of discontinued cash transfer programs or increasing the scale of existing 
programs targeted at vulnerable populations. Policy makers can project the costs required to 
achieve targeted child health outcomes after expansions based on our findings. However, 
additional health programming aligned to social protection programs, such cash-plus programs 
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Appendix A1: Economic and conceptual framework for paper 1 
 
A1.1. Economic framework 
 
This study is based on Sloan et al (1978)165 economic framework to explain how an 
increases in Medicaid physician payments increase the supply of health services for Medicaid 
patients. For simplicity, this model assumes there are only two markets, Medicaid and the private 
market, for which a provider can supply units of health services to. In the Medicaid market, the 
provider accepts payment as payment in full, and is not allowed to obtain additional funds from 
the patient.165 Consequently, in the market for Medicaid patients, providers face a perfectly elastic 
demand curve40 since the fee schedule in that market is fixed and they would demand the services 
of another provider in the market if they encounter one who is unwilling to supply the service at 
the set fee-schedule. Therefore, the Medicaid market represents a price-taking market such that the 
revenue in the Medicaid market is given by: 
 
𝑠𝑥                  (i) 
 
Where s is the Medicaid fee schedule and x is the number of units of the health services 
sold to the Medicaid patient.165 Administrative costs, such as bill collection costs, are a key 
component in the providers willingness to supply health services to the Medicaid market and 
therefore, model (i) is adjusted to: 
 
(𝑠 − 𝑔)𝑥                  (ii) 
 
Where g is the administrative cost in the Medicaid market.165 
 
In the private market, a provider faces a downward-sloping demand curve165 because even 
as a provider charges a higher price for its service, there will still be a market at the new price.3 In 
the absence of health insurance, the price-setting demand function is given by: 
 
𝑝(𝑦, ?̅?; 𝑀)                              (iii) 
 
Where p is the unit price net of bad debts, y is the quantity sold in the private or price-
setting market, ?̅? is the administrative cost associated with the private market and M reflects 
exogenous variable affecting the provider’s demand curve.165 For instance, M could represent a 
patient’s income, since without insurance coverage, it is the patient’s responsibility to pay the 
provider for the service. A bad debt would arise from the inability of a patient to pay their medical 
bill.   
The price-setting demand function with the presence of Medicaid and private insurance is 
given by:  
 







Where f is the expected (mean) fee schedule in the private setting market, ?̅? in the Private 
market fee schedule, ?̅? is the administrative cost associated with the private market and M is any 
exogenous variable, such as patient income, affecting the fee-schedule. In the market represented 
by (iv), a patient submits a claim to a third party, yet the third-party coverage of the providers 
services is incomplete as the patient has to pay part of the bill. Therefore, the patient’s income 
would still affect the expected fee schedule in the private market with insurance.  
 
In such a market, the provider maximizes the following function:165 
 
𝜋 = (𝑠 − 𝑔)𝑥 + [𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?; 𝑀) + 𝑝(𝑦, ?̅?; 𝑀) − ?̅?]𝑦 − 𝐶(𝑥 + 𝑦; 𝑁)   (v) 
 
Where, C(x+y;N) is the providers cost function for the cost C associated with seeing a 
Medicaid patient x and private patient y. In this simple model, it is assumed that the cost of 
providing service to a Medicaid patient Cx is the same cost as providing it to the private patient 
Cy,165 so that the cost of seeing a patient in either market does not influence a providers 
maximization objective. Since providing services to patients is the same regardless of the market,40 
physicians will allocate their time between Medicaid patients x and private patients y such that 
marginal revenue in the two markets is equal.166 Since providers have control over the extent of 
their involvement with patients,166  they maximize 𝜋 by deciding on the levels of x and y while 
taking into consideration s, ?̅?, g and M.  
When Medicaid fees increase relative to the private market, a provider is encouraged to 
reallocate their work effort so that they supply more services to Medicaid patients. However, the 
increased Medicaid fees would have to be high enough to induce physicians who mainly saw 
private patients to now provide their services to the Medicaid market.166 Thus, an increase in the 
Medicaid fee rate will entice providers on the margin to provide more services to the patients in 
the Medicaid market.40 
Consequently, the present study hypothesizes that higher Medicaid physician fee rates will 
increase the supply of health supply services to Medicaid patients.  
 
A1.2. Conceptual framework  
 
The conceptual framework for this study is based on Andersen’s behavioral model.57 This 
model is widely used for explaining healthcare service utlization.167 The Andersen model shows 
how the health care system, external environment, predisposing characteristics and enabling 
resources interact and affect health service utilization.57,167,168  
Within the healthcare system, Medicaid policy determines the providers reimbursement 
rates that affect provider availability and improve access and quality of SUD treatment. As 
described in the economic framework, an increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates will increase 
the amount of healthcare services supplied to Medicaid patients.34,40 
With more providers available, Medicaid patient’s access to health services will increase 
with decreases in travel and wait times as potential mechanisms.29 A crucial implication of this is 
that a patient is more likely to commence SUD treatment but also to continue with treatment, which 
is an indicator of treatment quality, once they access care. Moreover, increased access to SUD 
treatment may also increase access to guideline-concordant preventive and chronic disease 
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While provider supply may increase the access and quality of SUD treatment, we observe 
from the Andersen framework that predisposing factors, enabling characteristics and need also 
affect health care utilization. It should be noted that while these factors may impact health 
outcomes on their own, the model attempts to provide a causal pathway upon which these 
components result in the observed health outcomes.57 
Predisposing factors such as age and race and ethnicity affect SUD treatment utilization. 
Individuals who are older and White are more likely to have access to SUD treatment171 and be 
retained in treatment.172,173 Enabling characteristics such as income,174 living in an urban 
area,175,176 being employed174 and having insurance coverage176 are also associated with higher 
substance use treatment utilization. Further, the level of need for substance use treatment services 
will affect treatment-seeking behaviors. For instance, individuals with high comorbidities11,177,178 
and PLWH178–180 may use more treatment services due to their poor health that increases demand 
for care.  
Although the present study focuses on the intermediate outcome (access and quality of 
SUD treatment) it is worth noting that with more women of reproductive age receiving higher 
quality SUD treatment, improvement in health outcomes such as higher infant birthweight babies, 




































Appendix A2: ICD-9 codes for identification of individuals with SUD 
Code Description 
Alcohol  
            291.0 Alcohol withdrawal delirium 
291.1 Alcohol-induced persisting amnestic disorder 
291.2 Alcohol-induced persisting dementia 
291.3 Alcohol-induced psychotic disorder with hallucinations 
291.4 Idiosyncratic alcohol intoxication 
291.5 Alcohol-induced psychotic disorder with delusions 
291.81 Alcohol withdrawal 
291.82 Alcohol induced sleep disorders 
            291.89 Other alcohol-induced mental disorders 
            291.9 Unspecified alcohol-induced mental disorders 
303.00 Acute alcoholic intoxication in alcoholism, unspecified 
303.01 Acute alcoholic intoxication in alcoholism, continuous 
303.02 Acute alcoholic intoxication in alcoholism, episodic 
303.03 Acute alcoholic intoxication in alcoholism, in remission 
303.9 Other and unspecified alcohol dependence, unspecified 
303.91 Other and unspecified alcohol dependence, continuous 
303.92 Other and unspecified alcohol dependence, episodic 
303.93 Other and unspecified alcohol dependence, in remission 
305.00 Alcohol abuse 
305.01 Alcohol abuse 
305.02 Alcohol abuse 
305.03 Alcohol abuse 
357.5 Alcohol polyneuropathy 
425.5 Alcoholic cardiomyopathy 
535.30  Alcoholic gastritis 
535.31 Alcoholic gastritis 
571.0 Alcoholic fatty liver 
571.1 Acute alcoholic hepatitis 
571.2 Alcoholic cirrhosis of liver 
571.3 Alcoholic liver damage, unspecified  
E860.0 Alcoholic beverage poisoning  
Amphetamines  
304.4 Amphetamine and other psychostimulant dependence, unspecified 
304.41 Amphetamine and other psychostimulant dependence, continuous 
304.42 Amphetamine and other psychostimulant dependence, episodic 
304.43 Amphetamine and other psychostimulant dependence, in remission 







305.71 Amphetamine or related acting sympathomimetic abuse, continuous 
305.72 Amphetamine or related acting sympathomimetic abuse, episodic 
305.73 Amphetamine or related acting sympathomimetic abuse, in remission 
Cannabis   
304.30 Cannabis dependence, unspecified 
304.31 Cannabis dependence, continuous 
304.32 Cannabis dependence, episodic 
304.33 Cannabis dependence, in remission 
305.20 Cannabis abuse, unspecified 
305.21 Cannabis abuse, continuous 
305.22 Cannabis abuse, episodic 
305.23 Cannabis abuse, in remission 
Cocaine  
304.20 Cocaine dependence, unspecified 
304.21 Cocaine dependence, continuous 
304.22 Cocaine dependence, episodic 
304.23 Cocaine dependence, in remission 
305.60 Cocaine abuse, unspecified 
305.61 Cocaine abuse, continuous 
305.62 Cocaine abuse, episodic 
305.63 Cocaine abuse, in remission 
968.5 Poisoning by cocaine 




292.0 Drug withdrawal 
            292.11 Drug-induced psychotic disorder with delusions 
292.12 Drug-induced psychotic disorder with hallucinations 
292.2 Pathological drug intoxication 
292.81 Drug-induced delirium 
292.82 Drug-induced persisting dementia 
292.83 Drug-induced persisting amnestic disorder 
292.84 Drug-induced mood disorder 
292.85 Drug induced sleep disorders 
292.89 Other specified drug-induced mental disorders 
292.9 Unspecified drug-induced mental disorder 
Hallucinogens  
304.50 Hallucinogen dependence, unspecified 
304.51 Hallucinogen dependence, continuous 







304.53 Hallucinogen dependence, in remission 
305.30 Hallucinogen abuse, unspecified 
305.31 Hallucinogen abuse, continuous 
305.32 Hallucinogen abuse, episodic 
305.33 Hallucinogen abuse, in remission 
969.6 Poisoning by hallucinogen  
E854.1 Accidental poisoning by hallucinogen 
E939.6 Hallucinogens, adverse effects 
Other  
304.60 Other specified drug dependence, unspecified 
304.61 Other specified drug dependence, continuous 
304.62 Other specified drug dependence, episodic 
304.63 Other specified drug dependence, in remission 
304.80 Combinations of drug dependence excluding opioid type drug, unspecified 
304.81 Combinations of drug dependence excluding opioid type drug, continuous 
304.82 Combinations of drug dependence excluding opioid type drug, episodic 
304.83 Combinations of drug dependence excluding opioid type drug, in remission 
304.90 Unspecified drug dependence, unspecified 
304.91 Unspecified drug dependence, continuous 
304.92 Unspecified drug dependence, episodic 
304.93 Unspecified drug dependence, in remission 
305.90 Other, mixed, or unspecified drug abuse, unspecified 
305.91 Other, mixed, or unspecified drug abuse, continuous 
305.92 Other, mixed, or unspecified drug abuse, unspecified 
305.93 Other, mixed, or unspecified drug abuse, continuous 
Sedatives, hypnotics, anxiolytics, tranquilizers, barbituates 
305.40 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic abuse, unspecified 
305.41 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic abuse, continuous 
305.42 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic abuse, episodic 
305.43 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic abuse, in remission 
304.10 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic dependence, unspecified 
304.11 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic dependence, continuous 
304.12 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic dependence, episodic 
304.13 Sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic dependence, in remission 
Opioids  
304.00 Opioid type dependence, unspecified 
304.01 Opioid type dependence, continuous 
304.02 Opioid type dependence, episodic 
304.03 Opioid type dependence, in remission 







305.51 Opioid abuse, continuous 
305.52 Opioid abuse, episodic 
305.53 Opioid abuse, in remission 
E850.0 Accidental poisoning by other opiates and related narcotics 
E935.0 Heroin, adverse effects 
304.70 Combination of opioids with any other 
304.71 Combination of opioids with any other 
304.72 Combination of opioids with any other 
304.73 Combination of opioids with any other 
965.00 Poisoning by opium 
965.01 Poisoning by heroin 
965.02 Poisoning by methadone 





































Appendix A3: Access to SUD - CPT codes for classification of outcomes 
CPT Code Description of CPT Codes Source  
90801 Interview evaluation 182 
99205 Induction 183 
99215 Induction  183 
90805 Stabilization  183 
90862 Pharmacologic management 183 
99201 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99202 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99203 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99204 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99205 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99211 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99212 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99213 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99214 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99215 Evaluation and management 183`184 
99354 Prolonged services 183`184 
99355 Prolonged services 183`184 
99408 
Alcohol and/or substance abuse structured screening and brief 
intervention services, 15–30 minutes. 
185 
99409 
Alcohol and/or substance (other than tobacco) abuse structured 
screening (eg, AUDIT, DAST), and brief intervention (SBI) services, 
greater than 30 minutes 
185 
9446 Alcoholism counselling 185 
9453 Referral alcohol rehab 185 
9461 Alcohol rehabilitation 185 
9462 Alcohol detoxification 185 
9463 Alcohol rehab/detox 185 
9467 Comb alcohol/drug rehab 185 
9468 Comb alcohol/drug detox 185 
99215 Evaluation and management 185 
99354 Prolonged services 185 
99355 Prolonged services 185 
9425 psychiat drug therap nec 185 
9445 drug addict counselling 185 
9454 referral for drug rehab 185 
9464 drug rehabilitation 185 
9465 drug detoxification 185 
9466 drug rehab/detox 185 
9467 comb alcohol/drug rehab 185 
9468 comb alcohol/drug detox 185 
9469 comb alco/drug reha/deto 185 
H0049 Alcohol and/or drug screening  185 
H0050 Alcohol and/or drug service, brief intervention, per 15 minutes 185 







Appendix A4: Sensitivity analyses for paper 1 
 
Appendix 4.1: Sensitivity analysis – Sample using 2008 and 2012 data only 
 Full sample(n=4616) NH-Whites (n=2276) NH-Black (n=1789) 







Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio 0.02479 0.03459 0.020 0.049 0.147*** 0.058 
Age (ref: NH-White):       
NH-Black -0.04*** 0.01314     
Hispanic -0.01958 0.02753     
Other -0.02537 0.02671     
Age (ref: <+45years):       
<25 years -0.12*** 0.01978 -0.112*** 0.02964 -0.129*** 0.02939 
25-34 -0.06*** 0.01697 -0.045** 0.02620 -0.077*** 0.02362 
35-44 years -0.031*** 0.01534 -0.048*** 0.02538 -0.019 0.01979 
Share of the population employed, 
county  
-3.19675 1.47920 -3.79*** 1.97 1.85885 2.78475 
Share of the population with more 
than high school, county   
0.00330 0.00190 0.00420 0.00299 0.00176 0.00400 
Share of the population living in an 
urban area, county    
-0.18799 0.18318 -0.54*** 0.249 0.36569 0.32220 
Comorbidity 0.00803 0.01997 0.03800 0.02611 0.01845 0.03876 
Average household income (ln ($)), 
county 
-0.00532 0.01197 -0.00777 0.01791 -0.02954 0.01667 
Managed care 0.01436 0.02748 0.02693 0.04073 -0.01768 0.03595 
SUD prevalence (%) -0.18*** 0.02729 -0.21*** 0.04 -0.099** 0.03793 
Intercept -56.29** 21.55754 -13.902 23.83532 -158.8*** 39.15416 
*controlling for year and state fixed effect; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; reporting linear 



























   Standard error 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio * Minority (black=1) 0.22*** 0.08622 
Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio 0.01855 0.02604 
Minority -0.23*** 0.06951 
Age (ref: 45+ years):   
<25 years -0.166*** 0.01798 
25-34 -0.065*** 0.01524 
35-44 years -0.029** 0.01328 
Share of the population employed, county  0.0018** 0.01637 
Share of the population with more than high school, county   -0.02045 0.01069 
Share of the population living in an urban area, county    0.02451 0.02572 
Average household income (ln ($)), county -0.20297 0.02328 
Comorbidity -2.56* 1.24268 
Managed care 0.00204 0.00182 
SUD prevalence (%) -0.24*** 0.16411 
Intercept -53.59*** 16.04128 








































Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio 0.02321 0.02530 -0.032 0.04262 0.08*** 0.030 
Age (ref: NH-White):       
NH-Black -0.056*** 0.01205     
Hispanic 0.04500** 0.02070     
Other -0.02912 0.02172     
Age (ref: <25 years):       
25-34 0.109*** 0.01764 0.11*** 0.02386 0.08*** 0.02938 
35-44 years 0.150*** 0.01633 0.12*** 0.02288 0.118** 0.02660 
45+ years 0.185*** 0.01755 0.18*** 0.02531 0.128*** 0.02822 
Share of the population employed, 
county  
-4.05*** 1.22691 -3.83498 1.63002 -1.00182 2.45417 
Share of the population with more 
than high school, county   
0.00516 0.00153 0.00344 0.00237 0.00162 0.00347 
Share of the population living in an 
urban area, county    
-0.16881 0.16222 -0.38* 0.22124 0.05760 0.29272 
Comorbidity -0.00022 0.01055 -0.00868 0.01551 -0.03** 0.01547 
Average household income (ln ($)), 
county 
-0.02359 0.01596 0.00676 0.02110 -0.04582 0.03034 
SUD prevalence (%) -0.1493*** 0.03921 -0.19*** 0.05594 -0.09* 0.05371 
Intercept -55.85154 15.72465 -12.21 24.43322 -120.51 22.10625 





















Appendix B1: Economic and conceptual framework for paper 2 
 
B1.1. Cash transfers and healthcare utilization 
Traditional economic theory provides a framework on how cash transfers may influence 
healthcare use. A simplified consumer demand model states that the demand for services (Dh) is a 
function of the price of the service (Ph), the price of an alternative service (Pa), income (I) and 
preferences, including economic preferences (E):3  
𝐷ℎ = 𝑓(𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑎, 𝐼, 𝐸)                 (i.a) 
Subject to a budget constraint I: 
  𝑃ℎ𝑋ℎ + 𝑃𝑎𝑋𝑎 = 𝐼                     (i.b) 
Such that 𝑋ℎ is the quantity of service and 𝑋𝑎 is the quantity of an alternative service. 
 
When there is an exogenous increase in income, such as through a cash transfer program, 
the budget constraint increases allowing for an individual to demand more health services.3  
 
B1.2. Time preference and healthcare utilization 
An individual’s preference for current consumption of a good or service is determined by 
their valuation of future consumption. The discounted utility (DU) model assumes that the 
motivation for intertemporal choice involves a single parameter – a discount rate- such that:78 
 





𝑘=0       (ii) 
                             
 
So that the utility obtained from the preference over consumption profiles (ct,…cT) is the 
total utility they derive from consumption in period t+k factoring in D(k) -the relative weight they 
place on their well-being in period t to their well-being in period t+k.78 This intertemporal utility 
function represents individual preference that assumes a person evaluates new alternatives by 
integrating them within existing plans.78 In the context of the present study on healthcare use, 
individuals face a choice of spending the money and time on current healthcare utilization that has 
some future benefit or using their money and time now for other goods and services that have 
smaller more immediate benefits. Their decision to spend money and time for healthcare in the 
present period t will depend on whether they value the future benefit in period t+k.  
To understand how caregivers’ time preference may influence children’s healthcare use, 
consider the following.  Rosenzweig and Schultz’s (1983) model for child health production is 
given by the utility function:  
 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 , 𝐻), 𝑖 = 1 … , 𝑛; 𝑗 = 𝑛 + 1, … , 𝑚              (iv) 
 
Such that a caregiver’s utility is derived from their child’s health H, the consumption of goods 
and services that do not affect a child’s health X and goods and services that affect a child’s 
health Y. Given that consumption profiles exist across time periods as shown in (ii) and the 
utility from a consumption profile is based on an individual’s discount factor (iii), a caregiver’s 








                       𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶𝐻 + 𝐶𝑋 + 𝐶𝑌
𝑇
𝑡=0                                (v) 
 
where CH, CX and CY represent consumption of H, X and Y in a time period, respectively. 
Consequently, the DU model would apply to (iv) such that a caregiver discounts the utility 
associated with their child health. That is, caregivers’ time preferences affect decisions about their 
children’s health because child health is in their utility function. Therefore, as described in (i.a) a 
caregiver’s discount rate represented in E will affect the cash transfer program impact on the 
demand children’s health care utilization 𝐷ℎ. 
 
B1.3. Risk preference and healthcare utilization 
Decisions that involve uncertainty or risk, ones where there are more than one possible 
outcome along with the probability associated with each outcome are influenced by individual’s 
risk aversion.186 Therefore, choices between options with uncertain outcomes, like using 
preventive health care services, can be modelled using expected utility.186 The expected utility 
model postulates that a person has a utility function that assigns a “utility” to each possible 
outcome such that a person chooses an outcome with the highest expected utility.186 Therefore, the 
expected utility function can be defined as:187 
 
𝐸𝑈(𝐴) = Σ𝑜∈𝑂𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑈(𝐴)    (vi) 
 
Where the expected utility EU of a caregiver A is given by the probability P of an outcome 
o and  𝑈(. ) is the utility associated with an outcome. Given the utility function in (iv), a caregiver 
will maximize the expected utility against a set of possible benefits and losses of children’s 
preventive healthcare use.  Alternatively, (vi) can be represented as:188 
 
𝑃 ∗ 𝑈(𝑌 − 𝐿) + (1 − 𝑃) ∗ 𝑈(𝑌)    (vii) 
 
Where in the context of the current study Y is defined as the gains from child healthcare utilization 
of preventive services and L is the loss or consequence associated with not using preventive 
services. Consequently, the impact of increased income from the cash transfer of child health care 
use may vary depending on the weight a caregiver places on the loss of child health from not using 
preventive healthcare, or their level of risk aversion. 
 
B1.4. Conceptual framework  
The economic framework described above provides the basis of the conceptual framework 
shown in Figure 3. Traditional economic theory suggests that an increase in income will expand 
the budget such that there are more resources available at an individual’s disposal.3  The resources 
available through a cash transfer to low-income households may increase access to care.189 With 
the increased accessibility of healthcare services, households can demand more services. However, 
whether they demand health services also depends on their economic preferences (discount rate 
and risk aversion).  
Traditional economic theory states that economic preferences are predetermined when a 
consumer enters a market.3 Therefore, while income may increase and these preferences remain 
unchanged, it is plausible that demand for that service may remain unchanged – depending on their 







on healthcare utilization as economic preferences shape demand, and consequently healthcare use. 
While there is some evidence that economic preferences can change with additional income as it 
allows households to contemplate delaying consumption,190 prior evaluation of the CT-OVC found 
no impact of the cash transfer on time and risk preferences.91 Therefore, economic preferences are 
considered in this study to be exogenous but they are expected to moderate the impact of the cash 
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An assumption of the DU model is that a consumer has sufficient information about the 
future benefits of consumption to be able to value consumption profiles across time periods.78 
Education and literacy of caregivers therefore becomes important in decisions about their 
children’s health care utilization.96 It is worth noting that, while the increase in income will 
determine healthcare use, the initial level of income or wealth95 will also determine whether or not 
there will be an increase in demand. It is possible that extremely poor households with low or no 
income will receive cash transfers, but this income will not be sufficient to offset current competing 
demands such that there will be an increase in consumption of other goods depending on their 
preference (that is X in (iv) as opposed to Y in the economic framework). However, in poor 
households, household spending serves as a proxy for resource constraints and competing demands 
for the household.96 Further, in poor households, the number of rooms proxies the level of wealth.99 
Consequently, the conceptual model incorporates household spending, the number of rooms and 
the number of children to account for these tradeoffs.  
 Additionally, while a caregiver may desire increased healthcare use for their child, the 
supply of healthcare must be available to meet the demand for these services.96 For instance, there 
needs to be facilities available for caregivers to actually seek care, enough staff to manage the 
demand at these healthcare facilities and medications for treatment.12 In addition, the costs of 
seeking care, such as cost of vaccinations may impact demand for health services. 
Finally, demographic factors also play a role in the demand for healthcare. Taking an 
example of age, an older individual may have more experience raising a child and may not seek 
treatment for a child experiencing a symptom from prior experience.96 Altogether, Figure 3 
represents how a cash transfer, economic preferences, and individual, household and community 























Appendix B2: Child healthcare utilization survey questions 
  
Has a health card: Whether or not a child has a health card is created as a binary measure based 
on the following survey question: “Does [NAME]have a health card (vaccination card, growth 
monitoring card)?” As a health card is usually provided with a birth or visit to a healthcare 
facility,90 this serves as an indicator of child healthcare utilization. 
 
Receipt of tuberculosis vaccination: A binary measure for whether a child had a BCG vaccination 
against tuberculosis was created using a combination of recorded information by the survey 
interviewer from the health card. Where the health card was not available, I use the self-reported 
measure based on the following survey question: “Has [NAME] received BCG vaccination against 
tuberculosis, that is, an injection in the left arm that usually causes a scar?” 
 
Receipt of DPT/Hep/Flu vaccination: A binary measure for whether there is any record for a 
vaccination against DPT, Hepatitis C, or Flu on the health card. While these are independent 
vaccines, the health card reports this as a single record if any of the vaccines were received. 
Therefore, where a health card was not available, I combine the self-reported measure based on 
the following survey question: “Has [NAME] received DPT vaccination, that is, an injection in 
the thigh, sometimes at the same time as polio drops?”  
 
Number of DPT vaccinations: Similar to the receipt of DPT/Hep/Flu above, a continuous measure 
for the number of times these vaccinations was recorded on the health card (out of 3) was created. 
If the respondent did not have the health card, I use the response to the question: “How many times 
was the DPT vaccine received in total?” 
 
Receipt of Polio vaccination: A binary measure for whether there is a record on the health card for 
any vaccination against Polio was created. Where a health card was not available, I use the self-
reported measure based on the following survey question: “Has [NAME] received Polio 
vaccination, that is, drops in the mouth?”  
 
Number of Polio vaccinations: A continuous measure for the number of times a Polio vaccination 
was recorded on the health card (out of 4). If the respondent did not have the health card, I use the 
response to the question: “How many times was the Polio vaccine received in total?” 
 
Measles: A binary measure for whether a child received a vaccination against measles was created 
based on the following question: “Has [NAME] received an injection in the upper right arm to 
prevent measles?”  
 
Diarrhea treatment: Respondents for children under the age of five were asked if the child had 
diarrhea in the last six months: “Has [NAME] had diarrhea in the last month?” For those responded 
yes, I create a binary measure for whether or not treatment was sought for diarrhea based on the 
follow-up question: “Did you seek advice or treatment for the diarrhea?” This question was asked 
to all respondent regardless of whether they had a health card or not. 
 
Cough/fever treatment: Amongst children who had a cough or fever, or an illness with a cough, I 







the fever/cough from a health facility, pharmacy, shop, or other person”? This question was also 
asked to all respondent regardless of whether they had a health card or not. 
 
Vitamin A supplements: A binary measure for whether a child received Vitamin A supplements by 
a health worker was created based on the following question: “In the last six months, has [NAME] 
been given Vitamin A supplements by a health worker?” As vitamin A supplements prevent 
against illnesses and death in children,70 when administered by a healthcare worker, this is an 







Appendix B3: Sensitivity Analyses for paper 2 
Appendix B3.1: Results analyzing outcomes on health card versus self-reported measures1 
 












DPT received  
Received Measles 
vaccination  
             
                          
CT-OVC 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 









 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
DD -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) 
             
Observations 1,402 1,401 1,402 2,433 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 











1 The outcomes in the main analysis that include both health card and self-reported measures are receipt of any BCG vaccination, receipt of any polio vaccination, 























             
                          
CT-OVC 0.07* 0.06 0.04 0.04 1.01*** 0.84*** 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.27) (0.28) (0.04) (0.05) (0.19) (0.35) (0.03) (0.04) 
POST 0.08** 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 -0.30 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.26) (0.26) (0.04) (0.05) (0.18) (0.34) (0.03) (0.04) 
DD -0.08* -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.73** -0.62* -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.32) (0.33) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22) (0.35) (0.04) (0.04) 
             
Observations 1,526 1,526 1,495 1,495 1,117 1,117 1,510 1,510 1,192 1,192 1,280 1,280 
R-squared 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 





































             
                          
CT-OVC 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
Time Preference 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.35 0.36*** 0.04 0.03* 0.22 0.21** 0.13 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.26) (0.14) (0.05) (0.02) (0.20) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) 
Post  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.26** -0.27** -0.00 0.00 -0.16* -0.18* -0.14*** -0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) 
CTOVC*Post 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) 
CTOVC * Time -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.00 -0.44 -0.40* -0.02 -0.03 -0.27 -0.24 -0.08 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.35) (0.23) (0.06) (0.02) (0.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) 
Time*Post  -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.22 -0.24 -0.09 -0.11 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.32) (0.19) (0.06) (0.04) (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.13 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.41) (0.31) (0.07) (0.04) (0.31) (0.28) (0.19) (0.16) 
             
Observations 1,262 1,261 1,262 1,261 1,262 1,261 1,262 1,261 1,262 1,261 1,262 1,261 
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 































             
                          
CT-OVC 0.10** 0.10* 0.08** 0.09** 1.11*** 0.94*** 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.30) (0.31) (0.05) (0.06) (0.21) (0.41) (0.04) (0.05) 
Time Preference 0.15 0.15 0.19* 0.17*** -0.39 -0.31 0.25* 0.24*** -0.31 -0.20 0.14 0.14*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.93) (0.35) (0.14) (0.06) (0.69) (0.37) (0.10) (0.05) 
Post  0.10** 0.08 0.06* 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.19 -0.37 0.03 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.29) (0.28) (0.04) (0.06) (0.20) (0.39) (0.04) (0.04) 
CTOVC*Post -0.11** -0.12* -0.08* -0.08 -0.75** -0.70* -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.36) (0.37) (0.05) (0.06) (0.25) (0.41) (0.04) (0.05) 
CTOVC * Time -0.19 -0.18 -0.25** -0.23** -0.30 -0.14 -0.28* -0.27*** -0.28 -0.28 -0.18 -0.12 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (1.09) (0.55) (0.16) (0.10) (0.79) (0.49) (0.12) (0.09) 
Time*Post  -0.17 -0.15 -0.23* -0.19* 0.01 0.25 -0.28* -0.23* 0.23 0.42 -0.15 -0.16** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (1.08) (0.55) (0.16) (0.12) (0.77) (0.57) (0.12) (0.08) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  0.23 0.22 0.34** 0.33** 0.02 -0.07 0.36** 0.32** 0.32 0.09 0.12 0.07 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (1.28) (0.76) (0.18) (0.16) (0.90) (0.69) (0.14) (0.12) 
             
Observations 1,369 1,369 1,342 1,342 997 997 1,355 1,355 1,066 1,066 1,152 1,152 
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 






























VARIABLES                
                       
CT-OVC 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.17) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) 
Risk Preference 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.18) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) 
Post  -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.33** -0.34** -0.01 -0.01 -0.23* -0.24** -0.17** -0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) 
CTOVC*Post 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.29* 0.25* 0.12 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.20) (0.18) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) 
CTOVC * Risk  -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.22) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) 
Risk*Post  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.01 -0.00 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.20) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) 
CTOVC * Risk * 
Post  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.31 -0.28 -0.02 -0.02 -0.31 -0.30 -0.09 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.25) (0.24) (0.04) (0.05) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) 
                         
Observations 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 1,402 1,401 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 






























VARIABLES                
                       
CT-OVC 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 1.60*** 1.20*** 0.07 0.07 -0.19 -0.36 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.43) (0.43) (0.07) (0.08) (0.30) (0.76) (0.05) (0.05) 
Risk Preference -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 0.35 -0.04 0.03 -0.86*** -0.62 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.45) (0.38) (0.07) (0.08) (0.31) (0.74) (0.05) (0.06) 
Post  0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.53 0.41 0.00 -0.01 -0.56** -0.63 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.42) (0.37) (0.06) (0.07) (0.28) (0.72) (0.05) (0.04) 




1.37*** -0.08 -0.10 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.51) (0.50) (0.08) (0.09) (0.35) (0.75) (0.06) (0.06) 
CTOVC * Risk  0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.98* -0.59 -0.06 -0.05 0.39 0.59 0.02 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.55) (0.55) (0.09) (0.10) (0.38) (0.78) (0.07) (0.07) 
Risk*Post  0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.64 -0.73 0.00 -0.03 0.69* 0.58 0.07 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.53) (0.47) (0.08) (0.09) (0.36) (0.76) (0.06) (0.07) 
CTOVC * Risk * 
Post  0.10 0.12 0.06 0.08 1.33** 1.23* 0.10 0.12 -0.28 -0.33 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.66) (0.64) (0.10) (0.12) (0.45) (0.81) (0.08) (0.08) 
                         
Observations 1,526 1,526 1,495 1,495 1,117 1,117 1,510 1,510 1,192 1,192 1,280 1,280 
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 











Appendix B3.2: Results using continuous economic preference measure 
 
Table B3.2.a Time preference effect on CT-OVC impact on general healthcare use  
  





from a healthcare 
worker 
         
                  
CT-OVC -0.102 -0.079 0.057 0.041 0.129 0.118 0.124 0.125 
 (0.104) (0.114) (0.077) (0.104) (0.134) (0.184) (0.084) (0.115) 
Time Preference 0.025 0.016 0.003 0.002 -0.020 -0.018 0.003 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.039) (0.016) (0.023) 
Post  0.282*** 0.228** 0.126 0.083 0.041 -0.048 -0.062 -0.121 
 (0.091) (0.100) (0.080) (0.092) (0.130) (0.162) (0.087) (0.117) 
CTOVC*Post 0.078 0.070 -0.113 -0.100 -0.094 0.023 0.023 0.033 
 (0.117) (0.124) (0.103) (0.134) (0.171) (0.195) (0.113) (0.142) 
CTOVC * Time 0.015 0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.019 -0.008 -0.036* -0.040 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.019) (0.025) (0.035) (0.046) (0.021) (0.028) 
Time*Post  -0.038* -0.028 -0.021 -0.011 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.022 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.041) (0.022) (0.028) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  -0.014 -0.013 0.028 0.023 0.038 -0.001 0.028 0.026 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033) (0.043) (0.050) (0.028) (0.035) 
         
Observations 2,356 2,355 1,877 1,877 548 548 1,800 1,800 
R-squared 0.024 0.119 0.004 0.099 0.027 0.099 0.020 0.063 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 




























             
                          
CT-OVC 0.073 0.092 0.074 0.089 0.398 0.546 0.050 0.043 0.019 0.058 0.127 0.122 
 (0.072) (0.079) (0.062) (0.074) (0.355) (0.345) (0.080) (0.087) (0.331) (0.340) (0.096) (0.120) 
Time Preference -0.006 -0.010 -0.002 -0.009 0.064 0.053 -0.004 -0.012 0.013 -0.005 0.023 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.065) (0.062) (0.015) (0.015) (0.061) (0.055) (0.018) (0.024) 
Post  0.071 0.048 0.083 0.059 0.623** 0.449 0.055 -0.004 0.067 -0.182 -0.000 -0.059 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.054) (0.059) (0.298) (0.279) (0.068) (0.069) (0.280) (0.264) (0.083) (0.115) 
CTOVC*Post -0.068 -0.085 -0.089 -0.092 -0.262 -0.277 -0.071 -0.055 -0.087 -0.030 -0.036 -0.037 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.070) (0.079) (0.396) (0.386) (0.090) (0.089) (0.367) (0.325) (0.108) (0.128) 
CTOVC * Time -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.019 -0.049 -0.001 0.002 -0.022 -0.034 -0.038 -0.039 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.086) (0.084) (0.019) (0.021) (0.080) (0.076) (0.023) (0.028) 
Time*Post  -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.130* -0.102 -0.005 0.003 -0.057 -0.017 -0.029 -0.021 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.073) (0.067) (0.017) (0.017) (0.069) (0.055) (0.020) (0.026) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  0.004 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.027 0.021 0.009 0.003 0.047 0.019 0.032 0.025 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.096) (0.094) (0.022) (0.022) (0.089) (0.075) (0.026) (0.030) 
             
Observations 2,217 2,216 2,190 2,189 1,936 1,935 2,208 2,207 1,998 1,997 2,007 2,006 
R-squared 0.005 0.043 0.007 0.050 0.010 0.093 0.002 0.061 0.002 0.075 0.011 0.142 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 















Table B3.2.c Risk preference effect on CT-OVC impact on general healthcare use  
  





from a healthcare 
worker 
                  
CT-OVC 0.125* 0.077 -0.036 -0.057 -0.007 -0.002 -0.078 -0.102 
 (0.068) (0.082) (0.055) (0.070) (0.105) (0.141) (0.061) (0.088) 
Risk Preference 0.001 0.008 -0.013 -0.009 0.010 0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.013) 
Post  0.185*** 0.173*** 0.082* 0.046 0.064 0.024 -0.048 -0.091 
 (0.046) (0.056) (0.046) (0.058) (0.078) (0.088) (0.051) (0.068) 
CTOVC*Post -0.165** -0.144* 0.003 0.016 0.093 0.099 0.227*** 0.253*** 
 (0.070) (0.076) (0.063) (0.079) (0.114) (0.140) (0.070) (0.094) 
CTOVC * Risk  -0.048*** -0.033* 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.019 0.021 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.014) (0.020) 
Risk*Post  -0.012* -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) 
CTOVC * Risk * Post  0.053*** 0.045*** -0.004 -0.008 -0.014 -0.022 -0.028* -0.033* 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.023) (0.027) (0.014) (0.019) 
         
Observations 2,356 2,355 1,877 1,877 548 548 1,800 1,800 
R-squared 0.027 0.123 0.004 0.099 0.027 0.100 0.018 0.060 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 




























VARIABLES                
                       
CT-OVC 0.082* 0.072 0.048 0.044 0.333 0.205 0.066 0.039 -0.039 -0.229 -0.009 -0.040 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.040) (0.050) (0.222) (0.258) (0.051) (0.061) (0.206) (0.366) (0.061) (0.064) 
Risk Preference -0.007 -0.003 -0.011** -0.007 -0.061** -0.044* -0.007 -0.003 -0.036 -0.028 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.026) (0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.028) (0.007) (0.009) 
Post  0.092*** 0.083** 0.074*** 0.070* 0.381** 0.320 0.053 0.028 -0.032 -0.135 -0.070* -0.111** 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.027) (0.038) (0.150) (0.204) (0.034) (0.046) (0.139) (0.268) (0.042) (0.046) 
CTOVC*Post -0.171*** -0.179*** -0.108** -0.101* -0.401* -0.365 -0.116** -0.104 -0.150 -0.094 0.133** 0.106* 
 (0.049) (0.063) (0.042) (0.058) (0.232) (0.294) (0.053) (0.066) (0.214) (0.314) (0.064) (0.059) 
CTOVC * Risk  -0.009 -0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.045 -0.007 0.002 -0.010 0.044 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.048) (0.054) (0.011) (0.013) (0.044) (0.049) (0.013) (0.015) 




0.069*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.032* -0.031 -0.010* -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.027) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.007) 
CTOVC * Risk * 
Post  0.034*** 0.032** 0.018** 0.015 0.071 0.046 0.022** 0.017 0.070 0.038 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.047) (0.057) (0.011) (0.013) (0.043) (0.045) (0.013) (0.012) 
                         
Observations 2,217 2,216 2,190 2,189 1,936 1,935 2,208 2,207 1,998 1,997 2,007 2,006 
R-squared 0.014 0.055 0.012 0.055 0.013 0.096 0.004 0.064 0.005 0.078 0.013 0.141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 














Appendix B3.3: Weighted regressions  
 
Table B3.3.a Time preference effect on CT-OVC impact on general healthcare use (weighted regressions) 
  





from a healthcare 
worker 
         
                  
CT-OVC 0.140 -0.0131 -0.192** -0.0285 -0.152 -0.0408 0.0626 0.00118 
 (0.135) (0.0510) (0.0805) (0.0729) (0.0959) (0.0436) (0.0624) (0.0371) 
Time Preference 0.456*** 0.321*** -0.646*** -0.504*** -0.160 -0.0335 0.0501 0.0279 
 (0.155) (0.0907) (0.193) (0.174) (0.141) (0.103) (0.110) (0.106) 
Post  0.286** 0.329*** -0.158* -0.227** -0.160 -0.0717 0.102 0.0381 
 (0.131) (0.0514) (0.0810) (0.0924) (0.101) (0.0512) (0.0647) (0.0451) 
CTOVC*Post -0.137 -0.00784 0.306*** 0.169* 0.279*** 0.159*** -0.0638 -0.000417 
 (0.135) (0.0565) (0.0979) (0.0873) (0.106) (0.0582) (0.0713) (0.0508) 
CTOVC * Time -0.552*** -0.368*** 0.860*** 0.796*** 0.0297 -0.0745 -0.0223 0.0201 
 (0.177) (0.119) (0.211) (0.201) (0.155) (0.122) (0.126) (0.121) 
Time*Post  -0.431*** -0.263** 0.378 0.270 0.188 0.0492 -0.219 -0.153 
 (0.164) (0.110) (0.248) (0.223) (0.177) (0.147) (0.134) (0.129) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  0.584*** 0.388*** -0.599** -0.642** -0.129 -0.00637 0.143 0.0672 
 (0.188) (0.137) (0.269) (0.253) (0.196) (0.170) (0.158) (0.153) 
         
Observations 2,355 2,355 548 548 1,800 1,800 1,877 1,877 
R-squared 0.054 0.276 0.069 0.201 0.023 0.110 0.011 0.133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 

























                
                       
CT-OVC 0.330* 0.124*** 0.338* 0.127*** 1.353* 0.595*** 0.322* 0.107** 0.765 0.0594 -0.0177 -0.00808 
 (0.190) (0.0360) (0.189) (0.0350) (0.694) (0.170) (0.182) (0.0434) (0.632) (0.361) (0.0454) (0.0410) 
Time Preference 0.424** 0.217*** 0.413** 0.190*** 1.675** 0.950*** 0.442** 0.236*** 1.160* 0.510 0.104* 0.112* 
 (0.190) (0.0337) (0.189) (0.0321) (0.723) (0.235) (0.181) (0.0383) (0.642) (0.319) (0.0581) (0.0588) 





 (0.186) (0.0355) (0.185) (0.0353) (0.673) (0.177) (0.178) (0.0426) (0.619) (0.368) (0.0425) (0.0491) 
CTOVC*Post -0.320* -0.127*** -0.311* 
-
0.106*** -1.174* -0.424** -0.299* -0.103** -0.697 
-
0.0274 0.0869* 0.0688 
 (0.187) (0.0380) (0.185) (0.0370) (0.681) (0.185) (0.179) (0.0452) (0.624) (0.356) (0.0506) (0.0474) 












1.461** -0.633 -0.127 -0.110 
 (0.199) (0.0703) (0.195) (0.0615) (0.779) (0.336) (0.193) (0.0719) (0.685) (0.404) (0.0966) (0.0884) 








0.246*** -1.100* -0.306 -0.0778 -0.104 
 (0.190) (0.0550) (0.188) (0.0510) (0.727) (0.293) (0.184) (0.0611) (0.654) (0.452) (0.0829) (0.0853) 
CTOVC * Time * Post  0.464** 0.255*** 0.473** 0.269*** 2.161*** 1.266*** 0.523*** 0.315*** 1.290* 0.310 -0.0231 -0.00948 
 (0.202) (0.0892) (0.196) (0.0760) (0.791) (0.405) (0.198) (0.0918) (0.703) (0.519) (0.115) (0.112) 
             
Observations 2,216 2,216 2,189 2,189 1,935 1,935 2,207 2,207 1,997 1,997 2,006 2,006 
R-squared 0.098 0.308 0.129 0.364 0.084 0.273 0.086 0.283 0.026 0.179 0.013 0.134 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 











Table B3.3.c: Risk preference effect on CT-OVC impact on general healthcare use (weighted regressions) 
  




Received vitamins from 
a healthcare worker 
                  
CT-OVC 0.0189 0.00331 0.0374 0.108 -0.135* -0.135** -0.0533 -0.0667 
 (0.0807) (0.0856) (0.130) (0.125) (0.0692) (0.0660) (0.0688) (0.0632) 
Risk Preference -0.262* -0.0199 0.335*** 0.200* 0.0796 -0.0284 -0.180** -0.0993 
 (0.156) (0.0910) (0.123) (0.121) (0.126) (0.0698) (0.0839) (0.0667) 
Post  0.0926 0.294*** 0.112 -0.0237 -0.0443 -0.0650 -0.0389 -0.0384 
 (0.0816) (0.0862) (0.128) (0.124) (0.0785) (0.0756) (0.0837) (0.0741) 
CTOVC*Post 0.0799 -0.0359 -0.157 -0.0766 0.000872 0.144* 0.162* 0.111 
 (0.165) (0.102) (0.150) (0.148) (0.133) (0.0824) (0.0930) (0.0760) 
CTOVC * Risk  0.0799 -0.0359 -0.157 -0.0766 0.000872 0.144* 0.162* 0.111 
 (0.165) (0.102) (0.150) (0.148) (0.133) (0.0824) (0.0930) (0.0760) 
Risk*Post  0.221 0.0310 -0.271* -0.165 -0.147 -0.0154 0.143 0.0862 
 (0.159) (0.0989) (0.149) (0.139) (0.143) (0.0916) (0.105) (0.0856) 
CTOVC * Risk * Post  -0.0225 0.0980 0.101 0.0479 0.0783 -0.0824 -0.140 -0.0938 
 (0.170) (0.112) (0.178) (0.170) (0.154) (0.108) (0.117) (0.0994) 
         
Observations 2,607 2,607 633 633 1,992 1,992 2,073 2,073 
R-squared 0.057 0.265 0.060 0.163 0.020 0.102 0.015 0.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 




























VARIABLES                
                       
CT-OVC 0.0169 -0.00312 0.0167 0.00241 0.0968 -0.0253 -0.00465 -0.0207 -0.856 -0.913 -0.0760* -0.0810* 
 (0.0473) (0.0500) (0.0430) (0.0456) (0.234) (0.232) (0.0470) (0.0522) (0.810) (0.801) (0.0428) (0.0443) 
Risk Preference -0.345* -0.0605 -0.357* -0.0662 
-
1.489** -0.407* -0.385** -0.100* -2.034** -1.182 -0.103* -0.102** 
 (0.207) (0.0525) (0.206) (0.0504) (0.745) (0.245) (0.196) (0.0589) (0.962) (0.756) (0.0530) (0.0497) 
Post  0.0353 0.132*** 0.0435 0.124*** 0.0238 0.270 -0.0156 0.0649 -0.945 -0.655 -0.162*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0471) (0.0380) (0.0451) (0.203) (0.235) (0.0405) (0.0516) (0.806) (0.783) (0.0397) (0.0458) 
CTOVC*Post -0.0877* -0.0815 -0.0543 -0.0445 -0.180 -0.0951 -0.0183 -0.0172 0.788 0.806 0.163*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0526) (0.0463) (0.0479) (0.252) (0.246) (0.0516) (0.0557) (0.814) (0.794) (0.0544) (0.0554) 
CTOVC * Risk  0.312 0.114* 0.331 0.125** 1.158 0.618** 0.332* 0.135* 1.792* 1.360* 0.0668 0.0866 
 (0.210) (0.0651) (0.209) (0.0608) (0.765) (0.299) (0.200) (0.0716) (0.971) (0.794) (0.0697) (0.0648) 
Risk*Post  0.290 0.0335 0.286 0.0192 1.072 0.104 0.323* 0.0624 1.837* 1.069 0.111* 0.112* 
 (0.202) (0.0548) (0.201) (0.0542) (0.729) (0.261) (0.192) (0.0635) (0.958) (0.749) (0.0644) (0.0591) 
CTOVC * Risk * 
Post  -0.196 0.00945 -0.228 -0.0158 -0.796 -0.189 -0.241 -0.0378 -1.580 -1.110 -0.124 -0.136* 
 (0.206) (0.0691) (0.204) (0.0651) (0.755) (0.321) (0.197) (0.0770) (0.970) (0.787) (0.0814) (0.0764) 
                         
Observations 2,462 2,462 2,433 2,433 2,156 2,156 2,452 2,452 2,224 2,224 2,225 2,225 
R-squared 0.103 0.287 0.136 0.337 0.094 0.261 0.093 0.252 0.068 0.183 0.010 0.130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for child’s age, caregiver age, caregiver education, caregiver 








Appendix B4: Data check using healthcare card as an example 
 n probability 
Overall:   
CT-OVC=0, POST=0 219 0.5662 
CT-OVC=0, POST=1 781 0.717 
CT-OVC=1, POST=0 365 0.526 
CT-OVC=1, POST=1 1428 0.6926 
Time preference=1:     
CT-OVC=0, POST=0 17 0.8235 
CT-OVC=0, POST=1 54 0.6481 
CT-OVC=1, POST=0 43 0.4651 
CT-OVC=1, POST=1 166 0.741 
Time preference=0:     
CT-OVC=0, POST=0 174 0.5402 
CT-OVC=0, POST=1 646 0.7136 
CT-OVC=1, POST=0 287 0.5331 
CT-OVC=1, POST=1 1121 0.6851 
 
In the table above, the interaction of time preference=1, CT-OVC=0 and POST=0 is driven by a 
small sample size (n=17) yet the probability of having a healthcare card is the highest 0.8235. This 
is the pattern with all the outcomes (receiving a BCG, polio or flu vaccination) where the n is small 




























Appendix C1: Replication of prior analysis examining the effectiveness of the CT-OVC 
 
The original effectiveness study reported using a 3-level GLLAMM model using adaptive quadrature 
with 12 numerical integration points (nips).15 Based on these specifications, our GLLAMM could not 
converge and this could be due to differences in other specifications of the gllamm command in stata that 
the authors may have ran. The GLLAMM model presented here only specifies the link as logit. We obtain 
an odds ratio of 0.535 (95% CI 0.336-0.851) compared to the reported 0.556. Despite the slight difference 
in the odds ratio, the confidence intervals we estimate (95% CI 0.336-0.851) overlap the 0.556 odds ratio. 
The difference in odds ratio is due to the specification of the -gllamm- command in stata that the authors 





Table C1: Three-level GLAMM model, CT-OVC on pneumonia/malaria in children 
 Pneumonia/ Malaria Standard errors 
Treatment effect 0.535*** (0.127) 
Year 1.242 (0.253) 
Treatment status 1.975* (0.808) 
Ref: Age: 5 – 7 years   
Age: under 1 year 1.734* (0.493) 
Age: 1 – under 3 years) 1.792*** (0.335) 
Age: 3 – under 5 years 1.079 (0.162) 
Sex of child 0.855 (0.113) 
Orphan status 0.852 (0.132) 
Child/Grandchild 0.836 (0.227) 
Female household head 0.904 (0.154) 
Age of household head 0.991** (0.00407) 
Household head education  1.009 (0.0195) 
Rural 1.423 (0.324) 
Mosquito net 0.969 (0.152) 
Unprotected/open water source 1.297 (0.206) 
Poor cook fuel quality  1.234 (2.099) 
Crowding index 0.947 (0.0333) 
Asset/wealth index 0.939 (0.0614) 
Food insecurity 1.384** (0.229) 
Food expenditures 1.000 (0.000104) 
Food variety 1.041* (0.0225) 
Constant 0.853 (1.542) 












Appendix C2: Summary of debate on analytical decisions, discussion of proposed approach’s and justification for decisions 




Study perspectives  The WHO guide to cost-effectiveness 
recommends that the societal perspective be 
included.123 
 
The US panel on cost-effectiveness 
recommends conducting cost-effectiveness 
studies from both the health care perspective 
and from the society perspective.191  
The perspectives upon which a CEA analysis 
can be conducted: 
1. The healthcare perspective involves 
the viewpoint from the formal 
medical sector191 
2. The society perspective includes the 
view point that includes all costs and 
health effects no matter who incurs 
them.191 
 
I conduct the study 
from the societal and 
healthcare perspective. 
I conduct this study 
from the societal 
perspective based on 
recommendations and 
because there are 
patients’ costs 
associated with 
receiving the CT-OVC 
and the status quo that 
need to be taken into 
account to fully assess 
the economic costs and 
consequences. I also 
include the healthcare 
perspective costs 
because of the 
relevance to policy 




If the probability that a value is missing is 
correlated with certain determinants, this can 
lead to estimation bias.123 
 
 
Approach to address missing data: 
1. Missing data can be imputed if data 
is not missing in a systematic way. 
123 
I assess whether the 
differences between the 
study sample and the 
excluded sample are 
statistically significant 
differences between 
treatment and control 
groups. If there is not 
statistical difference, it 







study sample will be 
biased. 
Cost components 
(direct versus indirect 
costs) 
Direct costs include health-related costs. 
Indirect costs are health-unrelated costs and 
capture the real cost of the disease and real 
efforts to prevent the disease.123 
 
According to the WHO guide to cost 
effectiveness, recommends including both 
direct and indirect costs.123 
 
The US panel on cost-effectiveness 
recommends including both indirect and 
direct cost.191 
- I include both direct 
and indirect costs. 
Approach for price 
level 
As domestic price levels are usually higher 
than world market prices in almost all 
economies, it is important to bring resources 
into a common basis so as to aggregate them 
into a cost estimate for a health 
intervention.123 This involves choosing a 
price-level (domestic or world market price) 
and a currency (national or domestic).123 
 
The WHO guide to cost-effectiveness 
recommends that the world price is the most 
appropriate starting point as these prices 
represent the terms upon which a country 
can trade.123 This means that internationally 
traded goods are valued at their traded prices 
or “international prices”, representing how 
much foreign-exchange a country gave up to 
purchase these goods.123 Non-tradable goods 
are subject to local market conditions and the 
international prices may not reflect the true 
opportunity costs. The recommendation to 
use international prices is also for 
- I will use the world 
market price or 
international price level 
as this facilitates 
comparison from 
studies across different 
settings. In addition, as 
this study includes 
tradable goods, the 
international price 
reflects the true 
opportunity cost for 









The US second panel on cost-effectiveness 
in health and medicine has no 
recommendations on approach to price 
level.124 
 
Although, further recommendation is that 
studies done in a country should reflect 
prices for their own setting, and other 
research from a different setting should 




The WHO guide to cost-effectiveness 
recommends valuing traded goods in 
international prices and non-traded goods in 
local market prices when price and cost 
information is not available from their study 
setting. Doing this will reflect the true 
opportunity costs to a country by accounting 
for the tradable and non-tradable goods that 
cannot simply be aggregated by taking these 
prices at face value. This involves revaluing 
non-tradable goods to international prices 
while traded goods will be adjusted to 
include the cost, insurance and freight for 
imported goods.123 Non-traded goods should 
be valued using the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) 
 
The US second panel on cost-effectiveness 
in health and medicine has no 
recommendations on approach to treating 
tradable and non-tradable goods.124 
Methods for valuing tradable and non-
tradable goods into a common basis: 
1. Traded goods should be valued as 
they are in international prices and 
non-traded goods should be 
converted using the purchasing-
power parity (PPP).154 The 
international price for traded goods 
should be used if there is no reason 
to believe the price would vary in 
that country.154 Variation may 
include for instance availability of a 
generic drug or domestic transport 
costs. 
I will distinguish 
between tradable and 
non-tradable goods. 
Tradable goods include 
medications and 
equipment, while non-
tradable goods include 
labor patient and 
transportation costs. I 
will use the 
international price of 
the traded goods as 
there is no reason to 
believe the prices 
would vary in Kenya – 
for instance, it is 
unlikely that there is a 
generic drug available 
in Kenya. I will use the 
PPP for non-traded 
goods. 
Currency choice The WHO guide to cost-effectiveness 
recommends that studies done in a country 
The following are the reporting currency 
choices and advantage and disadvantages:  
I report costs in US ($) 







should report costs in the local currency as 
other researchers can convert the estimates 
from their study to that which is relevant to 
them.123 
 
The US second panel on cost-effectiveness 
only recommends that the type of currency 
should be stated.124 
 
 
1. International dollars: The 
international dollars are a 
hypothetical currency used to 
translate and compare costs from one 
country to another. Therefore, it 
allows for comparability with other 
studies as it captures the difference in 
purchasing power.123 However, the 
fact that this is a hypothetical 
currency means it may not be that 
meaningful when contextualizing the 
results of the study 
2. US ($): The advantage of using is 
that it is a commonly used 
international currency. Reporting in 
US$ may be relevant for donors.154 
3. Local currency: Local currency is 
relevant for local policy makers.154 
However, it limits comparability to 
other studies 
comparability with 
other studies and for 
the ease of 
contextualizing the 
findings.  
Year for reporting 
costs 
It is recommended to inflation adjust to the 
year in which the results will be reported.155  
- I choose to report costs 
based on the most 
recent year with GDP 
deflator from the World 
Bank is available.156 
Inflation adjustment  When the costs in the study are obtained 
from different time periods, it is important to 
adjust for inflation.  
 
The WHO guide to cost-effectiveness 
recommends using the health component of 
the (Gross Domestic Product) GDP 
deflator.123 When that is not available the 
GDP deflator should be used. If the GDP 
deflator is not available, the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) should be used. The CPI is only 
The approaches for inflation adjustment are as 
follows: 
1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
deflator. The GDP deflator is the price 
index that measures the change in the 
price level compared to real output.123 
The advantage of the GDP deflator 
incorporates all aspects of the 
economy and the annual price 
change.123 
I select the GDP 
deflator as this is the 
recommended by the 
WHO. It is also the 








appropriate if the price in question is 
changing at the rate of the general price 
inflation.123  
 
The US panel on cost-effectiveness states 
that there is no gold standard for inflation 
adjustment.191 
 
2. Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI 
reflects the change in the cost of the 
average consumer purchasing a fixed 
basket of goods and services.123 The 
advantage is that the CPI is a 
commonly used measure that can be 
generated for specific 
commodities.155,191 The CPI includes 
a medical component that can be used 
to adjust for medical health 
services.155 The disadvantage is that 
the CPI medical component is not 
available for Kenya. It is also 
questionable if the choice of goods 
and services in the basket reflects 
health costs as a whole.123 
3. Personal Consumption Expenditure 
(PCE). The PCE reflects all personal 
expenditure, such as medical 
expenditure.192 However, the PCE 
does not include government 
investments and expenditures.192 It is 
also not available for Kenya 
4. Personal HealthCare (PHC) 
Expenditure is proposed for disease-
specific costs  




The WHO recommends adjusting for 
inflation and then applying the exchange 
rate154 
The order for inflation adjustment and 
exchange rate: 
1. Inflation adjust and then apply the 
exchange rate 
I adjust for inflation 
before applying the 
exchange rate 
Discount rates for 
health effects  
The WHO-CHOICE recommends a 
discount rate of 3% and a rate of 6% in the 
sensitivity analysis.123 
- I discount health effects 
using a discount rate of 
3% 
Discount rate for 
costs  
Discounting is the process of converting 
future cost to their present value.123 
 
- I discount costs at a 







The US Panel on cost-effectiveness 
recommends valuing costs at the same rate 
as the health effects.191 
Confidence intervals 
for ICER 
The confidence intervals for cost-
effectiveness ratios provide probabilistic 
values within which one can be confident 
that the true ratio lies.155 There is no 
recommendation from the WHO guide to 
cost-effectiveness or from the US panel on 
cost-effectiveness on which approach to use 
for estimating the confidence intervals. 
 
 
The approaches to estimating confidence 
intervals:155 
1. Nonparametric bootstrap methods: 
This involves creating replications of 
the statistic of interest by sampling 
and replacing the original data. 
1.1 Bootstrap percentile method: 
This method uses ordered 
replicates to identify a 
confidence interval  
1.2 Bootstrap acceptability method: 
This method does not involve 
ordering of the replicates 
This method does not require any 
assumption about the distribution of 
the ratio.193 
2. Fiellers method: This method is 
based on the assumption that the 
difference in the arithmetic mean 
effect and the arithmetic mean cost 
has a normal distribution.155 This 
method assumes the numerator and 
denominator follows a bivariate 
normal distribution.193  
 
The Fiellers method takes into account the 
skewness of the data.193 However, depending 
on the rigor of non-parametric bootstrap, the 
confidence intervals produced are similar to 
those from a parametric method.193 
I use nonparametric 
bootstrap method to 
estimate the confidence 
intervals for the ICER 
Performance of the 
CCT (Willingness-to-
pay (WTP) threshold) 
The WHO Choosing Interventions that 
are Cost-Effective or WHO-CHOICE 
recommends a WTP threshold of three times 
- I use a WTP threshold 
of 3 times the GDP per-







the per-capita GDP.159 One times the per-
capita GDP is considered to be highly cost-
effective.159 
of once the GDP per 
capita for the CT-OVC 








Appendix C3: Variable definition in model on effectiveness  
Variable  Definition  
Post 1= post-baseline period; 0=baseline period 
Treatment status 1= child is in household that received CT-OVC vs 0=not in CT-OVC 
household 
Age Age of child (under 1 year, 1-2 years, 3-4 years, 5-7 years) 
Male child 1= male child; 0=female child  
Orphan status 1= child is orphan; 0= child is not an orphan 
Child/Grandchild 1= child is the son/daughter/grandchild of the household head; 0= 
child is not the son/daughter/grandchild of the household head 
Female household head 1= female household head; 0=male household head 
Age of household head Continuous variable for age of household head 
Household head 
education  
1= household head has more than high school; 0= less than high 
school  
Rural 1= household in rural area; 0= household not in rural area 




1= Households that did not source their drinking water from natural 
sources obtained water via pipes into the dwelling or compound, 
public outdoor tap or borehole with a pump, protected well or spring, 
mobile vendor, or purchased from a neighbor 0=natural sources of 
water 
 Poor cook fuel quality 1= Households that used paraffin, kerosene, firewood, charcoal, 
residue, animal waste, or grasses were coded as using poor cook fuel. 
0=Acceptable cook fuels included electricity and gas  
Crowding index Ratio of household size to number of rooms 
Food insecurity 1= low food availability in the community; 0=higher food availability 
in the community  
Food expenditure Amount of money spent on a variety of food items 
Food variety  Total number of different foods consumed  





















Appendix C4: Review of statistical models to estimate treatment effect in cluster-randomized 
trials with binary outcome 




The GEE estimates the change in the 
population mean given changes in the 
covariates while accounting for within 
neighborhood dependence.158 This 
approach eliminates the need for 
determining the link and family.155 The 
population average model provides a 
more relevant approximation of the 
truth.158 
The GEE is not recommended for 
cluster-randomized trials with few 
clusters (less than 20 clusters across 
treatment groups).194,195 
Logistic Regression  Commonly used and widely 
acceptable  
Does not permit multiple levels of 
clustering15 
Generalized Linear 
Latent and Mixed 
Models (GLLAMM) 
Allows for nesting of hierarchical data  
when levels are expected to influence 
outcomes.15 
Requires assumptions that cannot be 
tested by the data.158 
 
The Stata command has not been 
updated since 2004 and may not work 
well with newer versions of Stata 
Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM) 
Model both the mean and variance on 
the original cost data.155 The GLM 
relaxes the OLS assumption of 
linearity and homoskedasticity.155 To 
estimate the arithmetic mean involves 
simply exponentiating the predicted 
results.155 
 
The GLM with a gamma distribution is 
robust to violations of distributional 
assumptions.155 
 
The GLM model can be extended to 
account for nested data  
Misspecification of the family (that 
is, guassian, poisson or gamma) lead 
to a loss in efficiency, however, the 
estimates will be correctly 
specified.155 The correct family can 
be specified using a Parks test.155  
 
There is no test to specify the correct 
link function, which can result in bias 
of the results.155 
I select to use the Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) as the model provides population average 
estimates and does not require distributional assumptions. Further, this study has 28 clusters and the GEE 




















Appendix C5: Statistical methods for estimating incremental costs 




The GLM models both the mean and 
variance on the original cost data.155 The 
GLM relaxes the OLS assumption of 
linearity and homoskedasticity.155 
Modelling with a log link differs from the 
OLS on log-transformed because it 
models the log of the arithmetic mean as 
opposed to the arithmetic mean of log-
cost.155 To estimate the arithmetic mean 
involves simply exponentiating the 
predicted results.155 
The GLM with a gamma distribution is 
robust to violations of distributional 
assumptions.155 
Misspecification of the family (that is, 
guassian, poisson or gamma) lead to a 
loss in efficiency, however, the 
estimates will be correctly specified.155 
The correct family can be specified 
using a Parks test.155 
 
There is no test to specify the correct 
link function, which can result in bias 




Estimates the population mean and does 
not require distributional assumptions.158 
This approach eliminates the need for 
determining the link and family.155 The 
population average model provides a more 
relevant approximation of the truth.158 
The GEE is not recommended for 
cluster-randomized trials with few 




Allow for the correlation of costs and 
recognize clustering.195 Assumes a normal 
distribution on the error term.195 
The model may fail to converge if 
there are few individuals in a cluster.195 
This model assumes an unverifiable 
assumption of the data-generating 
distribution that can lead to misleading 






The transformed cost data may have a 
normal distribution and this assumption 
for the OLS to produce efficient estimates 
may not be violated.155 
The estimates and inferences made 
about the log-transformed estimate 
may not apply to the arithmetic 







The OLS model is easy to implement and 
readily understood.155 
As healthcare cost data often violate 
the assumptions of OLS (normality), 
the variance of the estimate is affected. 
155 Further, the model results will be 
prone to highly skewed data.155 
Sample/arithmetic 
mean: 





This measure is simple measure that 
informs policy-makes on cost of adopting 
an intervention.155 
There is limited power of the tests in 
differences between treatment and 
controls.155 Further, it does not account 
for differences in economic conditions 
or subgroups.155 
I select to use the Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) as the model provides population average 
estimates and does not require distributional assumptions. Further, this study has 28 clusters and the GEE 








Appendix C6: Sensitivity analysis 
 
Table C6: Cost-effectiveness for complete case analysis  
 Healthcare perspective Societal perspective 
 Estimate 95% CI* Estimate 95% CI* 
Incremental effectiveness (DALYs 
averted) 
0.002 [0.002 – 
0.002] 
0.002 [0.002 – 
0.002] 
Incremental cost (US$) 376.23 [363.34- 
389.12] 
763.90 [737.77 – 
790.04] 




Abbreviations: CI, confidence intervals; DALYs, disability adjusted life years; ICER, incremental 
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